145. Memorandum of Conversation0
PARTICIPANTS
- United States
- The Secretary of State
- Ambassador Dowling
- Mr. Bohlen
- Mr. Kohler
- Mr. Manning
- Mr. Morris
- Mr. Hillenbrand
- Germany
- Chancellor Adenauer
- Foreign Minister Schroeder
- Dr. von Eckhardt
- Dr. Carstens
- Dr. Krapf
- Dr. von Hase
- Dr. Osterheld
- Dr. von Braun
- Dr. Reinkemeyer
SUBJECT
- NATO Nuclear Problems
After discussion of the Berlin situation had been concluded,1 Foreign Minister Schroeder raised the question of the NATO nuclear problem. He noted that in Athens the Ministerial Council had received impressive statements from the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense. The Federal Republic largely shared the US strategic assessment but considered that the political and psychological problems were somewhat greater than US spokesmen had indicated. If there were nuclear possibilities on one side and the nuclear reaction on our side was in the hands only of the strongest partner, this created problems. In Athens the UK and French positions had seemed clear. Retention of their own nuclear capacity was given a greater priority than any contribution to a shared deterrent. The Federal Republic saw no better solution to the psychological and political problems involved than cooperation with the US proposal on MRBMs. This cooperation plus exchange of information and the working out of an integrated strategy would be the best course, even if it ultimately depended on one nuclear power. To ask a speculative question, Schroeder continued, he wondered whether the United States considered that the UK and French nuclear problem could be better worked out in the context of general European developments.
The Secretary said the nuclear problem is made especially difficult because it is not always easy to deal with the harshest realities of the harshest thing in the world today within the framework of friendly discussions in the Alliance. We do not underestimate what is required for a nuclear force if it is to have any effectiveness whatsoever. The US had made an enormous investment in its nuclear deterrent for more than 16 years. The Soviet strength in this field was only a fraction, although a substantial one, of US strength. We have been trying to bring the US deterrent capability within a multilateral framework by the provision of guide lines, by our commitments to consult and by coordination of policy. We realize this arrangement might not be good enough for the governments in the Alliance. We can see that those who might be incinerated will want to take part in this regardless of the size of the nation involved. We do not believe that national nuclear capabilities are the way to solve this problem. We have not said to the French that they cannot have a nuclear force. France has not asked us to help it. There has been no intergovernmental argument on this point. We cannot, of course, accept the idea that there could be any relatively small national nuclear force which for decades would make any difference to the military strategy of the Alliance. The idea that such a force might be used independently of the Alliance is frightening. The indivisibility of the nuclear defense of the West is fundamental. This is a harsh reality. Beginning in 1945 our policy against further expansion of these weapons in [Page 421] the hands of national governments has been constant. Not every government is constituted the same. He had to say frankly that, when we send envoys to some capitals, we are doubtful whether to send an Ambassador or a psychiatrist. These weapons are not toys. They relate to the chief end of man and to all that is worth living for. Their possession has made us as old as Methuselah.
We had hoped that the Allies would be able to talk out the problems of a NATO multilateral force. We have now concluded that we must participate in these discussions. We have stated some views on the subject but have not taken a final position and have put any proposals forward on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. We have emphasized certain elements: (a) that the US should not pay a disproportionate part of the cost of a multilateral force which is being built for political reasons arising elsewhere, and (b) that measures should be taken to ensure that the force is genuinely multilateral, for example, by multiple manning and by basing of the force at sea. The US, which is responsible for the nuclear defense of the Alliance, has had to go on its knees to plead for the deployment of its weapons on behalf of the Alliance. Half of the countries have said no, sometimes for trivial reasons. This has not been a pleasant experience for us.
There has been some feeling in NAC, the Secretary continued, that we had delivered a mortal blow to the multilateral force. This was certainly not because of any US policy opposed to such a force. If the serious problems involved dealt it a mortal blow, this is another matter. However, its failure is not inevitable. It should be fully discussed and we will participate in this discussion. If, of course, two leading NATO countries are opposed, this might be decisive. Attitudes on this subject as well as the form of the problem itself might change after a solution is obtained to the question of UK relationship to the Common Market. We hope that the UK will enter the Common Market. If the Rome Treaty were to provide more cohesion than now exists on political and defense matters, this would be relevant. We will provide all the information we can so that the discussion in NAC can proceed on realistic grounds.
Another aspect, the Secretary went on, was that we support a forward strategy and have many divisions on the German front. We would not like to see other countries fail to carry out their conventional force commitments in order to build up a nuclear force which has no military significance. The Secretary added that, although he had spoken vigorously on this subject, his views were not aimed at the Germans.
Schroeder said that the Federal Republic was convinced that a certain conventional strength was absolutely necessary. He agreed it was wrong to say, as some did, that we must have a nuclear force and therefore do not need conventional divisions. The Federal Republic would contribute her fair share of 12 divisions in the build-up of NATO forces. [Page 422] The problem of a multilateral nuclear force was complicated by the fact that the UK explicitly and the French implicitly, argue that they must first have national nuclear forces before making contributions to a multilateral force. Therefore, the burden falls on the US. The Federal Republic had a common interest with the US in this connection. The association of the US with the Continent was proved by the fact that there were large US troop contingents on the front lines. When, however, the question of political prestige was involved, the Federal Republic had no lesser interests than other countries. The Federal Republic thought the best way to satisfy this political aspect was by a multilateral project. The Germans would, therefore, proceed on this line in the NAC discussion.
The Chancellor remarked at this point that he appreciated this was a difficult subject for the US. He remembered how, in 1954, when at the Lancaster House meeting he had renounced the manufacture of ABC weapons in the context of the Nine Power Agreement, Secretary of State Dulles had said to him that the rebus sic stantibus doctrine would of course apply. The Chancellor said that he had indicated his awareness of this to Mr. Dulles.
[1 paragraph (3 lines of source text) not declassified]
Commenting on the question of UK entry into the Common Market, he [Adenauer] saw the negotiations as difficult and protracted. The British elections would come within at most two years. If Labor won, one could not forget that this party had originally ended conscription and that the Conservatives had not felt able to restore it.
The Chancellor referred to the plan which he said General Norstad had put forward late in 1960 at the Stikker residence on Lake Como.2 However, in view of the elections, the Eisenhower Administration did not feel itself able to push this plan. He then alluded to the fact that while he had confidence in the US President, the possibility might arise where the latter would be incapable of taking a decision on the use of nuclear weapons. He knew that the President had tried to reassure him on this point during his Washington visit last November. He, therefore, thought that the military aspect, rather than prestige and political aspects, was all important since a matter of survival was involved. The Federal Republic seeks a solution that will unite NATO and not split it.
The Secretary said we agreed the question should be intensively studied. He understood that this would start with the military aspects, but he recognized that there were also political problems involved. Since the proposals of 1960 to which the Chancellor has referred, there had been substantial changes in the nuclear field which affected the problem, for example, the great increase in our Polaris Program.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11–RU/6–2262. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Hillenbrand and approved in S on June 28. The meeting was held in the Chancellor’s Conference Room at Schaumburg Palace.↩
- A memorandum of the conversation on Berlin, SET/MC/24, is in vol. XV, pp. 196–200.↩
- Presumably this is the meeting described in Stikker, Men of Responsibility (New York: 1965), pp. 333–334.↩