Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

148. Memorandum for the President⁰

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

• General Norstad’s Trip

1. Background. General Norstad is visiting Washington against a background of concerns over US policy which he has expressed to US officials who have visited him recently. These concerns reflect, in part, the fact that in past years General Norstad has been a strong, able, and unquestioned leader of the alliance on matters of politico-military policy. This situation resulted partly from tradition (beginning with General Eisenhower in SHAPE) and partly from his own considerable talents of leadership and diplomacy. The advent to power of a US administration with its own ideas on strategy necessarily produced a new situation. The General’s reaction to this situation is a natural one, and is compounded by differences of view regarding some tactical, as well as substantive, issues. He may raise two of these tactical issues while he is here:

(a) The General indicates that, although he is in general sympathy with the views of the new administration, he believes that we have presented these views badly—thus antagonizing our allies. (He may refer here to US discussion of this strategy in NATO in terms which make clear that some of its aspects are a departure from the strategy that our allies support and have followed so far under General Norstad’s leadership. This US discussion has undoubtedly generated some allied questioning but, on balance, we believe that it has had a constructive educational effect. German Defense Minister Strauss indicated, when last here, that he welcomed the detail and candor with which the new administration’s strategy had been discussed in recent US speeches to NATO; he spoke feelingly of the silence with which US had veiled its views on basic strategy in the past.)

(b) The General is also reported to be disturbed by the practice of sending visiting experts from State and Defense for short tours of duty with Ambassador Finletter’s staff. He believes that this has caused confusion and misgivings among our allies. (These experts were sent at Ambassador Finletter’s request, so that his staff and other national delegations might be made more familiar with US thinking. The views which they have expounded have naturally not always coincided with those of our allies or of the General, but their presence has helped to ensure useful and meaningful communication between Paris and Washington thinking. The fact of the matter is that some of the thinking results from complex, new studies generated here in Washington. The only feasible way to make the necessary information available, fully and expeditiously, is by supplying key personnel who were involved in making the studies.)

2. June 15 Statement. The source of greatest concern to the General at the moment, however, is the June 15 statement of Ambassador Finletter concerning MRBMs—both because he was not consulted about it, and because of the issue which this statement takes with the MRBM requirement, of which he has long been the principal exponent.

3. Procedure. We should have consulted General Norstad about the June 15 statement, as a matter of courtesy, although his basic views were known. He can be assured that in the future, whenever time permits, we will seek and welcome his views.

4. Substance. On the substantive question, the basic MRBM differences are as follows:

(a) Requirement. General Norstad wants 450 MRBMs to replace strike aircraft in Europe, which will become increasingly obsolescent. (The basic question is one of developing a logical strategy. To a considerable extent there is a difference between US policy and General Norstad’s views as to whether a modernization of the NATO strike force or an expansion of its strategic nuclear capability¹ is justified. The US position is that planned alliance forces are adequate, but that a multilateral MRBM force would have some military utility and might have² considerable political importance; we are prepared to join in setting up such an MRBM force if our allies desire, provided that it³ does not unduly divert resources from non-nuclear programs.)

(b) Manning. General Norstad probably prefers MRBMs to be deployed under existing procedures, i.e., US MRBMs, and nationally manned allied MRBMs with US warheads under “joint control”. However, in the case of MRBMs the warheads would, for technical reasons, be contained in the missiles, instead of being stored in igloos. (Deployment to nationally manned forces of missiles capable of reaching the USSR and containing their own warheads would, even with planned technical safeguards, be regarded as close to creation of de facto national strategic nuclear capabilities by many countries, including the USSR. German participation would, therefore, create severe divisive strains within NATO and in East-West relations. Moreover, a national pattern would have been set for the future shape of allied nuclear efforts, which we hope increasingly to channel into multilateral forms. For all these reasons, the US position is that allied MRBMs should be under multilateral manning, ownership, and control.)

(c) Sea vs. Land. General Norstad wants MRBMs to be both land-based and sea-based. (We believe that land-basing would involve serious political problems.) Governments would demand a special national role in the peacetime deployment and control of any missiles on their territory, and the possibility of national seizure of such missiles in wartime would frustrate the whole point and purpose of a multilateral force. Serious European and Soviet concerns would be generated by the prospect of deployment of MRBMs on German territory. The evident presence of MRBMs with the warheads aboard travelling about European roads might stimulate neutralist and anti-nuclear sentiment and demonstrations in some countries. If an accident, possibly induced by sabotage, involving even the threat of nuclear contamination occurred on land, the political damage to NATO would be serious. For all these reasons, the US position—since it was first made public in the President’s Ottawa speech—has been that a multilateral MRBM force should be seaborne.

5. Tactics. These differences are of long standing. The US Government reached its position in full awareness of General Norstad’s views and the reasons for them. He, in turn, has known of our views, and the reasoning behind them, and has not been moved to change his own position, which antedated them.

It is doubtful, therefore, that a detailed substantive discussion will narrow the difference. Indeed, a discussion based on the premise that the US position was open to substantial early change might do more harm than good by causing the General to engage in arduous and hopeful debate.

It is also doubtful that it would be desirable or appropriate to try to suggest to the General the course that he should follow in discussing these issues in his July 25 appearance before the NAC. He is dedicated to the larger interests and cohesion of the alliance, anxious to avoid a divisive confrontation, and likely to handle himself in the NAC with restraint and statesmanship. He has, moreover, traditionally been sensitive to attempts to dictate his course as an international commander.

More useful than either of these courses may be to discuss with General Norstad the considerations which suggest that the difference between his position and ours is one that we can both live with, since the US position will partly meet his immediate needs. A suggested outline for a discussion along these lines follows:

“We appreciate that General Norstad’s views on the military requirement for MRBMs are rather different from those which the US holds and which the President instructed Ambassador Finletter to present on June 15. We also know that the General’s views are based on long and thoughtful examination of the questions involved. These views have received the most careful consideration here in our review of theater and global factors bearing on this problem.

“In terms of end results, the difference in views between General Norstad and the US may not be critical. Our approach to military aspects of the problem, as set forth in Ambassador Finletter’s presentation, is to consider that problem from the point of view of the objective which both the US and General Norstad share: to ensure that there be the best possible coverage of all targets, with full account taken of political and military factors.

“If agreement were reached on a sea-based multilateral MRBM force, with 200 missiles, this could go a long way toward covering many of the targets involved. Remaining targets can, we believe, be adequately covered by external or other forces. We will have this problem under continuing review in the future, to ensure their coverage with the best possible weapons. Whether further steps are needed is a question which the Alliance can continue to study. In order to keep open the possibility of future action as may be required, we are continuing research and development on a wide range of items.

“In addition, Ambassador Finletter’s statement said that, although the US does not feel there is an urgent military need for MRBMs, we do feel that MRBMs would have military utility and could be of considerable political importance. In his meeting with the Permanent Representatives on June 20,⁴ Secretary Rusk sought to make clear that the US is prepared to go forward. We do have some firm views on the need for a genuine multilateral approach to the MRBM problem for political reasons, and believe that the Alliance should have full information on such factors as costs before arriving at decisions. But, as Secretary Rusk explained to the Council, we certainly are not seeking to ‘kill off MRBMs as such.

“As for timing, we look forward to a careful, meaningful discussion of the MRBM question in the upcoming months. We do not expect, and other countries do not appear to expect, the Alliance to rush into a decision. We sense that there is within the Alliance a desire to give priority attention to the negotiations between the UK and the EEC, after which we will have a better picture of the shape of Europe and of the resulting relationship between Europe and North America. The general framework of that relationship was laid out in the President’s July 4 speech at Philadelphia.

“We are keenly aware of the great services General Norstad rendered and is rendering the free world in giving vital and effective leadership to its military efforts in the crucial European area. We wish to support and strengthen that leadership, on which we set great store. We are most anxious that US handling of the MRBM issue not have a contrary effect. The US will do what it can to avoid or minimize any divisive effects in continuing NAC discussions. We believe that action on this issue can have a vital bearing on the political future of the Alliance, and we are anxious that it be approached in a way that lays a sound basis for the larger partnership which we see ahead.”

0. Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, NATO/Norstad Meeting. Secret. The source text, which bears no drafting information, was attached to a memorandum to the President from Rusk and McNamara, dated July 14, and was intended as a briefing paper for the President’s meeting with Norstad on July 16. No record of that meeting has been found; but the President’s Appointment Book records a meeting with Norstad from 4:07 to 5:27 p.m. (Ibid.)
1. McNamara added by hand “or an expansion of its strategic nuclear capability.”
2. McNamara added the words “might have.”
3. At this point in the source text McNamara struck out the words; “is of a size, i.e., about 200 missiles, which.”
4. See Document 143.