Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

144. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

SET/MC/20

Paris, June 20, 1962, 3 p.m.

SECRETARY’S EUROPEAN TRIP

June 18–28, 1962

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The Secretary of State
  • Ambassador Gavin
  • Mr. Bohlen
  • Mr. Kohler
  • Mr. Manning
  • Mr. Hillenbrand
  • Mr. Cleveland
• France
  • Foreign Minister Couve de Murville
  • M. Lucet
  • Ambassador Alphand
  • M. Laloy
  • M. Barduc
  • M. de Margerie

SUBJECT

• NATO Nuclear Problem

The Secretary asked the Foreign Minister whether he had given further thought to the questions which were discussed in Athens, particularly to the proposals regarding guidelines and nuclear information, etc. Couve de Murville said he was not quite clear whether there was anything new about these proposals. His impression was that the guidelines, for example, were just a matter of carrying on the previous practice of the NATO Council but registering it on paper. The American suggestion for giving fuller information on nuclear matters was essentially a unilateral decision by the U.S., and so far as France was concerned it “raised no problems.”

The Foreign Minister then asked what the British attitude on these subjects appeared to be. Mr. Kohler replied that the implication of the proposal which the British themselves had made for a NATO Atomic Committee was that they were prepared to go along.

Couve de Murville continued that the question which was in fact on the agenda of the NATO Council was the MRBM question, which frankly he had never understood. So far as he could see the problem remained the same—that is, who possesses nuclear weapons, who controls them, and who makes the decisions about their use?

The Secretary replied that so far as the U.S. is concerned, our position is that we have a situation in NATO which is not unsatisfactory from our point of view. However, it has been suggested that others do not feel the same way. Our view is that if our Allies in NATO believe the situation with regard to nuclear weapons in NATO should be changed, they should get together and come up with a concrete proposal. We had taken the initiative in the matter because we had the impression that this would not happen otherwise. At the same time we did not want to propose a “U.S.” plan. Therefore we put out certain ideas as a basis for discussion. The difficulty is an old one—it is hard for us to float a tentative proposal without the others assuming that this is something we want to push. It is sometimes hard to consult about these important matters while ideas are in the stage of formation if the reaction of other countries is to say “How dare you put forward your ideas without consultation?” As soon as we express a few opinions, we found, for example, that some have misunderstood us when we pointed out certain problems which are raised by a multilateral force; some of our NATO colleagues have assumed—wrongly—that this means we are opposed to a multilateral force, whereas in fact what we wanted to do was to lay the problem out clearly so that intelligent discussion could take place on it. Another misunderstanding arose when we said there was no urgent military requirement for MRBMs in Europe. What we mean is that the targets are generally covered already, and that in addition we (the U.S.) have a strong second-strike capability. At some later time there would perhaps be an urgent requirement, and there may be some requirement now. As to the cost of a NATO force, our view is that these weapons should be paid for on a multilateral basis.

Finally, the Secretary said, we have not vetoed a multilateral MRBM force. If there were an alliance proposal, we would want to consider it, and we could even consider if necessary going back to the Congress to change our existing legislation.

In summary, the Secretary said, we are not crusading for a particular proposal nor are we vetoing any proposal. If the matter is not moved forward, we believe it will not be our fault.

The Foreign Minister commented that perhaps until other urgent questions are settled, in particular the question of the political organization of Europe, it might be better not to pursue the MRBM question in NATO. He added that he was not sure if any country except the U.S. knew what a multilateral European weapon really means. The idea has never been a very precise one.

What is likely to be the central political question, the Secretary said, is whether a government can delegate to international machinery or to a group a decision which involves the very life and death of the nation. The U.S. in a sense has this decision now, not by any group election but by the fact of our having developed the nuclear weapon. But to resolve the problem on a broader basis in peace time is extremely difficult. He said the dilemma involved the question of decision by unanimity or by majority. Unanimous decision would mean no action, but majority decision is also hard to accept—can a country accept a majority decision on a matter of life and death when it does not take part in the majority?

The real question, Couve de Murville continued, is “What is an alliance?”. There are two possible concepts: a) The philosophical concept—the purpose of the alliance is to insure collective defense at the lowest possible cost. b) The concept that an alliance is not something in itself but rather a collection of countries, with each doing things in its own way. If we consider the question of the Atlantic Alliance from the viewpoint of the second concept, then we must take into account principles other than simple efficiency. Nevertheless, even from the viewpoint of efficiency, the notion of a national deterrent is defensible. The defense of a country means the defense of its life, and its life is bound up with its nationhood. Therefore national forces also are efficient.

The Secretary replied that an American, of course, cannot disagree with the view that an alliance is an alliance of states. But it cannot be an alliance of separate defense policies, nor can it involve separate decisions on war and peace. It is not necessary that we should hold identical views on policies regarding defense outside of Europe and the North Atlantic area, but within that area agreement is necessary. It is this approach which lies behind the principle of guidelines which would help to define circumstances in which the atomic weapons would be used.

He was concerned, the Secretary continued, about the use of the. term “modern” weapons when referring to nuclear weapons. To use this term seems to reduce the importance of conventional force. The United States, with a million men overseas, cannot see why conventional forces should be considered infra dig. On the contrary, these forces are in our view necessary to maintain the forward strategy.

Furthermore, in the face of a single enemy, our defense must be considered indivisible, especially in the nuclear field. It is difficult indeed to conceive of a partial or separate nuclear war. In fact it is technically impossible. So we cannot see how it is possible to think of a series of nuclear forces in the Atlantic area independent of each other. In our view it is possible to find common policies within an alliance of states.

The Foreign Minister replied that we all agree on that. There is no question, he said, that common defense is necessary. The French also agreed that conventional forces are not outmoded. Rather, they consider that conventional and atomic forces are parts of a single force.

But, Couve de Murville, continued, some countries in the alliance, including the United States, have interests outside the NATO area. More than that, none of us can organize their entire national life and the military organization within the North Atlantic Alliance. The alliance is of great importance, but it cannot be exclusive; for example, France cannot deny itself part of the weaponry of a modern army simply because one of its allies has enough or more than enough of this type of weapon to take care of everybody. Any country has a present and future position, and must consider both of them in its policies. This is a fact of life.

The Secretary replied we could agree that the objective of an alliance like NATO should be an efficient defense of the area viewed as a whole. It is for this reason that we need a common defense effort. The Foreign Minister agreed, but added that this should not exclude consideration of national interests.

The Secretary asked if the end of the Algerian war would make a difference in terms of France’s ability to contribute to NATO forces. The Foreign Minister somewhat evasively replied that it would make it possible to completely reorganize the army, in order to train it for modern warfare. In particular the Army could be brought back to France; the term of compulsory military service could be reduced; the army could be re-equipped with modern weapons as fast as possible.

The Secretary asked Couve de Murville how the French see the problem of the diffusion of nuclear weapons. The Foreign Minister replied this is indeed a big question. At the beginning—in 1945—only the United States had atomic weapons. They appeared something fantastic and out of range for everybody but the United States. The Americans thought so too. But four years later, the Russians had their weapon. Then the United Kingdom followed suit and then came France, whose program was initiated as far back as 1954. There seems little question that the Chinese are working on atomic weapons, and if they succeed it will be impossible for India not to follow suit. Even certain highly-industrialized small countries like Sweden and Israel might follow.

Then there is the problem of Germany. The Germans have respected so far the agreement which involved a German renunciation of atomic weapons but they are showing increasing signs of being obsessed by the problem. Indeed, the proposal for a NATO multilateral nuclear force derives from this German obsession and the hope that it could be met in this way.

Finally, Couve de Murville said, there is of course the idea of Europe. If something can be done to create a political union of Europe, which would also involve coordination in the defense field, then the nuclear problem would arise in this context, between France, the United Kingdom, and Germany. (At a different point in the meeting, in the context of a discussion of the UK-EEC negotiations and the future of Europe, Couve de Murville remarked that despite the problem of less cohesion which would be raised by having a larger number of members in a political union, the nuclear problem could be dealt with more easily in the context of a Europe which included France, the United Kingdom and Germany, than in one which had in it only France and Germany.)

In conclusion, the Foreign Minister raised the question of whether in fact there is any way to stop proliferation. The Secretary asked whether in the French view a nuclear test ban might not make a contribution to this process. The Foreign Minister replied he was convinced the Chinese would not accept a test ban. This was a matter essentially between the United States and the Soviets.

Referring to an earlier remark by the Foreign Minister to the effect that the Soviets might accept a test ban when they felt they were not too far behind the United States in nuclear weapons development, the Secretary wondered whether there was not also the problem of the burden on the Soviet Union of extended competition in the nuclear weapons field, as indicated by recent Soviet economic measures. The Soviets might feel that a continuation of the nuclear arms race involved a continued investment of economic resources in nuclear weapons for a marginal military contribution. Mr. Couve de Murville agreed, giving it as his opinion that the United States could in fact stand the arms race longer than the Soviets. The Secretary remarked that this consideration of the use of resources might also be a discouraging factor for the Chinese and the Germans.

The Secretary then turned to the question of the meaning of an “independent” nuclear strike force. He asked the Foreign Minister if he could envisage the idea of allied nuclear forces acting differently from each other, rather than in an indivisible manner. The Foreign Minister replied that theoretically this was not impossible but practically and politically it was very unlikely. One theoretical possibility: assuming the takeover of all of continental Europe by the Russians based on a fully conventional war, with Britain then facing invasion from the continent. Under these circumstances the British might want to use their nuclear capability. The Secretary said that in such a case a nuclear war would in fact have started at a much earlier stage.

The disturbing thing, the Secretary continued, is the notion that a strike force should be national rather than within the alliance. The Foreign Minister replied that the strike forces would be national just as all forces are national, including. those assigned to NATO. The French strike force would be independent until there are agreements which settle its use.

The Secretary asked if the French would envisage their own strike forces as being at least as multilateral as the United States taking into account, for example, the proposed NATO guidelines and atomic information program. The Foreign Minister replied that the United States force is at the President’s disposal. The United States he continued, is committed to use its own nuclear weapons as is necessary in the defense of Europe. But such a commitment is not the same thing as multilateral planning. There is, of course, nuclear planning which takes place in SHAPE, but on the atomic side, General Norstad takes his orders from the President of the United States. The Secretary referred to the NATO alert list, but the Foreign Minister replied that this list is British and American.

Mr. Kohler asked how the French strike force would be targeted. The Foreign Minister replied that this is a different area from that in which General Norstad operates, because on the American side the parallel organization is SAC. The French strike force, he said, should be considered as parallel to SAC, not to the tactical nuclear weapons which were in SHAPE’S area. It would be independent in the same way that SAC is independent, if there were no coordination.

The Secretary asked if the Foreign Minister saw any difficulty with a combined target list for the French strike force. The Foreign Minister replied that in realistic terms the French strike force would not add much to the striking power of the United States; as to the suggestion for a combined target list, he said he was ready to have it considered. The Secretary said that the problem of independent employment of nuclear force needed study. The Foreign Minister agreed that it needed study, and repeated that he was prepared to have it studied. He added that this idea had never been discussed before between the two Governments.

Proceeding on the same line, the Secretary said it was difficult to see any issue which would be nuclear for the French but not for the United States.

Mr. Couve de Murville agreed. He said it was normal that we should raise the question. It was not, of course, an immediate question, in view of the development of the French strike force, but he would think it over and discuss it further with the Secretary.

The Secretary asked if he were correct in assuming the French would not conceive the function of their strike force in terms of using it as a “trigger” in case of a nuclear war. The Foreign Minister replied emphatically: “No. We’re not that silly.” The French reason for wanting a nuclear strike force is the same as that of the British: since these arms exist and form part of the normal armament of a modern army, there is no reason why a country with the necessary resources should not try to have these capabilities.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11–RU/6–2062. Secret. Drafted by Cleveland and approved in S on June 26. The meeting was held at the French Foreign Office.