Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

257. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State⁰

Paris, July 6, 1962, 6 p.m.

86. Eyes only Secretary from Ambassador.

(1) I have been reflecting on conversations you had here with de Gaulle, Couve de Murville and Pompidou and read with keen interest your telegram Secto 27 from Bonn.¹ Below I am submitting some of my views on present situation in France, particularly as it affects Franco-US relations and on developments which we foresee in rapidly evolving “Europe”.

(2) Most important difference between France and US is certainly centered on French nuclear deterrent. I fully subscribe to view expressed paragraph 1 your tel that France will continue its nuclear program whether de Gaulle at helm or not. As for de Gaulle’s motivation in pursuing his program, I am convinced it fundamentally political and skepticism on flat commitments certainly plays important part in de Gaulle’s thinking as does desire create position of strength which will enable France have greater degree of independence from US. Added reasons are possession of nuclear deterrent would give France stronger voice in world councils and give her clear advantage over countries not possessing such weapon. Also de Gaulle believes no great power can voluntarily accept status which would leave it in permanently inferior position. Moreover I believe that de Gaulle in no wise constitutes voice crying in wilderness for I find more and more Europeans inclining toward view that some sort of European nuclear force, independent from, but complementary to US and NATO controlled nuclear forces is needed at present stage in European development.

(3) I believe de Gaulle’s remark quoted in paragraph 7 of your telegram that French must have nuclear weapons for its own defense “if Germany falls” is not based so much on unawareness of military realities as on belief USSR, like Hitler in Czechoslovakia, might be successful in absorbing Germany through non-military means or perhaps in neutralizing Germany, and that France must keep herself in position of sufficient power resist USSR encroachment and blackmail. However that may be I believe we must not only work on assumption France will have bomb but I have strong feeling that in spite of possibility of a multilateral NATO deterrent (to which de Gaulle opposed on grounds it would merely be means for sharing costs of disguised purely American control force) we must regard as a possible, even probable, contingency development sooner or later of independent “European” deterrent mentioned above. Logic would seem argue that from closely integrated economic organization of Europe, including UK, and from integrated political organization, presumably less closely integrated, would flow common defense organization with coordination and pooling of material, scientific and industrial resources. It seems difficult envisage any such defense organization encompassing two independent and uncoordinated nuclear forces—UK and France. There certainly many in France who are beginning to think along these lines and it is development we must watch carefully. In this connection I was interested note comment by Macmillan’s Private Secretary (Secto 82 from London)² that he felt ultimate solution might involve pooling UK and French deterrents in some kind of European force.

(4) Complementary problem is how de Gaulle might envisage control of any such European deterrent. I think he would want it independent though closely coordinated with US deterrent under NATO umbrella. Within Europe he would probably wish control limited to major powers, i.e., France, UK, Germany and Italy. This would be consisent with contempt of small power mentioned paragraph 2 your tel. His whole reasoning on this nuclear problem is, I believe, based on assumption there will not be war. In the meantime he knows he can and must rely on US strength and will continue support Atlantic Alliance.

(5) Other major but related subject which can be expected hold center of stage in France when, [garble] Algeria out of way will be development of “Europe”. As you point out in your paragraph 8, it seems France will not offer any overriding political objection UK entry into Common Market and to subsequent entry into political organization of Europe. This will profoundly affect de Gaulle’s position of leadership but at same time it seems reasonable think de Gaulle believes UK accession would over period of time fundamentally dilute US-UK intimate relationship and that France would be able play major role in a Europe on par with US. De Gaulle is realist and I expect he has already adjusted his thinking to this prospective new power relationship.

(6) De Gaulle’s view of “Europe” is I believe based on his historical concept of French position in world and on his view of Europe’s future. His view is long-range and is motivated I think only in part on desire for European policy which can be independent of US. In this connection I thoroughly agree with your comment in paragraph 4 your tel re de Gaulle’s general attitude of friendliness towards US. I have had feeling some people have made mistake of interpreting many of General’s actions as being in some sense directed primarily at US. I do not believe this is true in most instances. Fundamentally his concern is French national interest which, on basic issues, he regards as largely same as that of US. He seeks a Europe in form of loose confederation of states guarding their sovereignty jealously but I am convinced he regards this as a stage in development over long run of increasingly close political association which can develop only in time as policies become more closely coordinated and individual powers rid themselves of problems particular to each, i.e., Belgium and Congo, France and Algeria, Germany and unification. Sense of European nationalism will grow but only slowly.

(7) I am in full agreement with your view in paragraph 13 that we should not attempt to solve major problems of our disagreement until Common Market discussions have been brought to conclusion one way or another. However, in meantime we must anticipate that problems of nuclear deterrents and of economic political and defense organization of Europe will put serious strains on NATO and on our desire for close consultation and coordination of policy. While it true many beneath de Gaulle would like to work with US as closely as he willing permit (paragraph 5 your tel) we should not exaggerate this tendency or overlook fact that many of these men share certain of de Gaulle’s views, particularly as they relate to unwillingness place France in position where, as they see it, US would maintain predominant role enjoyed in 1950’s. US will be faced with many thorny and sensitive problems and movements may develop which are irresistible. A European deterrent may be one of them.

(8) As regards French I believe we must continue to cooperate and consult in all possible areas of mutual concern, refrain from showing our displeasure too openly or too often and reserve use of strong influence or pressure for a limited number of selected objects of principal importance to us. Chief among those is of course maintenance strong NATO with unified control over European deterrent, should it develop, and a clearly coordinated position with our Allies on East-West questions, especially Berlin.

(9) As regards NATO, establishment of political organization of Europe and development of European defense policy will certainly affect it and should be expected make necessary some sort of reorganization of machinery of North Atlantic Alliance. If we take initiative on reorganization it should help ward off undesirable initiatives taken for example by de Gaulle who so far has kept his ideas on reorganization of NATO to himself. Plans for any new institutions of North Atlantic Alliance should be designed to encourage full and intimate French cooperation, coordinated with and through Europe.

Gavin

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, France. Secret.
1. Document 256.
2. Not printed. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2122)