Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

256. Telegram From Secretary of State to Rusk to the Department of State⁰

Bonn, June 21, 1962, 10 p.m.

Secto 27. Eyes only for President and Acting Secretary. Eyes only for Ambassador Gavin. Following are my principal impressions after brief talks with DeGaulle and Pompidou and several talks with Couve de Murville.¹

1. The motive of DeGaulle’s determination to acquire a national nuclear capability is primarily psychological and subjective. It is in part based upon his desire for status to place France on roughly the same level as the United States and clearly distinctive from other European countries. We must, I believe, accept as a fact, in current situation, the French intention to develop a national nuclear capability from which there will be no weakening even though means were found to accord them more status. I think we must also work on the assumption that France will continue its nuclear program whether DeGaulle is at the helm or not.

2. A derivative of the above is DeGaulle’s relative contempt for smaller and weaker countries. His aversion to the UN, disrespect for a majority of NATO, objection to disarmament negotiations in front of eight neutrals are symptomatic.

3. He is asking for a status which he apparently thinks we and the British can confer upon him if we were only well disposed toward France. The fact that we cannot do so without deep injury to the sensibilities of other allies, including his neighbors Germany and Italy, he chooses not to understand.

4. His general attitude toward the United States is nevertheless friendly and derived from a combination of his respect for American power and his personal liking for President Kennedy with whom he is obviously deeply impressed.

5. It seems to me that practically everyone beneath DeGaulle would like to work with us as closely as he will permit. But this should not be exaggerated because he keeps these matters under rather close reins.

6. A line of argument which will be impossible on its face for us to meet is that no one can surely foresee the future, therefore France must be in a position to uphold the interests of France whatever comes. This leads him to be skeptical about flat commitments for the immediate future which might seem to be dangerous for French freedom of action for the longer range.

7. DeGaulle’s remark that France must have nuclear weapons for its own defense “if Germany falls” seems to me to reveal the narrowness of his approach and the serious limitations on his appreciation of the nuclear weapon. I think we must continue to make major efforts to educate both DeGaulle and other French officials on the nature and indivisibility of nuclear warfare.

8. I was somewhat surprised by the affirmation of interest in European unity and solidarity which I met on all sides. On Common Market, for example, I clearly had the impression that France will not offer any overriding political objection even though they still have regrets about what they think will be the change in a united Europe introduced by the presence of Anglo-Saxon Islanders. It seems clear that this is partly because DeGaulle had hoped that eventually France would in fact be the spokesman for a united continental Europe.

9. We succeeded in removing a good many impressions based upon gossip and rumor. We have underestimated the fact that Paris has even more active centers of gossip, bons mots, and barbed wit, than we find in Georgetown cocktail parties. I am taking up with my colleagues special steps to moderate the effect of this static upon our official relations.

10. Pompidou is a very impressive man and it might be that some occasion could be found for him to have an informal talk with President Kennedy.

11. Couve de Murville and I agreed that a meeting between President Kennedy and DeGaulle could be advantageous if it could be informal and could close without an impression of serious disagreement, but both of us agreed that the time was probably not yet.

The resistance to DeGaulle’s attitude toward European unity will not, I believe, be a major factor because DeGaulle will probably accept a high degree of European integration if Britain joins the Common Market on the political terms set by the present six. Further, I would suppose that France is relatively united behind the French nuclear program, partly because of the special quality of French nationalism and partly because it represents a declaration of independence from the US, at least symbolically. Questions about integration of French nuclear forces with us or with NATO will probably be deferred until France has something operational.

12. I believe the French must still come clean in their attitude toward Germany. There is on the one hand a desire to have an intimate relation with Bonn but, on the other, a desire to insure that France is clearly the senior partner. This may change after Britain enters the Common Market (which the French expect) but it will take some time. I found Couve de Murville wishing to be as helpful as possible, and this was made manifest on a large number of questions such as Laos, Algeria, UN matters, etc. It is rumored Couve will be replaced possibly in July. If his successor is a pure DeGaullist without the European experience of the past decade which Couve has had, Couve’s departure would be a loss.

13. I do not believe we should attempt to solve major problems of present disagreement before Common Market discussions have come to a conclusion one way or the other. These would include nuclear relations, methods of consultation, NATO multilateral force, NATO organization.

14. We have had the usual difficulty with the press which has tried to deal with questions which cannot be resolved at present and on which the press would like to sick France and the United States on to each other. But I am quite sure that we made some headway during my short visit in reducing Washington–Paris temperature somewhat and in clarifying points of difference and the far more numerous points of agreement.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2122. Secret. Drafted by Rusk and cleared with Kohler and Bohlen. Repeated to Paris.
1. A report on the meeting with de Gaulle is printed as Document 255; a report on the one with Pompidou on June 20 was transmitted in Secto 23 from Paris, June 21 (Department of State, Central Files, 611.51/6–2162); memoranda of the conversations with Couve de Murville are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2122 and Central File 110.11–RU.