150. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- Mexican policy towards Cuba
PARTICIPANTS
- The Secretary
- Antonio Carrillo Flores—Ambassador of Mexico
- Mr. Martin—Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs
- Mr. Sayre—Officer in Charge, Mexican Affairs
The Ambassador called at the Secretary’s request. The Secretary inquired about the projected trip of President Lopez Mateos to the Far East. He said that the United States wanted to do whatever it could to assist the President while he was in the country. The Ambassador expressed appreciation for this offer. He thought the President would make a technical stop at Los Angeles on October 4, would stay over night at Honolulu on October 5, and make another technical stop at Guam on October 6.
The Secretary then turned to a discussion of the Cuban situation.
The Secretary said that he had little to add to the facts which he had described earlier to the Latin American Ambassadors. In response to the Ambassador’s question, he said that the weapons received by Cuba were normally used in a defensive system. He noted, however, that they had offensive capability if targets came within range, e.g., if a U.S. aircraft flying outside Cuban territorial waters came within the 17-mile range of ground-to-air missiles it could be shot down. He acknowledged that the weapons did not constitute a direct military threat to the U.S. and that they would require minimum attention if the U.S. had to move into Cuba. He said that the United States of course had no intention of permitting Cuba to export any of these to other Latin American countries.
The Secretary said that the American republics had to recognize that the Castro regime could not be permitted to continue in the Hemisphere for an extended period because it was incompatible as the Foreign Ministers had said at Punta del Este. He said that the United States is concerned about Cuban subversive activities, the large number of Latins receiving training in Cuba, and the amount of money being provided from Cuba for activities in other countries. He said that the people of the United States are seriously concerned about Cuba, as are the other [Page 319] republics. He said that some might consider these feelings irrational, but that these feelings are a fact and the United States Government had to deal with the situation with them in mind. The Ambassador said that he could confirm from his own experience that the people of the United States viewed the Cuban issue with considerable emotion. He said he is unable to make a speech anywhere without the question arising. The Secretary said that in explaining this situation to the NATO parliamentarians he had told them that all the money their countries are spending on publicity campaigns in the United States would be to no avail so long as ships carrying their flags participated in the Cuban trade.
The Secretary said that the U.S. considers that extra-continental intervention in the Hemisphere is a fact. We believe that Cuba intends to export its system to other countries. We view Castro-Communist activities as deeply antagonistic not only to the OAS Charter but to the values and systems of each of the republics. He urged that Mexico review its position on Cuba, giving the most solemn consideration to Mexico’s own interest, to the views of Mexico’s neighbors who look to her for leadership, to Mexico’s commitment in the Hemisphere, and to what Cuba really means to Mexico and to the Hemisphere.
The Secretary said that he did not want to make any specific proposals to Mexico. These would occur to Mexico as it studied the problem. He did want to mention that Mexico’s neighbors are preoccupied by the large number of their citizens who are passing through Mexico enroute to Cuba. The use of Mexico in this manner is disturbing to them and they are frustrated in dealing with the problem. He noted that a Mexican airline provides part of the service. He said that the U.S. feels that a strict watch should be kept on activities in the Caribbean. The American republics could not afford secrecy in this area. He said he knew Mexico maintained some surveillance against possible movements to and from Cuba. He expressed the hope that this could be increased and Mexico could announce publicly its action. The Secretary mentioned the subversive activities of the Cuban Embassy and consular personnel in Mexico. The Ambassador referred to the strict controls which his Government maintains at the Mexico City airport as an example of surveillance over Cuban diplomatic and consular personnel. The Secretary said he referred to Cuban diplomatic activities only as a point which Mexico might want to consider. Maybe such activities could be controlled by limiting the number of Cuban personnel in Mexico.
The Secretary emphasized again that he was not proposing or asking for any specific action but did want to suggest that Mexico earnestly explore what was in its own best interest and that of the Hemisphere. The Ambassador inquired whether he could say that the sense of the Secretary’s remarks was that Mexico should show it is preoccupied and not indifferent to the problem. The Secretary hoped that Mexico could go [Page 320] further, and show that it is deeply concerned. He said Hemisphere leaders had to look forward, and see where continuance of the present situation would lead. He noted that this is the first time that people now living have had to deal with the problems of a vicious form of intervention in the Hemisphere. The Secretary said he thought everything should be done to isolate Cuba and was afraid Mexico was not conveying an impression of solidarity.
The Ambassador said that he had not previously been confronted with so difficult and complex a problem in US-Mexican relations. He thought it was a political and not a military problem. He understood the Secretary to be urging that Mexico consider how it could best establish that it had a sense of solidarity with other republics on the Cuban issue. He recalled that President López Mateos had said in meeting with President Kennedy that Castro was no longer a popular figure and was now a tool of the Soviets. Mexico also recognized Cuba might be a greater problem for Mexico than the U.S. The problem was to find a solution that would not boomerang. Mexico was limited by its own political situation and upcoming presidential election. President Lopez Mateos is seeking to avoid an open fight between the extreme left and right. Steps by Mexico on the Castro regime therefore would have serious political consequence. Thus President Lopez Mateos had to make concessions first to the right and then to the left in order to maintain harmony. He noted Mexico’s relations with Spain were a concession to the left. Assistant Secretary Martin suggested the Mexican President might consider making concessions to the right on Cuba.
The Secretary said that the problem for the U.S. is not just political or one of public opinion in the U.S. or Congress. In a real sense, it involved the future of Cuba and of the Hemisphere. Cuba is the first point of confrontation with the Soviets in the Hemisphere. He noted that the U.S. has a million men on duty outside the U.S., with casualties a weekly occurrence.
The Secretary said that the Soviets are investing substantial sums in Cuba. He noted that the Soviets are not investing this for Cuba alone, but with the thought that Cuba is a bridgehead to the rest of Latin America. If the American republics could demonstrate that the investment will not pay off, the Soviets might reconsider the value of Cuba because the Soviets cannot afford such an investment on Cuba alone.
The Ambassador inquired as to the possibility of a meeting between President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev and whether Cuba would be discussed. The Secretary indicated that he thought not, because the Soviets would link Cuba to Turkey or some other spot. Assistant Secretary Martin noted that agreement by the U.S. to discuss Cuba with the Soviets would be in keeping with Khrushchev’s view that the Monroe Doctrine is dead.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 612.37/9-1862. Secret. Drafted by Sayre and approved in S October 12. The conversation was held at the Department of State. The time of the meeting is taken from Rusk’s Appointment Book. (Johnson Library)↩