Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics

98. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts in the American Republics¹

Washington, August 10, 1962, 8:51 p.m.

230. Influential members Congress, wide segment press and some LA civilians severely criticizing MAP program, alleging: (1) close association of U.S. with LA military promoted by MAP and other joint activities contributes little or nothing to developing LA military respect for constitutional principles, e.g. Peru, Argentina; (2) U.S. equipment utilized largely to increase military prestige and capability to suppress non-communist democratic elements; (3) military establishments, budgets and arms acquisitions already too large; (4) MAP should include only minimum equipment and training critically required for internal defense defined in narrowest terms (e.g. police-type assistance) and civic action.

Following assumptions believed to underlie this criticism: (a) LA military have no legitimate hemisphere combat mission and U.S. armament only stimulates arms race; (b) long history military coups and caudillos likely to continue; (c) military largely oriented toward right and generally oppose social and economic reform; (d) military not significantly engaging their resources in economic and social development; (e) because military’s right-wing orientation militates against danger it will affiliate with local communists or Sino-Soviet Bloc, U.S. can, without jeopardizing its security interests, severely limit assistance it grants or sells to that which U.S. determines unilaterally to be critical LA requirement; (f) restrictive U.S. arms policy would promote reduction military expenditures and divert savings to economic development, but if not, would benefit U.S. public image by disassociating U.S. from LA military extravagance and irresponsibility.

Embassy requested cable soonest thoughtful comment re validity criticism and assumption. Include judgment whether adoption of more restrictive grant and sales policy would result in net U.S. gain or loss in terms our across-board foreign policy objectives in country.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 720.5/8-1062. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Spencer, cleared in the Department of Defense, and approved by Martin. Sent to all diplomatic posts in the American Republics except Lima and repeated to CINCARIB and CINCLANT.