Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

255. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State⁰

Paris, June 20, 1962, 10 p.m.

Secto 13. Eyes only for President and Acting Secretary. Following is complete account of Secretary’s conversation with de Gaulle June 19 which included Ambassador Gavin, Mr. Kohler, Couve de Murville, and Mr. Andronikov, interpreter. As this is complete cleared report, no mem/con will be prepared.

Begin text.

The Secretary opened the conversation by expressing his pleasure at meeting again with President de Gaulle and of having an opportunity to continue with M. Couve de Murville the tour d’horizon which the two Foreign Ministers had initiated on the occasion of the NATO meeting in Athens. He told de Gaulle that he had been specially charged by President Kennedy to express his warm regards and his admiration for the wisdom and courage with which President de Gaulle had conducted his French policy toward Algeria and to express President Kennedy’s sincere wishes for a successful and peaceful conclusion of these efforts.

The Secretary said that at present time the United States felt that Allied solidarity was of the utmost importance. It was for this reason that he and Couve felt that it would be useful to sort out and narrow down any areas of difference between the two governments. He mentioned the known U.S. interest in the question of solidarity as involved in such discussions as the organization and possible enlargement of the Common Market. We are not interested in details of intra-European arrangements but have a vital interest in Alliance unity. For this reason the Secretary had been greatly distressed by press gossip that he was coming to Europe to play one capital against another. Any such behavior would be fundamentally contrary to U.S. interest and policy.

He felt that there had been some misunderstanding and misinterpretation of each other’s position and that much of this could be cleared away through friendly discussion. He was satisfied that our basic purposes were in fact identical. It seemed quite possible, the Secretary continued, that we are approaching a climactic situation. It is clear that on the Soviet side they are facing many problems. After Stalin’s death and Khrushchev’s proclamation of a policy of peaceful coexistence, Khrushchev had been under constant pressure to prove that his policies would be effective in extending the Communist empire. However the Soviets had been faced during this period with the emergence of a strong Europe and by the unexpected resistance to their influence which they had encountered in the newly emergent nations. Differences and disputes had developed between Moscow and Peiping as to the means to be used to promote Communist purposes. A debate is now in course and a big decision may well be pending.

The Secretary said he would illustrate his views by referring to the specific question of Berlin. We had been discussing this question for a year now with the Soviets. After Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin had made his statement during their last conversation, the Secretary had asked him frankly whether he had said anything new. Mr. Dobrynin had admitted he had not said anything new but had simply summarized the Soviet position. In turn, after the Secretary’s reply, Dobrynin had asked him whether he had said anything new, to which the Secretary had also responded in the negative. These talks with the Soviets, the Secretary continued, had produced no basis for negotiations. It had become clear that the central issue was the Western presence in West Berlin which we did not regard as negotiable. In the past months, apart from the central issues, the U.S. had introduced a few subjects of a broader nature in which the Soviet side might have an interest such as non-diffusion of nuclear weapons and nonaggression arrangements between the members of the NATO and Warsaw Pacts. However there had been no real discussion of these questions. And there had been no progress on the central point because the Soviets had not withdrawn their demand for liquidation of the occupation forces and we could not concede on this subject.

Despite this lack of progress, the Secretary said, the Soviet side had indicated that they did not wish to produce an early crisis or bring the talks to an open impasse. However there had been several opportunities for them to do so. They seemed to be as anxious to keep the conversations going as were many in the West, in which we did not, of course, include President de Gaulle.

The Secretary was aware that the question arises as to why these talks should take place. When he had seen President de Gaulle before, he had indicated that President Kennedy considered that he had a political problem both as respects the American people and the people in the free world generally. The President continued to feel it essential that contact be maintained. The Secretary recognized that the French view had been that no basis for negotiations would be found and that this view had proved to be correct up to present. Nevertheless we felt that the talks had been useful. Khrushchev had used the fact of the talks as an excuse whenever called upon to explain why he had withdrawn deadlines or desisted from harassments. For President Kennedy, who had been asking the American Congress and people for funds for a military build-up for an extension of aid, it was important to let the people know that diplomacy had not been idle in seeking peaceful resolution.

In sum, the Secretary said, we had reached no agreements of any kind with the Soviet side and there had been no withdrawal of the Soviet demand for the ouster of our troops from West Berlin. We were in a nose-to-nose confrontation. We had made it clear to the Soviets that Berlin is a war issue. However they did not seem to be moving the situation either toward a crisis or toward a diplomatic impasse. This could, of course, be different tomorrow since Moscow could make a decision one way or the other.

President de Gaulle said he wanted to say to Mr. Rusk that the French were informed through Ambassador Alphand. As we knew, there had been no reason for the French to object to the talks though they foresaw no result from them except perhaps talking for the sake of talking. He said that he had to recognize that while there had been no result, still the French apprehensions as respects the Germans had not been justified. He had thought that the Germans would react strongly but they appeared not to have been unduly concerned. On the question of Berlin, while the U.S. had got nothing, neither had the Soviets. The Germans had not been upset and there had been no upheaval in Germany as the French had feared. However he wondered whether the United States did not fear that if the talks were prolonged there would be engendered in the Germans and in the other European Allies as well a new political attitude. They would get used to the idea that all these things are to be negotiated between the Soviet Union and the United States even if there are no results from these negotiations. Eventually the impression would grow that these two were the only important powers and that there is nothing else to negotiate. He wondered whether this was good for the state of mind of an Alliance. He could see that the U.S. was concerned by a loosening—he would not say distortion—of the Alliance. He wondered whether we were right in pursuing our present line. As regards the Franco-American relations, he could understand what we had in mind and what our policy is. Everyone knows that there are in fact two centers of power in the world. But the question is whether there is an Alliance or whether there are only the two powers facing each other with the result that in the end there will either be war between the two or peace between the two. This approach to the situation is to be seen in statements of our leading figures. Even President Kennedy says that the U.S. has the power so it is up to them to act. Defense Secretary McNamara says that since overwhelming nuclear power is in the hands of the U.S. others should not have it. In this case why should there be an Alliance?

The Secretary said he wanted to comment on President de Gaulle’s statement. He said the U.S. does not claim or seek the role of spokesman for anyone. Neither do we think it is possible for two powers to dispose of all questions. He wanted to point out that the U.S. has practically no bilateral problems with the Soviet Union. The real issue between the two is in fact the safety of places like Berlin and Western Europe. We have committed ourselves to their defense and have so informed the Soviet Union. Berlin might well lead to a nuclear war so it was prudent and necessary that contact be maintained so that if war should result we could say that we had done everything reasonable to avoid this result. We were conducting our talks with the Soviets on the basis of policies agreed in the Alliance. He would concede that France had not participated and we had made it clear to the Soviets that others were not committed. However we had conducted these explorations on an agreed basis and fourteen members of the Alliance were anxious that we continue them.

The Secretary said he would cite one other instance—that of Laos. After the new administration had come to power President Kennedy had carefully reviewed the situation there. He had concluded that it was unfortunate that in 1960 the U.S. had broken from the position of the UK and France. He in fact agreed with the views of these great friends. President Kennedy had discussed this question with Chairman Khrushchev in Vienna. However he had not attempted there to talk for the Alliance. The actual negotiations had occurred in Geneva and taken place in full concert between the Western Allies (though some of our Asian friends had been pained). The Secretary emphasized that we had no intention of negotiating alone without our Allies on these great questions.

President de Gaulle replied that he wanted Secretary Rusk to understand him well. He had not said that U.S. policy was not wise but only that the manner in which it was conducted risked inducing the frame of mind that he had described. He himself understood U.S. policy and did not fear that the U.S. and the Soviet Union were going to partition the world. However, our Allies might be led to believe that this was the case, particularly since this was exactly what the Russians wanted. Turning again to the McNamara speech,¹ he asked how it was possible to explain in France statements by leading members of the U.S. administration that it was dangerous to have nuclear weapons in the hands of countries other than the U.S.

The Secretary commented that no American had said it was dangerous to have nuclear weapons in the hands of any other countries; some countries have them now. This was the problem, he said, which our two governments had never really discussed. The U.S. had gone very far in the NATO Council in giving the basic information required to explain why we sincerely see these problems as we do. We think that it was generally felt in the NATO Council that this exposition as such had been helpful. The Secretary felt that we should go as far as possible (as an Alliance) in discussing nuclear strategy. During the past year we have made great strides in developing guidelines for the use of nuclear weapons, assurances as to availability of these weapons for use and in discussing target coverage. We have taken these initiatives because we thought that if we should find ourselves in a nuclear war, those who will suffer have the right to be consulted. We have also been asked to participate in discussion of a multilateral NATO nuclear force. In this connection we have put forward facts to be considered with respect to political and military factors and to cost. However behind all this it must be taken into account that U.S. policy with respect to diffusion of nuclear weapons is deeply rooted. Ever since we produced the first bomb the U.S. has sought ways to limit the extension and multiplication of this weapon, for example in the Baruch Plan.² There is nothing attractive in the prospect of widespread development and diffusion of nuclear weapons. We also have in mind the impact on the possibilities of disarmament. A real problem is how to deal with several hundred nuclear missiles coming at a speed of 1200 miles per hour against us or against the great Alliance. The nuclear arms race requires of necessity staggering resources and the concentration of scientific talents on a vast scale to get at problems threatening to surpass the mind of man. We hope to turn this course downward. That is why we were interested in the end of nuclear testing. Otherwise we are faced with the need for a fantastic effort with mounting instability and danger.

As to national nuclear forces in the Alliance, the Secretary continued, we on our side are trying to commit our nuclear capability as fully as possible to examination and judgment by the Alliance. Far from being able to act independently, we find that with the possession of nuclear weapons we have less freedom of action than ever before. If there are nuclear forces within the Alliance which might move separately, then we are faced with a whole series of most difficult problems. Defense in NATO must be indivisible. We must act together. It is impossible for us to act separately. There are delicate problems of common action but this is fundamental.

President de Gaulle replied that he fully understood Secretary Rusk’s position.

These problems were not only difficult but perhaps unsolvable. The U.S. has fantastic means and faces the enemy with similarly fantastic means. Therefore, the U.S. considered that strategy and defense policy belonged to it. Any other power in the place of the U.S. would probably do the same. However, the problem is how to reconcile this policy with the need to maintain the Alliance. States like France must have their own personality and must be their own masters. He was not angry with us (“je ne vous en veux pas”). He did not see how the problem could be settled. Perhaps it was best for each of us simply to play his own game and live with the situation. This was not a deadly matter since our aims are the same.

The Secretary said that he wanted to ask a question—not that he thought that this would solve the problem. He said it was hard for us to imagine a nuclear war issue for our friends in Europe which would not also be a nuclear war issue for us. He said he could not exaggerate the fundamental change which had come about in American thinking since World War I. The American policy was based on national interests and American interest is not separable from that of Europe. We, therefore, find it impossible to understand or even to conceive the possibility of a separate action. The unity of strategy is the central problem.

President de Gaulle asked what the Secretary meant by speaking of “acting separately”. Surely he did not believe that the French were going to go on their own. The Secretary replied that we had not discussed this question and then he did say frankly that some of the public debates and press comments were confused and confusing. Much of it seemed to indicate distrust in Europe as regards the U.S. commitment, a matter on which we were very sensitive. He thought separate action was impossible in this situation, whether by President Kennedy or by Prime Minister Macmillan or anyone else. In a nuclear issue with the Soviet Union we are all involved. The atmosphere of some public discussion left quite another impression.

President de Gaulle commented that the French could not do much about this problem nor could the Americans. The Soviet Union has now developed enormous nuclear capability and naturally enough this had changed American psychology. No one could be sure what could be done. The French do not believe that the Americans would abandon Europe even as Europe would not abandon the U.S. in case of a Soviet attack. However, one could not be sure as to the timing and the conditions and the extent of the decisions the U.S. would take for all parts of Europe. The U.S. does not know the answer to this itself. It was impossible to know the answer. For example, if Germany should be lost France could not remain without any French national defense. So France is building the means for such defense, however modest. The French simply do not know what would happen and neither could the Americans. The fact that the U.S. has not made these decisions was shown by the fact that we did not give nuclear arms to our Allies since that would involve us. The U.S. does not want to give help to France since that would involve it. The very fact that we feared such involvement showed that we were not decided.

The Secretary replied that it was clear that we must talk these questions out more between us. The U.S. was involved much more than President de Gaulle might imagine, since we consider ourselves a part of Europe from the point of view of our safety and our defense. He considered it important that what is in fact indivisible be thought about as such. Perhaps the forthcoming debate in the NATO Council would begin to open the question for some solution.

President de Gaulle replied what Secretary Rusk conceived of as indivisibility seemed to him to amount to integration which meant American control. For the French this no longer corresponded to what is necessary. Of course, we must be ready and if a fight should come we would stand together.

End text.

Secretary will comment on above by separate telegram at first opportunity.³

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11–RU/2062. Secret; Niact; No Other Distribution. Relayed to the White House. Rusk visited Europe June 18–28.
1. See footnote 3, Document 247.
2. For text of this plan, June 14, 1946, see Department of State Bulletin, June 23, 1946, pp. 1057–1062.
3. See Document 256.