150. Letter From President Kennedy to Prime Minister Macmillan0
Dear Prime Minister: Thank you for your message of August 3.1 The thoughts you express therein in many ways parallel the conclusions I had reached regarding the use of nuclear weapons in the European theater. One of the first things I took a hard look at last year was precisely this question. It seemed clear to me that we must arrange for a more effective control over the nuclear weapons already in the theater and that we must achieve the capability of a balanced and flexible defense which would enable us to deal with any military aggression in such a way as to give us the possibility of engaging military forces to bring about a pause which might give a last clear chance to avert the danger of nuclear war and to resume negotiations. This seemed to me also to require a really substantial build-up of conventional forces since it was not credible to me, and I am sure would not be credible to Moscow, that we would go from relatively limited surface probes directly to nuclear warfare as contemplated under the prevailing NATO strategic doctrine. As you know, we have been moving, without directly challenging that doctrine (CM–56),2 toward bringing our allies toward a recognition of both aspects of this matter. This effort has stirred some criticism and encountered some opposition.
On the question of achieving better control of the nuclear weapons stockpile in Europe, we have moved ahead toward the installation of permissive links to enable us to exercise a centralized control over their use. I think this is an important first step. I agree that it is desirable to consider in due course other methods of strengthening controls, including your idea of a tactical nuclear command directly under SACEUR. But I think it would be premature to go very far with this at the present time, since very complex questions about the organization of Europe and of NATO would arise. Further, if it were even known that we were considering such an organizational step at this moment, it would immediately give rise to further suspicions and speculations, some of which would be attributed to the forthcoming change in the Supreme Command.
[Page 440]Another reason for waiting a while on this matter, from my standpoint, is that Secretary McNamara has begun a careful review of our whole policy on tactical nuclear weapons. It is a tangled subject, and one on which feelings run high, but we hope by the end of the year to have a much better grip on it than we now have, and so to be in a position to join in forward steps of the sort which are implied in your letter. But before this study is completed and the argument thrashed out among us, it would not be easy for us to take a clear position.
We have tried to see to it during the past year that NATO received a considerable education with respect to nuclear weapons. You will recall the speeches which have been made in the NATO Council by Secretaries Rusk and McNamara. For your convenience, I am attaching a portion of Secretary McNamara’s speech in Athens3 which bears directly on this problem. Efforts of this kind have been beneficial, I am sure, but the educational process is still continuing. At the moment the discussion tends to focus on the question of an MRBM force and, as you know, we have agreed to soft-pedal this in order not to cause complications to your Common Market negotiations. Meanwhile what we need, I believe, is more education and less controversy. For this reason I would suggest the omission, in the statement you propose to make about Blue Water, of the first phrase in the fourth sentence reading, “whatever the ultimate NATO decisions may be on the concept of large-scale use of tactical nuclear weapons in support of land forces in a continuing battle.” I fear that this particular phrase would stimulate public discussion of this complex and controversial issue at a time and in a way which would not be helpful to the continuing consideration of broader nuclear issues in the NATO forum.
As to the decision you are making not to proceed with the development of Blue Water, I appreciate your reasons for this and feel they are right. I welcome the suggestion that the savings in this respect can be devoted to speeding the build-up of your conventional force.
In summary, then, let me say that I was very glad to get your letter and that I think we are much of one mind on these matters. For a number of tactical reasons—the current situation in NATO, the Common Market negotiations, and the timing of our own internal studies—I believe that major new departures should wait until 1963. But I remain very glad that you have opened this subject with me, and I hope that we can work closely together in pressing forward to a better posture at the right time.
With warm personal regards,
Sincerely,
- Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.↩
- In this message Macmillan expressed his growing concern about the diffusion of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, advanced the idea of a tactical nuclear command directly under SACEUR, and informed the President of the British decision to cancel its Blue Water missile. (Ibid.)↩
- Not found.↩
- Not printed, but see the source note, Document 136.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩