Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics

348. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State¹

Santo Domingo, October 15, 1962, 8 p.m.

570. Policy. Reference: Airgram A-173.²

Part One: Background

1. Political situation still fluid but developing rapidly. Deadlines approaching. By this Saturday, October 20, any Council member intending run for president or vice president should resign in accordance with gentlemen’s agreement among themselves. UCN held national district convention and PRSC organizational convention last weekend. UCN will hold provincial nominating conventions October 19. PRD will hold national nominating convention this Friday-Sunday, October 19-21. All candidates must declare selves by November 5. Political tensions rising. Strikes occurring or threatened various places. Saturday October 13 Fiallo meeting Puerto Plata stoned and UCN photographer shot dead, possibly by sniper actually aiming at Fiallo himself.

2. Cass, Fandino, and I spent long weekend aboard yacht Exangelita with President Bonnelly, Imbert, Reid, Freitas, Ramon Caceres, prosecutor Garcia Vasquez, General Luna, Commodore Rib, President’s daughter and son-in-law, an Imbert chum, others, and the wives of most. Collective impressions, supported by other recent observations and interviews, are that (a) Imbert and Amiama are in effect virtually running country; (b) Bonnelly knows they are; (c) Bonnelly has not joined them nor begun actively supporting them but probably does not intend oppose them and is only trying maintain tranquility to end; (d) Imbert indifferent to Bonnelly; (e) Bonnelly joins all aboard in appallingly deep contempt [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and all political parties, hardly mentioning Bosch at all; (f) all seem to assume neither Fiallo nor Bosch will become President; (g) Imbert controls police; (h) Imbert controls administration criminal justice; (i) military dislikes Imbert but is afraid of him and unless rapidly stiffened may not stand up to him in any move he may make; (j) Imbert and Amiama maneuvering furiously to try to put together coalition ticket possibly including Vanguardia, Juan Isidro Jimenez Grullon’s party, and minor parties; (k) candidate unknown, though Imbert himself, Fernandez Caminero, Tabare Alvarez, and others have been mentioned; (1) Imbert determined not relinquish power in any case; (m) Amiama working with Imbert, though keeping in background; (n) they emerging publicly as strongmen who can maintain order.

3. Military, always the key, has been suddenly deprived of its own defenses and its non-political role by (a) Fiallo’s blunder of two weeks ago (Embassy telegram 515)³ and (b) Bonnelly’s blunder in response to that blunder and (c) Bonnelly’s semi-withdrawal from power. This appears to give Imbert opportunity to move in on military.

4. Imbert’s intentions uncertain except that he does not intend relinquish power. He has several roads open: (a) Put together coalition and try to win or steal the election, or, failing to win or steal, cry “fraud” and knock over winner; (b) abstain from election then confront winner with his control of police and military and demand government posts making his control official; (c) direct coup before or after elections; (d) create sufficient bloodshed and terror in streets and in strikes, with or without help extreme left, to force Council to declare state siege and suspend elections, with possible new Council of State including perhaps himself, Amiama, Bonnelly. He is now trying (a). If it fails, he may try (b). We can probably continue to deter (c). He could try (d) as alternative to (b). Either (b) or (d) would confront us with extremely difficult situation. We do not believe he himself knows just what his moves will be. We had hoped he could reach accommodation with one or, preferably, several parties. But he is not negotiating with them and has indicated to me he will not.

Part Two: Immediate Action

1. In this situation, we can (a) support Imbert; (b) support free election contest between PRD and UCN; (c) stay out completely. I favor (b).

I would much prefer to reach an accommodation with Imbert. But if that proves impossible because he is intransigent and bent on total power, as he seems, I would prefer to oppose him than to yield, even if we lost.

2. After much difficult maneuvering, it now appears possible to hold meeting of Fiallo and Bosch, plus aides, at which they will agree that (a) the loser will support the winner; (b) the winner will permit the loser to exist as loyal opposition; (c) the winner will offer Cabinet posts to the loser. It may prove necessary for me to participate as mediator. If so—but only if my presence is essential—I propose to do this no later than Thursday, October 18. (Imbert and Bonnelly know I favor such an agreement. They consider it impossible.)

3. At this meeting, I would also hope that Fiallo and Bosch could agree on making their best joint offer to Imbert. (They have separately offered him pension, bodyguard, honors. They might go higher but it is doubtful they will give him more than senate seat or ministry without portfolio; and they might not offer that much.)

4. I consider it desirable after this meeting that Imbert understand immediately that this meeting was held, that we support free elections, and that we intend to see that the winner takes office and the loser survives. (Others also should know that this is our position, to avoid any impression we supporting Imbert.)

5. Concomitantly, we will do what we can to make it difficult for Imbert to put together his coalition by trying to keep the lesser parties out of his hands.

6. Obviously I am proposing we stand up to Imbert (since no one else, with possible exception Fiallo, will). To make it stick, we should work to (a) encourage the military to resist any effort by Imbert to enlist them for his cause; (b) give moral support to Bonnelly as he confronts Imbert’s increasing encroachment on his power; (c) make clear to all hands, including Imbert and Amiama, that we oppose their taking power and support an honest election between PRD and UCN. Rumor says Imbert is about to remove Rivera Cuesta, commander army. This would increase Imbert’s power and fear of Imbert among the officers. I propose we immediately tell military leaders, Imbert, Amiama, and Bonnelly we would look with disfavor upon any further arbitrary changes in high military command before next government takes over. I propose we tell them now that we support free elections, including elections free from pressure by anyone in present government.

7. We shall probably need to take further steps later. These represent what we deem present needs.

Martin

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 739.00/10-1562. Secret; Limit Distribution.
2. Not printed. (Ibid., PER)
3. Not printed. (Ibid., 739.00/10-362) “Fiallo’s blunder” refers to Viriato Fiallo’s speech of September 30 to the UCN Women’s convention in which he said that he had been in contact with senior military figures who had assured him that they would “guarantee” the December elections. Bonnelly, angered, threatened to fire the chiefs of the military serv-ices or resign himself.