Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

149. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations⁰

Washington, July 19, 1962, 5:32 p.m.

Topol 128. Brussels for Embassy and USEC. Personal from Secretary to Finletter.

1. I appreciated your thoughtful Polto 21.¹ Such analysis and projection is most helpful, and I hope you will continue to favor us in this way from time to time. In re your suggestions, in para 8–10:

2. Atlantic Interdependence. I agree (your 8B) we must try to shape events so that the partnership takes forms which, in the military and other fields, foster Atlantic unity. We want to make clear, in every way we can, that US strategic power not only is adequate to allow the time essential for settling nuclear issues in a wise and orderly way, but also is tightly linked to the defense of NATO Europe. We wish to educate our allies to military fact that the defense of the entire NATO area is an integral problem and not divisible; we wish to reaffirm by U.S. actions and statements that the U.S. commitment to this collective defense is complete and unreserved. This seems to me essential:

(a) to maintain allied unity, confidence, and cohesion;

(b) to minimize pressures for hasty or unwise allied action;

(c) to ensure that a multilateral force, if one is created, does not fragment the unified defense of the NATO area and that planning for its use assumes that it would be employed in integral association with other alliance nuclear forces;

(d) to ensure that our allies, if a multilateral force is created, do not consider that it—rather than the total Western nuclear complex—is the instrument on which they must place primary reliance militarily for their nuclear defense, and are not moved by this view to divert unduly large resources from non-nuclear programs to building it up.

I should be most interested in any specific suggestions you may have concerning further actions to strengthen this allied awareness of Atlantic inter-dependence. Creation of the NATO nuclear committee and commitment of Polaris submarines to NATO were intended to serve this purpose.

3. US Posture Toward MRBM’s. I agree (your 8C) that we should make clear to our allies that they err if they believe that we oppose a multilateral MRBM force.

This is not our view, and there is everything to be gained by making that fact clear. I recognize that in the end our allies may not settle on a NATO force, and may conceivably find themselves inclining instead to a so-called “European” multilateral force, but these possibilities do not make the education re advantages of multilateral approach and indivisibility of nuclear defense referred to in para 4, below, any less important. On the contrary, such education is essential, to ensure that whatever force may be set up is genuinely multilateral and linked to other alliance forces; and this educational purpose will only be served if our allies take current discussion of multilateral approach seriously. To get them to take this discussion seriously, you should stress political and military reasons US is willing to go forward with multilateral force, if our allies desire:

(a) Political. I am prepared to see us lean quite hard on the political importance of multilateral force, in view of the impressions of German attitudes which I formed in Bonn. Schroeder was quite explicit on the point that the best approach to the German situation lies through a multilateral approach. You can make clear to our allies that we are prepared to accept, as legitimate in political terms, an allied desire for a greater role in the nuclear field, provided that the role is fulfilled in a military framework which links it to other alliance nuclear forces and through a genuinely multilateral form, and provided that it is fulfilled without detriment to non-nuclear programs.

(b) Military. The U.S. has said that the programmed force is adequate, on present assessments, to carry out the necessary and feasible strategic missions. Within the aggregate force which is now planned, however, substitutions are possible, and a satisfactory multilateral force might, therefore, permit some adjustments in presently planned force programs. You can stress, therefore, that if other members of the alliance would like to participate more directly in the alliance’s nuclear mission through multilateral force, this can surely be arranged in a way that would be militarily useful.

4. Educational Work re Multilateral Concept. I wholly agree with your proposition (para 9) that in explaining the basic principles on which a genuine and effective multilateral force would be built we can exert a powerful and constructive educational effect on European thinking in nuclear field. We should use this discussion, therefore, to get across to our allies (i) the feasibility and necessity of a genuinely multilateral rather than national approach to allied nuclear problems; (ii) how a genuinely integrated force would differ from essentially national forces under a thin veneer of multilateralism; (iii) indivisibility of nuclear defense, from a military standpoint. This education will be of value as background for the consideration of nuclear policy by our allies which lies ahead.

For this reason among others, you can be most forthcoming and aggressive in setting forth our views both re practicality and advantages of having any allied MRBM force under multilateral manning, ownership, and control, and re need for linking that force to other alliance nuclear forces. You should indicate, as I did at Bonn, that such a force must be so integrated as to preclude withdrawal of national forces, and thus alert our allies to the distinction between genuine and phoney multilateral alternatives.

All this can best be done in bilateral talks at present time, and I hope that you will act aggressively to this end.

While we do not want now to create debate in the NAC which would compel other countries to take positions on this issue before the UK-EEC negotiations are completed, we do want to make the U.S. position on genuine multilateralism and on indivisibility of nuclear defense wholly clear. More than this, we want to present to other countries the basic facts and analyses which are relevant to that position, so that they will be most likely to reach sound conclusions when they do begin to grapple with these nuclear issues.

As further step to this end, we hope to make available the studies you ask for in Polto 22,² plus appropriate back-up personnel as necessary, by September, If an NAC sub-committee could be established by then—without any policy commitment by other governments concerned—to collect and study for Council the facts about how a genuine and effective multilateral force might be set up, this could be a useful means of education. Such a technical study for the Council would not require the UK and others to take positions on policy issues till after the EEC negotiations, and could provide sound basis for eventual decisions by Council. If de Staercke is now to ask in NAC for further information of technical nature about the principles of multilateral force, therefore, I hope that he will indicate (i) that he does not expect U.S. answers until September; (ii) that even then he looks to thorough study rather than early policy decisions by other member governments; and (iii) that he proposes NAC sub-committee be set up by then as useful means to this end.

5. Control. I agree (your para 10) that it is of utmost importance we convince our allies that they are free to explore the control issue on its merits. You can certainly stress, as I did to Couve, that we are open to allied proposals and that we do not exclude the possibility of a change in the law.

In re your request for specific examples of possible control procedures, I suggest that you hold to those cited in the Presidentially approved policy paper³ which you have. I should think these would be specific enough to get allied discussion going, without appearing to foreclose U.S. government position on proposals allies might eventually make to us re issue and manner of U.S. participation, since these examples would be relevant regardless of U.S. role. These examples would also serve additional purpose we have in discussing control issue, i.e., making clear that multilateral control is feasible, in terms of both political and operational needs, contrary to French argument (Paris A–2419)⁴ that only national control can really meet these needs. I hope you will have this purpose well in mind and will work actively in bilateral discussions to fulfill it.

Once the allies thus begin to consider control of a multilateral force on its merits, I hope they will be able to focus on the facts—instead of the slogans—involved, and thus begin to take the indivisibility of nuclear warfare more seriously. A continuing objective of our educational efforts, should be to lay before them the facts and analyses which are necessary to this understanding.

But the only way in which we will get them to grapple with these facts and analyses is through a really free and serious discussion, and I doubt we’ll get such a discussion until the misapprehensions concerning our position on control to which you refer are removed. So I hope you will treat clarifying allied thinking on this latter point as a matter of the first importance.

6. I trust you will continue to keep us well informed about technical-level discussions of multilateral concept, as it proceeds, and your judgments thereon. I regard these discussions as of great importance in trying to guide and influence allied thinking along constructive lines. I hope you will take lead in such educational discussions, both in bilateral side-talks and in technical discussions, in elaborating and discussing the matters referred to above. I take it you are aware that you do not need specific instructions in pursuing this educational end within framework of approved U.S. policy. You should of course bear in mind that U.S. has agreed with what appears to be NAC consensus that NATO multilateral MRBM force concept should not be pursued at policy level in full NAC discussions while UK-EEC negotiations undecided. I am following your labors closely; you have my full support, as well as my best wishes for success, in this important endeavor.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 375/7–562. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Owen and Kranich; cleared with Kohler, Nitze, Fessenden, Weiss, Kohler, the Department of Defense, and the White House; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Bonn, Brussels, Rome, The Hague, and London.
1. Polto 21, July 5, examined the role of NATO after the United Kingdom, as seemed probable, joined the Common Market. (Ibid.)
2. Polto 22, July 5, reported that de Staercke would propose to the North Atlantic Council a study of the principles for an MLF. (Ibid., 375/7–562)
3. Document 135.
4. Airgram 2419, June 28, summarized a discussion on June 25 between French and U.S. officials about French nuclear policy. (Department of State, Central Files, 375/6–2662)