Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

254. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, May 31, 1962.

SUBJECT

• US-French Exploratory Talks; Second Session

PARTICIPANTS

• French
  • Ambassador Alphand
  • Minister Claude Lebel
• US
  • The Secretary
  • Mr. William R. Tyler, EUR
  • Mr. Johannes V. Imhof, WE

The Secretary’s Trip to Europe

The Secretary said that he hoped to be in Paris on June 19 and to have dinner with Couve and additional conversations on June 20 and June 21 if possible. Ambassador Alphand said that he would confirm these dates with Couve de Murville.

Couve de Murville’s CBS Interview

Ambassador Alphand gave the Secretay an advance copy of Foreign Minister Couve de Murville’s interview with CBS, to be broadcast at 10:00 p.m. on May 31.¹ He said he was happy to note that Couve de Murville’s statements support the arguments which he, Alphand, had made in the meeting with the Secretary on May 28.

Nuclear Policy

Ambassador Alphand noted that the next point on the agreed agenda was nuclear policy. He felt that again it was necessary to clarify certain misunderstandings. There had been numerous reports in the press that the French desired an independent nuclear force as a kind of trigger, to force the US to use their own nuclear weapons. Nothing could be further from the truth. There were also allegations that France desired an independent nuclear force to pursue a neutral policy. Ambassador Alphand noted that he had already refuted the argument of neutralism in the previous meeting. A typical example of distortion was the sudden reprint, in The Washington Post of May 29, of an article by Defense Minister Messmer on nuclear policy which had actually been published on February 15. The Washington Post had made it appear as if this article had just been released. Alphand said he had talked to The Washington Post about this.

Ambassador Alphand said that there were two main reasons why the French were determined to have an independent nuclear force: (1) the need for a deterrent against a Soviet threat directed specifically against France or French interests. Although it might be argued that France was amply protected by the US deterrent, it was impossible to tell what conditions would be in ten years from now and France would therefore not feel safe without having a deterrent of her own, and (2) France must have modern weapons if she wants to be a modern country.

Ambassador Alphand noted that France had never requested nuclear aid from the US. General Lavaud’s visit was concerned with a quid pro quo on a purely commercial basis. No political considerations had entered into this discussion. Also, all talks that the French were looking to aid from the British in this field and would exact British nuclear aid as a price for British entry into the Common Market was absurd and without any foundation.

Ambassador Alphand said that it might be argued from the technical point of view that the French nuclear program represented a duplication of effort and that the French would not be able to develop a fully effective force. The fact remained that politically France required such a force. The nuclear program had been started before de Gaulle came to power and would be continued after de Gaulle had left the scene.

The Secretary said that he wished to explore some peripheral questions for the purpose of further clarification: (a) For example, it had been argued that it was necessary to give the French army a new mission in order to improve its morale. The Secretary asked whether this consideration played a role in the French nuclear program. Ambassador Alphand said this was a contributory element. He said the army was in a state of despair. It had fought in distant areas and must be brought to realize that its primary mission was the defense of the nation. The army must feel that defense is a national responsibility. Ambassador Alphand noted parenthetically that, in Europe, only General de Gaulle agreed with the US that Europe should bear a heavy defense burden.

(b) The Secretary said that the costs of a nuclear program and of space research were of course enormous, but that there was a feedback into the economy as a result of technological and other advances. He wondered whether this consideration had a bearing on the French nuclear program. Ambassador Alphand said that this was indeed a very important reason to which he had meant to refer when he had said that France wants to be a modern country and therefore must have modern weapons.

(c) The Secretary asked whether the French Government had considered the effects of its nuclear program on Germany and eventually on other countries. Ambassador Alphand said that he hoped a further spread of nuclear weapons could be controlled. In the case of Germany, there was, in the first place a legal obstacle. Furthermore, Germany had no uranium and no launching sites. M. Lebel added that he recalled that General de Gaulle told President Kennedy that he understood our position because if he had the bomb he would pursue exactly the same policy, particularly vis-à-vis Germany. Ambassador Alphand said that once the French had acquired a nuclear force the French would cooperate in preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons.

The Secretary said that all of our allies in the West would be concerned if the Germans moved into the nuclear field and the Eastern bloc would be particularly concerned. Ambassador Alphand said that the Germans had thus far not exercised any pressure on the French to acquire nuclear weapons and asked whether we were under such pressure. The Secretary said that they were not pressing us either, but our problems with Germany would be multiplied if we cooperated with the French nuclear program. Ambassador Alphand said that our non-cooperation extended to fields not covered by the McMahon Act and mentioned as an example missile guidance systems.

(d) The Secretary asked whether an agreement on disarmament would reduce pressures in France to acquire a nuclear capability. Ambassador Alphand said this would be the case if existing stocks of nuclear weapons were destroyed or fully controlled. On the other hand, if it were simply a question of a nuclear test ban, the French would remain determined to acquire a nuclear capability. The Secretary said that at Geneva we had proposed a 30 percent reduction in nuclear delivery substance in the first stage of a disarmament program. The Soviets had proposed a 100 percent reduction. Because of the great Soviet superiority in conventional forces it would be necessary to increase the conventional forces in NATO before such a proposal could be seriously considered. It would also be necessary to take a hard look at Communist China. The Secretary said that it was regrettable in this connection that the French had been absent from Geneva. Ambassador Alphand said that he felt that the Geneva Conference did not provide the kind of forum in which real progress could be made. The Secretary agreed that no real progress had been made but pointed out that the forum itself was immaterial. The decisions would be taken by the Big Powers and the other nations were merely onlookers.

Reverting to the policy issue in the nuclear field, Ambassador Alphand asked why we objected to France having a bomb and why we had no such objections with regard to Britain. The Secretary said that our policy was not directed against France as such but against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We consider this weapon to be indivisible. The Secretary said that in his discussions in Paris on this subject² he had obtained the distinct impression that the accent was placed not on cooperation, but on independence which implied independent action. Ambassador Alphand quoted from President de Gaulle’s letter to President Kennedy in which de Gaulle referred to the coordinated use of Western nuclear forces.³ He recommended that this be discussed with Couve. The Secretary asked whether this might open the way for a NATO nuclear force. Ambassador Alphand said that coordination should take place between those Western powers which possess this weapon and not with those which did not possess it. It was desirable to correct this situation. The Secretary said that it would be necessary to include some of the powers which while they did not have nuclear forces would suffer equally from the effects of a nuclear war. We were therefore giving consideration to a multilateral NATO nuclear force. Ambassador Alphand said that there was nothing new in our NATO proposal except that it perhaps served to appease the Germans if indeed they wanted to be appeased. Our proposal did not provide an answer to the sharing of controls.

The Secretary asked why the French were opposed to the stationing of our nuclear forces in France. Ambassador Alphand said that this was connected with de Gaulle’s 1958 memorandum and that there existed a clear link between the agreed use of nuclear forces and permission to station them on French territory.

Ambassador Alphand asked whether our position on proliferation of nuclear forces was perhaps linked to our disarmament talks with the Soviets. The Secretary said that our position went back to the earliest period when the bomb was first employed. It was then realized that possession of this weapon might lead to uncontrollable consequences. It was frightening to think what might happen if Israel, Egypt, or China had the bomb. Ambassador Alphand said that once the French had reached an agreed position with the US on nuclear policy they would cooperate to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

The Secretary asked whether in the French view there was an organic connection between possession of the bomb and tripartitism. If there was, he could not agree. Naturally there would be a relationship between the Three on nuclear questions but there would not be tripartitism on political issues. Ambassador Alphand said that this problem would have to be placed into the column listing US-French disagreements. The Secretary said that the Three could no longer impose themselves on the rest of the world. Ambassador Alphand said that the French did not wish to impose themselves but that they did want to have their own say on important political and strategic matters. Ambassador Alphand repeated that he was convinced France would coordinate the use of its nuclear forces with ours.

The Secretary said that an independent nuclear force seemed to imply an independent use of such a force and this in fact could act as a trigger on our forces. He said it was difficult for him to envisage a situation under which the French would be prepared to use nuclear weapons and we would not. Ambassador Alphand cited as a example Soviet blackmail aiming at the establishment of a pro-Soviet regime in France. The Secretary said that our presence in Europe was precisely designed to prevent such a blackmail. Alphand said it was difficult to foresee what the situation in this respect might be ten years from now. The Secretary said that he had come away from his last discussion with de Gaulle with the feeling that France doubted our determination to defend Europe. He had felt like saying that if such a situation ever arose it would be because Europe had made it impossible for us to defend her.⁴

0. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Drafted by Imhof and approved in S on June 15.
1. Not found.
2. Presumably Rusk is referring to conversations he had in Paris at the time of the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting December 13–15, 1961, but no specific record along these lines has been found.
3. The pertinent phrase in the January 11, 1962, letter is: “When the time comes it will no doubt be advisable to organize the combined use of the Western nuclear armaments.” [Footnote in the source text.]
4. At their third meeting on June 9 Alphand and Rusk agreed to group the problems they had discussed into those where there was: 1) basic disagreement, 2) no longer any need for discussion because they had resolved the misunderstandings, and 3) discussion was still needed. These problems would comprise the topics addressed by Rusk and Couve de Murville in Paris. (Telegram 6631 to Paris, June 9; Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2124)