134. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations0
Topol 1579. Subject: Multilateral MRBM Force. You are authorized make following statement at earliest opportunity to NAC, which should [Page 381] be represented not as US proposal but as a US contribution to the resolution of the issues involved in the question. We leave tactical handling to you,1 but suggest you may wish arrange in advance support of Spaak, de Staerke, Stikker and others.
Begin text: During the course of the past several months the NAC has been engaged in the consideration of many facets of the problem of NATO’s nuclear role. These discussions have centered around provision by the US of nuclear weapons information to NATO, assurances of the US that it will maintain adequate nuclear capability at the disposal of the Alliance and guidelines for the use of nuclear weapons. We hope these measures will go far toward meeting our allies’ concerns in this field. We are prepared to go further, however, if they desire. We are prepared to join our allies in creating a genuinely multilateral NATO MRBM Force, if they believe that such a Force is needed. We are also, as a separate measure, prepared to commit additional external forces to NATO.
Within the US an intensive review of this question has now been concluded and the US desires to place a résumé of its conclusions before the NAC at this time. This is not done in order to precipitate immediate discussion, but rather to provide the NAC with a body of US conclusions which other countries can review and consider, in order that the Alliance can give early attention to the questions involved soon after the Athens Ministerial meeting, perhaps in a committee established especially for this purpose. It is not intended that this presentation should in any way disrupt the Council’s present schedule for discussion of items other than the two steps I am about to discuss between now and the Athens meeting.
To take the more immediate of these two steps first: The US is prepared to commit to NATO US nuclear forces outside the European continent, additional to those already committed. In this connection, the US will provide NATO at the Athens meeting with a schedule calling for progressive commitment of Polaris submarines as the total submarine force grows.
As the second step the US is prepared to join its allies in developing a modest sized (on the order of 200 missiles) fully multilateral NATO sea-based MRBM force. We do not urge a NATO MRBM force on the Alliance, in view of already programmed US strategic forces, but we are prepared to proceed with it in view of the recognized need for greater [Page 382] sharing of nuclear responsibilities within the Alliance and the fact that such force would have military utility.
This conclusion is consistent with past indications of our views. The US is on clear record, in President’s Ottawa speech and elsewhere, that it is prepared to join with its NATO allies in considering creation of a truly multilateral sea-borne NATO MRBM force, should the Alliance desire such course, as means for providing allies with greater participation in Alliance’s nuclear role. The US has on several occasions indicated, as for example in statements of Secretaries Rusk and McNamara in Paris in December, that the US would only facilitate procurement of MRBMs for NATO if these missiles were to be placed under multilateral ownership and control.
I should like now to indicate some of our specific thoughts as to the nature of this NATO MRBM Force.
- First, It would be under multilateral ownership, being financed, both for continuing cost and operation, through infrastructure principle, under formula to be determined. Costs would be equitably shared, with greater part of costs being borne by our allies.
- Second, It would be subject to multilateral control as to use in accordance with NATO agreed guidelines or any agreed formula for consultation and decision-making.
- Third, There would be sufficient degree of mixed manning to ensure that no single nationality is predominant in the manning of any vessel, or of the missiles aboard any vessel, in the multilateral force.
- Fourth, This initial force would be sea-borne in order to avoid the political problems associated with land-based deployment, facilitate multilateral control, minimize collateral damage if attacked by enemy nuclear fire, and lessen vulnerability.
- Fifth, This force would come under appropriate NATO commanders’ command.
- Sixth, Since defense of NATO area is indivisible a NATO MRBM Force, if one is created, should not fragment this unified task. Planning for its use should, therefore, assume that it would be used in integral association with other allies’ nuclear forces. Construction of such a Force along the lines suggested above would thus not imply that the separate defense of Europe was its purpose or likely effect. On the contrary, US willingness to join in creating such a Force should be dramatic evidence of US unconditional commitment to defense of the entire Alliance.
- Seventh, US would be prepared to furnish warheads. Ways should be found to safe-guard design data, e.g., US custodians could remain aboard any multilaterally manned NATO vessel with standing orders to [Page 383] release the warheads in case a properly authenticated order to fire was received through agreed channels.
- Eighth, Targeting of the force and the kind of missiles and vessels to be used in the force would be determined at an appropriate time in the light of our continuing consideration of NATO strategy, of the role of this force in that strategy, and other relevant factors.
The US would welcome the views of its allies concerning the formula for multilateral control of this force. A formula which would involve transfer of warheads or procedures for using the force without US concurrence would require amending existing US law and could well entail other obstacles, depending on the character of the arrangements. The US is willing, however, to consider any proposal which is put to it by a clear majority of the Alliance.
The above described multilateral MRBM force, together with the other steps that we have mentioned, would represent an effective program for sharing nuclear responsibility within the Alliance. This program would, we believe, respond to allied concerns in a way which would ensure that nuclear weapons become a force for cohesion, rather than division, in the Alliance. It would provide substantial impetus to the forces of integration within the Alliance. The multilateral force, in particular, would represent a bold and affirmative action toward greater Atlantic interdependence. It would provide our allies with a role in strategic deterrent which should effectively deflate Soviet attempts at nuclear blackmail. It would thus create an alternative to national development of nuclear capabilities which would make sense from both a military and political standpoint. We repeat that these views are outlined not as a US proposal but as a US contribution to resolution of the issues involved in this question. While this resolution will obviously take time, we would welcome any expression of views, either before or at the Athens meeting, and would be prepared to join our allies in considering it in more detail thereafter.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 375/4–1662. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution; Verbatim Text. Drafted by Fessenden and Kranich; cleared with Nitze, Seymour Weiss, and Owen; and approved by Kohler. Repeated to Bonn, Brussels, and London.↩
- On April 19, however, the Mission to NATO was informed that the “highest levels” in Washington did not want to be in a position of trying to push its MRBM proposal on the Alliance, but rather wanted to be in a position of responding to Allied desires. Because of this Washington wanted the subject handled in a way not likely to give rise to press reports that the United States had submitted a proposal for adding MRBMs to Allied forces. (Topol 1607 to Paris; ibid., 700.5612/4–1862)↩