Office of the Historian

349. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic1

Washington, October 17, 1962, 7:33 p.m.

433. Your 570.2

1.
On basis your analysis, we concur in course action outlined Part Two reftel. Wish make following comments which you should bear in mind in executing steps called for your plan.
a.
Support free election contest between PRD and UCN clearly only one of three alternatives posed which serves our current interests.
b.
We consider it essential thwart efforts by Imbert (with or without Amiama) to: (1) interfere with holding of elections; (2) nullify results of elections (if they are satisfactory to us); and (3) dominate elected government.
c.
It is most important Imbert and his associates be informed unequivocally of our position that we support free elections held in as calm an atmosphere as possible, that we intend to see the winner (provided he is not committed to left extremists or Trujillistas) take office, and that we expect to use our influence to see that the elected government can govern free of domination by the military or police or by elements controlling them. It should again be made unmistakably clear to Imbert that we would find it extremely difficult to recognize and provide assistance to any government installed by a coup against the Council or its elected successor. If you consider it helpful, Assistant Secretary Martin prepared go Santo Domingo to reinforce your approaches. In addition, we will work on Freites here on grounds he may be able influence Imbert, his cousin and associate. We believe we should avoid playing too heavily with Imbert and Amiama on theme GODR, Dominican people and parties owe them special debt because of danger this may only confirm intransigency.
d.
Our position should also be made known critical elements in Council, parties, military and police.
e.
On three-point agreement between UCN and PRD, we assume second point (survival of loser) will be presented not as special concession by winner but as natural feature democratic system. We also hope that Social Christians can still be brought into agreement.
f.
Re best joint offer to Imbert, we consider agreement by parties to name him or Amiama Secretary for Armed Forces or Secretary Interior would put elected government at their mercy. We recognize Imbert may not settle for less, in which case clear warning of our general position would be only brake on his plans.
g.
Not only should we do what we can to keep lesser parties out of Imbert’s hands but we should also try to induce acceptable parties (PNR clearly not acceptable and Vanguardia and perhaps others presumably so) which are potential participants in coalition manipulated by him to align themselves with UCN or PRD. Efforts with Social Christians particularly important, although we assume chances their association with Imbert coalition comparatively small.
h.
We believe military should be encouraged to maintain neutrality and to resist not only Imbert’s but any other’s efforts embroil them in elections. We agree further arbitrary changes military high command should be strongly discouraged. Is Imbert hold over police so strong as to make efforts break or weaken it fruitless?
i.
We consider that you should take every appropriate occasion to build up Bonnelly’s stature and stiffen his spine gainst Imbert’s encroachments. As we read Embassy’s reporting, only Council member clearly resisting Imbert is Reid. Can he play any significant further role in [Page 719] our confrontation with Imbert? Where does Pichardo stand in relation to Imbert?
2.
Your current estimate voting strength in percentages total vote of UCN, PRD, PRSC, far left (14 June, MPD, PNR, FNR, PSP) and possible Imbert coalition would be very helpful. We recognize, of course, that any such estimate would have to be at best very rough guess subject to substantial change.
Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 739.00/10-1562. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Crimmins and approved by Martin.↩
  2. Document 348.↩