Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics

151. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts in the American Republics¹

Washington, September 21, 1962, 8:23 p.m.

508. Depcirtel 468.² Department believes that informal MFM at conclusion its deliberations should issue public communique containing meaningful statements regarding increased danger Cuban subversion and aggression and specifying defensive measures which American community should take meet it.

We believe communique might include following elements:

1. Recognition recent Cuban arms build-up with Soviet military personnel and equipment intensifies dangers hemispheric peace and security. FonMins view with increasing seriousness Soviet intervention in building up Cuba as vanguard for assault on institutions of American Republics. This requires governments keep situation under constant review and renew efforts, individually and collectively, guard against further communist penetration this hemisphere.

2. Agreement work through appropriate OAS organs as necessary in pursuing following courses of action:

a. Reexamine trade relations with Cuba to see what additional steps affecting trade in items other than food and medicines could be taken limit capacity Castro regime subvert institutions OARs or threaten peace and security individual country or hemisphere.

b. Act to prevent vessels under their control from carrying to Cuba arms, implements of war, other items strategic importance.

c. Appeal all other independent nations take similar action with respect trade with Cuba and use vessels under their control.

d. Intensify efforts prevent Castro-communist agents and groups within their respective countries from subverting their established institutions.

e. Recognize Caribbean is area most immediately vulnerable to subversion from Cuba and consequently governments of area, pursuant paragraph 3 Resolution II of 8th MFM, have special interest take defensive measures prevent clandestine shipment men and material from Cuba to their countries for subversive purposes.

f. Agree that in this hemisphere cloak of secrecy should not be used cover up military buildups supported by extracontinental powers threatening peace and security of Americas and consequently intensify their individual and collective surveillance of delivery of arms and implements of war and all other items strategic importance to Cuba from any source and exchange information on such deliveries.

g. Request COAS undertake, pursuant Resolution II of 8th MFM and using SCCS as necessary, urgent and thorough investigation of: (1) transfer of funds from Cuban sources to OARs for purpose subverting peoples and governments in interest of international communism, (2) flow of Cuban subversive propaganda to OARs, (3) utilization Cuba as base for training and indoctrination of persons from OARs in techniques communist subversion and as staging area of movement of persons from OARs to Sino-Soviet bloc countries for further training. Investigation should include recommendations to governments on how combat these dangers, bearing in mind laws and constitutional provisions of respective countries.

3. Reaffirmation by FonMins their determination invoke Rio Treaty to counter immediately and effectively by whatever means may be necessary, including use of force, any threat from Castro regime or Sino-Soviet bloc powers to safety of American Republics and peace and security of hemisphere.

4. Declaration that FonMins look forward to time when freedom-loving Cuban people will establish government compatible with principles and purposes inter-American system which will be quickly recognized, assisted and welcomed back into family American nations.

Foregoing is exclusively for information of addressees. No mention should be made to local officials until specifically authorized by Department. We recognize this is ambitious program and may not be possible to secure agreement of FM’s at informal meeting this character to commit themselves this far. Will be exploring very informally with them individually in NY next week. Meanwhile would appreciate your comments.³

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 371.04/9-2162. Confidential. Drafted by Bowdler, cleared by Martin, and approved by Allen. Sent to all diplomatic posts in the American Republics except Kingston and Port-of-Spain and to USUN, and repeated to POLADCINCARIB and POLADCINCLANT.
2. Document 149.
3. Printed from an unsigned copy.