135. National Security Action Memorandum No. 1470
Washington, April 18,
1962.
TO
- The Secretary of State
- The Secretary of Defense
SUBJECT
The President has approved the recommendation of the Secretaries of State and
Defense that U.S. policy on MRBMs be
governed by the provisions of the paper entitled “Suggested NATO Nuclear Program,” dated March 22, 1962;
except that Paragraph 2(d) should not be volunteered by the U.S.
In handling the MRBM issue in the North
Atlantic Council, the U.S. should outline its views in accord with the
contents of this paper, not as a U.S. proposal, but as a U.S. contribution
to the resolution of the issues involved in this question.
The Secretary of State will have the responsibility for handling tactics on
this topic, consulting with the Secretary of Defense as appropriate.
[Attachment]
1
Paper Prepared by the Departments of State and Defense
Washington,
March 22,
1962.
SUBJECT
- Suggested NATO Nuclear
Program
After approval by the President, the United States should outline the
following elements in NAC, at
appropriate times and in suitable detail. These elements should be
discussed in the context of revised strategy.
[Page 385]
Within this framework, the need for improved
conventional forces should be stressed and elaborated in necessary
detail, and the extent to which the nuclear proposals are dependent on
an adequate conventional program should be made clear.
- 1.
- NATO
Participation: Measures should be instituted to give NATO greater information about US
nuclear strategy, and greater participation in the formulation of
that strategy. (Specific actions to this end currently under study
by the State and Defense Departments should be included, if they are
found to be useful.) As part of these measures:
- (a)
- Procedures should be instituted under which we would share
information about our nuclear forces and consult about basic
plans and arrangements for their use in the NAC and the Standing
Group–Military Committee. Although we should withhold highly
sensitive operational information concerning sorties
commitments, time on target, penetration tactics and the
like, we can and should provide a considerable body of
information, including targeting policy, nuclear force
strengths, analysis of the force capabilities, some
intelligence on Soviet Bloc strengths, and constraint
policies. In putting forth this information, the US would
stress the extent to which planned uses of this US strategic
force are devoted to European as well as North American
interests, the importance of responsible, centralized
control over nuclear forces, the strength of the present and
future nuclear capabilities of the US, and the probable
consequences if a nuclear war were to occur. To facilitate
this enlarged participation by NATO in over-all nuclear planning and
operations, increased functions regarding these matters
could be assigned to appropriate bodies, such as a small
special group and the NATO
Standing Group-Military Committee.
- (b)
- An attempt should be made to work out NATO guidelines, which the US
President would agree to observe, regarding use of all US
nuclear weapons in defending NATO.
- 2.
- US Forces Outside the Continent:
- (a)
- The US should indicate to its allies that an appropriate
portion of US external forces will be directed against
targets of special concern to Europe.
- (b)
- The US should state that it is prepared to commit to
NATO US nuclear forces
outside the European continent (additional to those US
forces already committed, in amounts to be determined). This
might be the force indicated under (c).
- (c)
- To meet on an interim basis any political need for having
MRBM’s based in the
European area which would come under NATO wartime military command,
Polaris submarines should, as promised by the President in
May 1961, be committed to NATO. The US should furnish
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NATO with a schedule
calling for the progressive commitment of Polaris submarines
as the total Polaris force grows.
- (d)
- To meet on an interim basis any political need for
multilateral political control over MRBM’s based in the European area, the US
should indicate its willingness to consider proposals for
some form of multilateral NATO control (such as indicated under 3(g)
below) over the Polaris submarines committed to NATO, if this is strongly
desired by our allies. It should make clear that it could
not consider proposals which would limit the operational
effectiveness of this vital element of the free world
deterrent or prevent the US from using these submarines in
self-defense whenever it felt compelled to do so. The US
should also make clear that the timing of any institution of
any agreed multilateral control would have to be determined
by the US in the light of operational considerations at the
time the proposals were made. Any multilateral control over
these Polaris submarines would lapse when they were replaced
by a multilateral MRBM
force.
- 3.
- Multilaterally Manned NATO Force: The US should indicate its
willingness to join its allies, if they wish, in developing a
modest-sized (on the order of 200 missiles) fully multilateral
NATO sea-based MRBM force. It should not urge this
course, and should indicate its view that MRBM forces are not urgently needed for-military
reasons, in view of already programmed U.S. strategic forces; it
should make clear that it would be prepared to facilitate
procurement of MRBM’s only under
multilateral ownership, control, and manning.
- (a)
- Targeting and Weapons. The question
of the targeting for a multilateral force, and the question
of the kind of missile and vessel to be used in the force,
should be determined in the light of NATO’s continuing
consideration of strategy, the role of the force in that
strategy, and other relevant factors.
- (b)
- Participation. The US should only
be prepared to proceed if the venture had adequate allied
participation, so that it did not appear to be a thinly
disguised US-German operation.
- (c)
- Costs, the costs should be
equitably shared. The US should make clear that it would not
be prepared to make a major contribution to the cost but
would expect the greater part of the burden to be borne by
the allies.
- (d)
- Mixed Manning. The US should
require a sufficient degree of mixed manning to ensure that
one nationality does not appear to be predominant in the
manning—and is not, in fact, in control—of any vessel or of
the missiles aboard any vessel in the multilateral force.
Members of the mixed crews would be recruited from national
armed forces into the NATO
MRBM force and would
thereafter be under the control of that
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Force; for trial and
punishment of major crimes, they would be returned to their
country of origin.
- (e)
- Custody. Ways should be found to
safeguard design data, e.g., US custodians could remain
aboard any multilaterally manned NATO vessels, with standing orders to release
the warheads in case a properly authenticated order to fire
was received through agreed channels (see g, below).
- (f)
- Centralized Command. In presenting
these views, the US would stress its belief that the defense
of the NATO area is
indivisible and that a NATO
Force, if one is created, could not fragment this unified
task. Planning for its use should, therefore, assume that it
would be employed in integral association with other
Alliance nuclear forces. Construction of such a Force along
the lines suggested above would thus not imply that the
separate defense of Europe was its purpose or likely effect.
On the contrary, our willingness to join in creating such a
force should be dramatic evidence of our unconditional
commitment to the defense of the entire Alliance.
- (g)
-
Control. The US should indicate
that it wishes to ascertain the views of its allies
concerning the control formula. In the ensuing
discussion, it should be receptive to a control formula
along the lines of that on which they are most likely to
agree:
- (i)
- Advance delegation to some person or group of
authority to order use of the MRBM Force (in
conjunction with other nuclear forces available to
NATO), in the
clearly specified contingency of unmistakeable
large scale nuclear attack on NATO.
- (ii)
- Agreement that the decision to order use of
the force in other contingencies should be based
on a prearranged system of voting in the NAC, which a majority of
our allies will almost certainly wish to provide
for voting by unanimity or by a group including
the US.
In connection with NATO
consideration of the multilateral force the United
States should make plain that transfer of nuclear
warheads or procedures for using the force without
United States concurrence would require amending
existing United States law and could well entail other
obstacles depending on the character of the arrangement.
The United States should indicate, however, that it is
willing to consider any proposal which is put to us by a
clear majority of the Alliance.