Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics

100. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the Chairman of the Subcommittee on American Republic Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Morse)¹

Washington, September 15, 1962.

Dear Mr. Chairman: This is in response to your letter of August 3, 1962,² in which you requested that we examine in depth the policies underlying our military assistance program for Latin America and provide you answers, with supporting data, to several questions which you raised regarding this program. As I indicated our intention to do in my initial response of August 10,1 Secretary McNamara and myself, the members of our staffs and our Ambassadors in the field have been engaged in a careful and serious re-examination of these policies and programs. Your thoughtful letter, together with recent political developments in Latin America, have been helpful in stimulating a fresh look at this important area of policy. This explains the delay in responding to your request.

In historical perspective, our program of military collaboration with Latin American Governments has not developed haphazardly. It has constituted, since the beginning of World War II, a calculated United States response to three major historical military developments bearing in their wake direct and serious challenges to the security of the United States: (1) the threat of Axis domination, represented by World War II; (2) the threat of global war, brought into sharp focus by the Korean conflict; and (3) the threat represented by the appearance in Cuba of a Marxist-Communist regime committed to promote subversive, Castro-communist movements throughout Latin America. Our military programs have developed and altered in response to these threats. Our current programs have a three-fold objective: (1) improving hemispheric defense, principally through continuing to develop Latin American ASW capabilities; (2) internal defense, where necessary; and (3) a growing civic action program of direct civilian benefit.

Thus, broadly speaking, our programs are designed to contribute to hemispheric stability, to the maintenance of political democracy and to the principles of the Alliance for Progress. Notwithstanding occasional, deplorable military actions which have temporarily set back the progress of democracy, I am convinced that our programs are making a substantial contribution to all of these objectives.

The basic causes of the problem of violence in Latin America are to be found not in the military, but in basic weaknesses in the political, economic and social fabric of Latin American societies. Clearly the ultimate solution requires nothing less than the establishment of political, economic and social stability, under democratic institutions, throughout Latin America. In this process, an examination of history since World War II shows that the Latin American military have in general been a force for good and have played a leading and often decisive role in unseating dictators and helping to maintain political stability against revolutionary efforts to impose totalitarian regimes. Moreover, as we work toward the ultimate, evolutionary solution to the violence problem, we dare not disregard the current, most serious challenge I have mentioned above—the threat posed by the intention of the Castro-communist movement to utilize subversion and military force, whenever necessary, to retard or prevent democratic development. Thus a primary purpose of our military program must necessarily be to provide Latin American countries with the training and military equipment they require to frustrate such efforts.

In connection with our re-examination of our policy and programs, we asked each of our Ambassadors in Latin America to appraise the local impact of our military assistance policies and programs and to inform us whether, in his best judgment, a more restrictive policy with respect to the furnishing of military assistance would result in a net gain or loss in terms of United States foreign policy objectives in the country.³ Their replies, without a single exception, take the view that a more restrictive United States arms policy would not be in our national interest.⁴

It is to be borne in mind that these programs of which we speak, although important to our national objectives, are not large. Our total military assistance effort for Latin America is less than five percent of our world-wide program. It represents less than six percent of the military budgets of the Latin American nations themselves and thus is not responsible for the size of Latin American armed forces, which, in their turn, are not distorted in size compared with those of most other developing countries, accounting for only about ten to fifteen percent of total Latin American budgets.

In short, our re-examination of our current three-pronged program in the perspective of our over-all policies and objectives, leads us to conclude that the program is basically sound.

The foregoing comments and conclusions emerge from a detailed Staff Study which we have prepared in response to your request and which I enclose.

Your letter also requested information covering five specific points which I am happy to provide. This information is set forth in Part II of the enclosed Staff Study and the supporting material appended thereto.⁵

Sincerely yours,

Dean Rusk⁶

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 720.5/8-362. No classification marking. Drafted by Director of the Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs Ward P. Allen and Spencer.
2. Not printed. (Ibid.)
3. See Document 98.
4. Detailed replies are in Department of State, Central File 720.5.
5. The September 2 staff study and its enclosures are not printed.
6. Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original.