Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics

97. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All Posts in the American Republics¹

Washington, April 18, 1962, 8:30 p.m.

1781. Following is guidance to assist Ambassador carry out internal security program responsibilities cited President’s letter last May.² Following applicable particularly to counter-insurgency, civic action, military indoctrination and other programs bearing US military “cold war” label.

As general rule US should encourage and whenever in US interest assist LA military and/or police to: (1) improve their capability to maintain internal security against communist inspired or exploited subversion and violence; (2) engage in those high-impact civic action projects which are necessary primarily for security reasons, i.e. projects required to improve image of local military and thereby improve military’s ability to maintain public support, particularly at village and campesino level, for necessary security measures; (3) engage in larger-scale, longer-term civic action projects which serve broad nation-building goals more than narrow security objectives, provided such projects consistent with and make practical contribution toward Alliance for Progress, are within local government’s economic capabilities to finance and/or US budgetary limitations to support, and do not substantially detract from required reorganization, training and equipping of necessary internal security forces.

However, each US movement into these relatively new fields of collaboration must have Ambassador’s prior assessment of its political-economic-military impact on country. To insure such assessments, Amb requested keep informed, in consultation Country Team members and CINCARIB, all current and proposed internal security activities of US departments. Whenever necessary, Amb should consult Dept for additional information or advice he requires for their adequate evaluation.

In particular, local civilian, police and military authorities should be stimulated by members Country Team, or US personnel visiting country, to request or accept only those US programs or activities which Washington has approved after full consideration Ambassador’s views. Dept desires that timing and channeling of such stimulation be subject Ambassador’s approval in every case.

In developing his recommendations to Dept re any internal security program, Amb should, unless he considers inadvisable or is otherwise instructed, obtain views pro-US, anti-communist civilians who Amb believes are in position make sound judgments re possible adverse impact of program on genuinely democratic developments and who he believes can be relied on to provide frank advice on pitfalls to avoid.

In developing recommendations re assistance to local police and/or paramilitary forces, particularly counter-insurgency training and equipment, Amb should evaluate risk of pro-communist municipal, provincial or other authorities using such forces against efforts of national military to maintain security against communist subversion and violence. In assessing this risk, Amb should, unless he considers inadvisable or is otherwise instructed, consult pro-US, anti-communist civilians or military authorities who can be relied on for objective and disinterested judgment on likelihood of any such misuse.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 720.5/4-1862. Secret. Drafted by Spencer, cleared in draft by Maechling and with the Agency for International Development and the Department of Defense, and approved by Martin. Repeated to CINCARIB and CINCLANT.
2. Reference is to a letter of May 29 from Kennedy to all U.S. Ambassadors. For text, see the Department of State Bulletin, December 11, 1961, pp. 993-994.