Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

253. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, May 28, 1962, 11 a.m.

SUBJECT

• US-French Exploratory Talks; First Session

PARTICIPANTS

• French
  • Ambassador Alphand
  • Minister Claude Lebel
  • Mr. Johannes V. Imhof, WE
• US
  • The Secretary
  • Mr. William R. Tyler, EUR

The Secretary’s trip to Europe

The Secretary said that he regretted press speculation from Bonn concerning his visit there. He said he had discussed the possibility of a European trip with Couve de Murville in Athens. No firm date had been set as yet for the trip but the Secretary was thinking of leaving in the third week of June. His tentative plans would be to visit Paris, the UK (to receive an honorary degree at Oxford) and Bonn. Ambassador Alphand said that he would inform Couve de Murville.

Procedure

The Secretary suggested that the present talks should consist of several shorter sessions rather than one long one. Ambassador Alphand agreed.

The Secretary asked Ambassador Alphand whether he had seen Secretary McNamara’s statement at Athens.¹ Ambassador Alphand said he had not. The Secretary said that Ambassador Alphand should be provided with a copy of Secretary McNamara’s statement. (Note: We took this action on May 29.)

Third Force

Ambassador Alphand said that he thought one of the principal purposes of this discussion was to separate misunderstandings from real differences and to find a formula which would make it possible to live with some of the real differences. He said some of the misunderstandings arose from the press treatment of de Gaulle’s statements. The press had exaggerated and distorted some of de Gaulle’s recent statements. The press had ignored repeated references by de Gaulle to the Atlantic Alliance. The French continued to consider NATO as essential and there was no change in France’s basic alignment with the West. The Secretary recalled that in the discussion of the communiqué² during the President’s visit with General de Gaulle, de Gaulle had not liked the statement that NATO was the basic element. Ambassador Alphand said that the form of the Alliance was not basic, that the structure might change, but that the principle of the Alliance with the West remained firm.

Ambassador Alphand said that it was necessary to remember that de Gaulle often spoke from the point of view of an historian. For instance, his recent references to a balance in Europe certainly did not mean that he would enter into negotiations with the Soviets tomorrow. This statement merely reflected his belief that in the long run serious negotiations leading to a real détente might take place. The press had distorted all this to make it appear that de Gaulle was anti-NATO, anti-US and toying with an independent policy toward the Soviets. Nothing could be further from the truth.

The Secretary asked whether de Gaulle had used the term “third force.” Ambassador Alphand said he had not. He said that General de Gaulle was opposed to the concept of a neutral Europe. For this reason, de Gaulle was against negotiations on Berlin now, precisely because he feared this might lead to a neutral Germany, and by extension to a neutral Europe. Ambassador Alphand said that de Gaulle had in mind a modified relationship between the US and Europe. Europe should be less dependent on the US. The Alliance must continue although its form might change.

Ambassador Alphand said that General de Gaulle believes that an effective defense must be national and that the entire Alliance would be less effective if there was a high degree of dependency on the US. The Secretary said that without any briefing on our part the press had begun to talk about the concept of a “third force” in connection with de Gaulle’s press conference.³ This touched a very sensitive nerve. The concept that Europe could be the arbiter between the US and the Soviets was basically fallacious. Europe was the key issue outstanding between the US and USSR. If ever Europe decided to play an independent role, issues between the US and the USSR would be greatly reduced. In a sense, the US rather than Europe was the “third force” in this combination.

Ambassador Alphand reiterated that there was no question of a neutral posture on the part of France, nor flexibility in dealing with the Soviets.

Structure of NATO

The Secretary said we had accepted the concept of defending the principle of the Alliance in the remotest corners of the world. He wondered whether de Gaulle took the same view and equated such a commitment with the defense of France. Ambassador Alphand repeated that it was the form rather than the substance of the Alliance that was an issue. General de Gaulle fully accepted the principle of the Alliance. France and the US would stand together in any real crisis. Ambassador Alphand cited as an example the present relationship between the French Mediterranean Fleet and the Sixth Fleet which, according to Admiral Anderson, was better than ever despite the fact that the French Fleet had been withdrawn from NATO. He said that units currently being withdrawn from Algeria might not be integrated in NATO but would be available in case of need. Mr. Tyler asked whether these units would be stationed in Germany. M. Lebel said that it might not be possible to station these troops in Germany unless they were integrated into NATO.

The Secretary asked Ambassador Alphand to comment on General de Gaulle’s views regarding a reform of the structure of NATO. Ambassador Alphand said he could discuss this only in the most general terms. This topic should be reserved for discussion on the Ministerial level. In general, the greater role of Europe and the US loss of its nuclear monopoly must be taken into account. He said it was difficult to discuss this question in detail as de Gaulle’s precise views were unknown to him.

The Secretary asked whether Couve de Murville would be prepared to discuss the nature of changes in NATO which the French might propose. Ambassador Alphand said that he would mention this to Couve.

The Secretary said that we had gone far to reduce our special position in NATO and to underline NATO solidarity. We were taking up many issues in the North Atlantic Council. We had promised at the last meeting to consult about the use of nuclear weapons anywhere in the world. It must be borne in mind that the reaction in NATO to this might not be uniform. For instance, some governments might prefer not to be consulted about this problem.

Ambassador Alphand said that de Gaulle wanted closer consultation between the big Three and some tripartite organization to back up these consultations. The Secretary said that the implications of a special position of the Three would create problems in NATO. Ambassador Alphand said that de Gaulle’s January 11 proposal⁴ for regular meetings of representatives of the Three and for a small organization to prepare planning for military and strategic matters had never been answered. The Secretary said that if Bonn and Rome agreed to a special position of the Three we would have less of a problem. Closer consultations among the Three were desirable if not accompanied by a public posture showing that the Three were acting as a kind of directorate.

Ambassador Alphand noted that there had been no tripartite consultations recently except on Berlin. He regretted that the French had not been invited to participate in the recent consultations on the Congo and said that it would be useful in general to have consultations on strategic planning. The Secretary said that the main purpose of the Congo talks had been to induce financial interest to bring pressure on Tshombe. As to strategic planning, the Secretary thought that some of this might be useful but that there would be no point in conducting contingency discussions, e.g. the circumstances under which nuclear weapons would be used. There were limits inherent in this problem which inhibit detailed discussions not only with foreign powers but even within our own Government. We should be under no illusion that by having a paper we also have a policy. As an illustration, the Secretary mentioned the 1948 events in Korea.

The Secretary asked Mr. Tyler to cite a specific problem, the tropospheric scatter system, which was important to the Alliance but to which the French had thus far refused to agree. Ambassador Alphand said that he was not informed about this problem but would have himself briefed.

The Secretary asked to what extent the French had taken into account the views of other members of NATO with respect to tripartitism. Ambassador Alphand said there should first be a discussion with the French and then with the British and then with the others. He said experience in NAC had shown that if the US, UK and France agreed, the others concurred. The Secretary wondered whether this was still true. The new strength which Europe had acquired affected not only France but other countries as well. Ambassador Alphand agreed and said that this issue was closely linked with the organization of Europe. If the European Community included an agreement relating to defense, the Alliance would have to take this into account. The French were now actively considering this problem, which could be an additional topic for discussion with Couve.

The Secretary said that we were not frozen to any form. It seemed to him that much of the discussions in NATO in the past had overlooked the fact that the US was also a member. Discussion had generally centered on the three European fronts, the central front and the northern and southern flanks. Targeting for instance must take into consideration the problems of all members of the Alliance. Fortunately there was as yet no competition on this but differences might arise in the future.

Organization of Europe

Ambassador Alphand said that de Gaulle was not opposed to British entry into the Common Market. The economic problems involved posed no essential differences from those confronting the US. The UK must enter without the Commonwealth although there could be a period of adjustment. At the end of this period the Commonwealth should be in the same position as the US.

The Secretary asked how this would affect the former possessions in Africa. Ambassador Alphand said that there might be a longer period of adaptation for political reasons until there was some global arrangement to develop their resources. Although admitting that there were some practical problems, Ambassador Alphand said that in the economic field we were much closer than the press would lead one to believe.

Ambassador Alphand referred to a statement made by the President to Minister Malraux⁵ that the US was in favor of British entry despite the fact that this was against the economic interest of the US. He thought it should be recalled that trade between the US and the Common Market had tripled since 1952. He said the Common Market would not be protectionist. Admittedly, differences (wage scales, etc.) for the moment were too great to permit the creation of a free trade zone but the Common Market was not protectionist and would on the contrary attempt to establish closer economic relations with the US.

On the political side, on the other hand, Ambassador Alphand felt there might be problems. It was questionable whether the European spirit was compatible with the British outlook. Certainly the Europe of the Six would be more coherent than a Europe of the Seven or Nine. Ambassador Alphand wondered in this connection why we wished Britain to become politically a member of Europe.

The Secretary said that this was the trend of history. The Commonwealth no longer really constituted an operational unit. Britain belongs to Europe and the Channel was less of an obstacle than former French-German antagonism which had been liquidated. UK membership would contribute to the cohesion of Europe in the long run and would also help to reassure Germany. Furthermore, joint French-UK efforts, especially in Africa and in the UN, could be extremely effective and would be most helpful to the US. In reply to the Secretary’s question Ambassador Alphand said that there was no basic disagreement between France and the UK outside of Europe. The main problem was the UK position on relations with the Soviets and doubts whether the UK was really European minded. Ambassador Alphand said that he himself believed in European integration. He felt at the same time that de Gaulle’s concept of European unity was a step in the right direction. Certainly de Gaulle’s concept suited the British better than the concept of European integration.

Relations between the US and Europe

The Secretary said unnecessary theoretical debates about the US relation with Europe should be avoided. The practical fact was that we had given up sovereignty in many fields and would continue to draw close to Europe.

Ambassador Alphand said that de Gaulle did not suggest that we should get out of Europe but rather that we should not get into details, and should permit Europe to establish its own organization. The Secretary said that we had no blue print for Europe, nor did we desire a controversy about our relationship with Europe. European solidarity was in our national interest. There would be less controversy the more cohesive Europe becomes. Ambassador Alphand observed that the US would sometimes be accused of playing one European power against the other, sometimes of favoring a united Europe in order to be able to dominate it better.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11–RU/5–2862. Secret. Drafted by Imhof and approved in S on June 12.
1. See footnote 3, Document 247.
2. For text of the joint communiqué, June 2, 1961, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, p. 535.
3. See footnote 4, Document 250.
4. See footnote 1, Document 239.
5. See Document 249.