Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

147. Paper Prepared by the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant (Bohlen)⁰

Washington, July 2, 1962.

IMPRESSIONS IN REGARD TO UNITED STATES-EUROPEAN RELATIONS

As compared to previous times that I have been to Europe in the last few years, this was the first time that we went to various capitals in the same visit, which gave me an opportunity to judge some of the general questions which will be of importance for our relations with that continent in the fairly immediate future.

It is perhaps difficult for an American fully to understand how much their dependence upon the United States in the immediate post war period was resented by the Europeans. These nations, and I am now speaking only of the larger ones—in particular France—have a long tradition of independent political and economic action and occupied a primacy of place in world affairs, which it is extremely difficult for them to forget. In the case of France, there is also the element of a guilt complex arising from the fact that it was only thanks to the efforts of the United States and the United Kingdom that France survived the war at all. The defeat of 1940 has left a very definite psychological influence which affects, in no small measure, the policies of France at the present time. Added to this is the memory of Suez in 1956 and the unbroken string of French postwar defeats in Colonial questions. Sentiments which are psychological and subjective, have found their true expression in General de Gaulle. His own writings reveal how much he bitterly resented the necessity of being dependent on the United States and the United Kingdom during the war years, and how vigorously he sought to circumvent or overcome this dependence whenever possible. To some extent, this feeling of now being in a position to get out from under the tutelage of the United States, which in European eyes was always tremendously exaggerated, is present in all European countries in varying degrees. I am sure that we all recognize the fact that Europe is now a self-supporting entity and we must expect, therefore, that they will be much more inclined not to accept American views on international questions. I am not speaking here of the specifically European differences which we have had in the past, such as on the Colonial question, but rather a change in European psychology brought on by European recovery and the consequent watering-down of the American predominant position in the world.

It is against this background that we should look at what unquestionably will be the biggest single political issue in the not-too-distant future; namely, that of the ability of some of the European countries, individually or together, to produce a nuclear capability. I say in the relatively near future since the question of England’s joining the Common Market will undoubtedly have a major effect on the development of this question, but also because a certain amount of time will be necessary before any such nuclear capability appears on the continent. The main choice that we will have to think about is whether or not this capability is to be on a purely national basis or whether it can be directed into some all-European form; in other words, multinational. In either case, this will require a very careful study on the part of the United States as to our relationship to this capability, and keeping in view the very real possibility that some changes will have to be made in the McMahon Act if we are to preserve good relations with the European community or the individual members thereof.

In addition to the historic and traditional reasons which will impel Europe towards this capability, there are some of a more practical nature, involving the whole complex of defense and armaments. While it may not be immediately apparent, there is, in my opinion, unquestionably a connection between the development of the nuclear arm and the development of conventional forces. While Europe was weak and in the process of recovery, this factor did not emerge. But if nations are told that they will have no voice in the major weapons of war upon which their security and future depend, they may well tend to regard the money and resources required for the development of conventional forces as not worthwhile. There is some truth in the thesis that the ability to act in its own defense is an attribute of sovereignty and that if nations are told that their real defense, which will be in the nuclear field, will be in the hands of others, they will recoil from the sacrifices necessary to build up the conventional forces. I do not mean this as an absolute thesis because there will, in any event, be a considerable European conventional force in being, but merely as a intangible factor which does play on the whole complex of an adequate defense. This is particularly true in Europe proper since it is extremely difficult to see how conventional forces on the continent of Europe, given its division, could ever play an important part in an actual war—almost certain to be nuclear from its inception.

France

The attitude of the French, and especially your talk with de Gaulle,¹ seems to indicate a certain relaxation in their attitude to many of the international questions. This seemed to be true particularly in regard to the Berlin discussions and I imagine that de Gaulle’s statement to you that these talks had not produced the dangerous reaction in Germany that he had expected, is probably a true expression of his views. In addition, there may well be the feeling that France was being left out of a process in which the United States was, in effect, carrying the ball for the whole Western world. It may, therefore, be that France will be more disposed to enter into the Berlin discussions with us and the British than has been the case for almost the last year.

On the nuclear question, there was uniform conviction from everyone I talked with in Paris, whether French or foreign, that France was going to go ahead with the development of a nuclear armament no matter what the cost in the way of diversion of funds and resources from other tasks which we might consider more urgent. While in theory and in practice this small and ineffective nuclear capability is folly, stemming primarily from the particularly French subjective attitudes outlined above, I don’t see what we could do to prevent it without doing mortal damage to the whole concept of the Alliance.

In your talks with Couve de Murville,² he was not quite definite that the nuclear arm would, under all conditions, remain completely independent and completely national, and it may be that we might direct our policy with a view to having France, once she has obtained some nuclear capability, work towards its eventual integration into a European complex. This will be extremely difficult and probably impossible as long as de Gaulle is in power, and obviously as long as France continues to work on national lines, she will, by the development of certain patterns as well as a technical civil service in the nuclear field, tend to freeze herself in the direction of the maintenance of a purely national force. I don’t think, under the circumstances, we could, with any wisdom, agree to assist her in the development of this force along national lines, if only for the eventual and inevitable effect on West Germany. Since we must accept the fact that France will sooner or later have this nuclear force, there might be certain elements of inducement which we might be able to use to bring her around to the idea of an integrated European nuclear capability.

Germany

With Germany, the main question at the moment is that of Berlin and particularly those elements of any conceivable Berlin settlement which would deal with the problem of Germany as a whole. It seemed to me at Bonn that the Germans are very reluctant to contemplate any agreement on non-diffusion of nuclear weapons which might, in any conceivable circumstance, apply only to Germany. They also showed a good deal of reluctance to any nonaggression arrangement between Warsaw and the NATO Pact for the same reason. The question of frontiers did not arise in any of the meetings at which I was present. On the other hand, there are tendencies in Germany working towards the modification of the Hallstein doctrine which will undoubtedly come about certainly no later than the departure of Adenauer.

The Chancellor’s reference to the alleged Dulles remark on “rebus sic stantibus” in 1954, at the time of the German signature renouncing the manufacture of ABC weapons, was of considerable interest in connection with the nuclear question.³ It seemed to me that the Germans would prefer to be equal participants in any European multinational force but, failing that, would sooner or later begin to move towards a national nuclear capability.

Schroeder is obviously a very intelligent and effective man, and I certainly gained the impression from the talks with him that he thinks much more along our lines than does the Chancellor; but, in general, Germany seems to be in a kind of an interim situation and will be as long as Adenauer stays on, since all of the leading candidates for his post will undoubtedly be influenced in their thinking on any question by their estimate of its effect on their chances of getting the job.

At the moment, with the talks with the Soviets on dead center, there would appear to be no great problems of an immediate nature with the Germans, but if, as is always possible, there should be some shift in the Soviet attitude, we will have, I imagine, considerable difficulties with the Germans, especially if the shift is in the direction of some compromise arrangement on Berlin.

Italy

I did not find in the conversations I attended in Rome any great, major problems of a European nature, except that of the activities of Mr. Mattei and the inherent problems of the “opening to the left.”

England

While the conversations in England were very agreeable and, in general, satisfactory, I was again struck by the curious fixation that the top British seem to have in regard to the necessity of making additional moves or even concessions towards the Soviets at this time. (Lord Home’s remarks about the need to take advantage of the lull in order to put forth new concessions on Berlin and the insistence of Mr. Godber that it was up to the West to make some new moves in the disarmament field.) I imagine this is probably due to certain domestic currents and with the government clearly worried about the internal situation, it is probably natural, but I think we should stand very firm, particularly in disarmament, against yielding to any British attempts in this direction.

The general sentiment in Paris, Bonn, and Rome seems to be that, in the last analysis, Great Britain would join the Common Market and this sentiment seemed to be shared by Heath in London. It is obvious, however, that the French accept this probability with some reluctance since it seems to cut across the idea of a French-dominated European community. But certainly my impression in Germany and, of course, in Rome, was that the governments were strongly in favor of Britain’s adherence. I did not talk enough with Adenauer, however, to get any impression of what his real views on this subject are, but certainly Schroeder and his associates were definitely in favor of Britain’s joining.

Since there seems to be a general consensus that no serious discussion in regard to the question of the nuclear factor in the European picture could be dealt with until the decision had been reached in regard to Great Britain’s joining the Common Market, we have a period of a number of months in which we can attempt to sort out our views in regard to this question before it becomes actual. I would only make one suggestion, and that is preferably we would avoid any public statements on the subject during the coming months and, above all, avoid the term “the indivisibility” of nuclear power, which to any European is merely a euphuism for absolute American control. If we do use the term, we should know how it will be interpreted abroad.

I fully realize how immensely complex and difficult the entire question of the nuclear factor in our relations with Europe, is and will be. There are obviously many facets of the subject which I do not know, but I am convinced, from a political point of view that we will be faced with some form of European nuclear capability—at best or at worst, a number of independent national nuclear capabilities, with all the consequences that this would entail for the Alliance and for the security of the United States. I would think it might be well to institute a very high level group, particularly from State and Defense, which would, examine very carefully, and with some urgency, all the aspects of this problem so that we would be ready to meet it when it arises in our relationship with Europe.

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2124. Secret. The source text, which bears no drafting information, was attached to a brief memorandum from Bohlen to Rusk, July 2, stating that these impressions were in response to a request by the Secretary of State.
1. See Document 255.
2. See Document 144.
3. For a memorandum of Rusk’s conversation with Adenauer on June 22, see Document 145.