347. Editorial Note
Ambassador Martin kept President Bonnelly apprised of the U.S. sugar bill as it made its way through Congress. The political repercussions of the legislation were made clear to the Ambassador by Council members Imbert and Amiama who on June 25, 1962, told him that if the sugar problem were not resolved he “had better find them a home outside the Dominican Republic.” (Telegram 2486 from Santo Domingo; Department of State, Central Files, 411.396/6-2562) The same day the Senate Finance Committee passed a sugar bill much like the Administration’s but which contained a special quota for the Dominican Republic. On June 30 a conference committee sugar bill still unfavorable to the Dominican Republic was passed. On July 2 Ambassador Martin was authorized to make a compromise proposal to the Dominican Government. “It said, in substance, that the conference bill’s quota, plus the Cuban windfall, was worth, at current prices, about $31 million less in profit than the Republic would have received [that] year under the present law. President Kennedy, recognizing the special case of the Republic, would undertake to make up the difference—to establish a special economic readjustment fund over three years… provided the Consejo [Council] would use this special ‘Kennedy Fund’ to diversify out of sugar. As for the $22 million, it would be paid as a grant, probably out of AID funds.” (Martin, Overtaken by Events, page 169) On July 4 a slightly refined proposal was accepted. Ambassador Martin’s memoirs trace the progress of the “Great Sugar Crisis” on pages 161-163.