Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume III

110. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Smith) to Secretary of State Herter⁰

Washington, July 28, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Study of Limited War Capabilities

The attached document “United States and Allied Capabilities for Limited Military Operations to 1 July 1962” (Tab A)¹ was prepared by an interdepartmental study group made up of representatives from State, Defense (including JCS), and CIA. The study was undertaken largely at the instance of the State Department and was projected in a conversation you had in Geneva in the spring of 1959 with Mr. McElroy. The study supersedes one conducted in 1958² and corrects certain deficiencies noted in the earlier study, particularly the assumption that the US could use nuclear weapons in certain limited war situations while the enemy would not have this capability. More attention has also been given in the present study to the problems of logistics, including sea- and airlift.

The five situations examined (Korea, Offshore Islands/Taiwan, Iran, Berlin, and Laos/Cambodia/Vietnam) were selected as representative of the types of areas and situations where the US might be required to conduct limited military operations. They cover a sufficient range of problems to support certain over-all conclusions on our capabilities.

The principal conclusion reached in the study is that the US and its allies have the capability to handle any one of the operations studied, without the use of nuclear weapons except for air defense purposes in Korea and the Offshore Islands/Taiwan. This conclusion must be viewed, however, in the light of the following:

a) the Berlin case does not involve meeting aggression, but only a brigade-sized probe along the autobahn;

b) in Iran it is assumed that no more than 5,000 Soviet “volunteers” assist the Iranian rebels;

c) in a major insurrection in Laos military action alone would not be sufficient to restore and maintain the RLG’s authority; if the insurrection were supported by North Vietnam, the SEATO forces involved would be able to reestablish control only after a period of years; if large-sized DRV forces were to intervene, the allies could meet the situation only by attacking targets in North Vietnam;

d) the effort required in Korea against a combined Chinese Communist-North Korea invasion would be on the same order as that required in 1950–1953, although such an effort would enable the US and its allies to restore pre D-Day positions, thus preserving the territorial integrity of the ROK.

Nuclear Weapons

With respect to the use of nuclear weapons,

• —the scale of the Berlin and Iran operations studied did not require US use of such weapons;
• —in Laos, during an insurrection, there would be few profitable targets for nuclear attack; use of low yield weapons against targets in North Vietnam would be militarily profitable, but Sino-Soviet retaliation could seriously damage SEATO forces and jeopardize the operation;
• —to maintain air control over the Offshore Islands, upon which defense of the islands and Taiwan largely depends, nuclear air-defense weapons were found to be essential;
• —in Korea, it was found necessary to use nuclear weapons for air defense in order to protect the population as well as UN forces and logistic facilities including ports; while the US defensive capability would be enhanced by tactical use of nuclear weapons on the ground in addition, it was concluded that two-way use would probably result in either a military stalemate or an unpredictable expansion of the conflict.

CW/BW Agents

Only in Laos, was there considered to be a possible military advantage in the initiation by the US or its allies of non-lethal CW/BW agents.

Airlift

An operation in Iran of the kind studied would stretch US airlift capabilities to the utmost and would require such extraordinary measures as use of commercial airlift under contract to the Air Force, activation of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet and of Air National Guard Transport Units. An operation in either Laos or Korea would also place great strain upon airlift capabilities, and no two of these three limited military operations could be supported simultaneously.

Counter-Guerrilla

The US and its allies do not have an adequate military capability for operations against guerrillas.

Overall Conclusions

The conclusions of this study reinforce my conviction that the US does not have an adequate capability to deal with the kind of Sino-Soviet aggression which seems most likely to occur during the next few years. Such a capability, in my judgment, must be different from, and additional to, the deterrent/retaliatory forces which represent our ability to meet general war conditions. Although this concept is gradually gaining acceptance among military policy makers and planners, the slowness with which it is being reflected in actual capabilities is shown by the study.³ The fact that we do not have such a separate capability is shown by the study’s conclusion that any substantial limited military operation would detract from our readiness for general war, and any two such operations at once would cause the overall US general war capability to be degraded to an unacceptable degree. This effect would occur because of our present logistics posture, particularly our airlift and sealift capability, and because the small size of the Strategic Army Corps would not permit us to conduct certain limited military operations while maintaining an adequate posture for general war, or retaining a capability to conduct military operations in other areas.

Our inability to deal with limited aggression in the Far East without using nuclear weapons is a matter of great concern. All indications are that the initiation of the use of such weapons in Korea or the Taiwan Strait area (as well as in other areas) would be at prohibitive cost to the US in terms of world public opinion including the support of our allies. This consideration is quite apart from the authoritative estimates that our use of nuclear weapons would provoke counteruse, greatly expanding hostilities and possibly leading to general war.

The evident deficiencies in the mobility, size, and flexibility of US forces for limited military operations shown by the present study indicate the importance of your emphasizing whenever possible the foreign policy considerations relating to our defense posture set forth most recently in your letter of July 1 to Secretary Gates (Tab B).⁴ From a foreign policy standpoint, as well as from an over-all national security point of view, the US ought to have an adequate capability to respond effectively to local aggression wherever it occurs by conventional means, if desired. As a start toward such a goal I believe you should press for development of the capability to deal simultaneously with two sizable limited military operations without either degrading unacceptably the US general war posture or necessitating the use of nuclear weapons.

Recommendations:

The attached study will be presented by Defense in September to the National Security Council.⁵ Prior to the NSC meeting Defense intends to present it to a meeting of the Armed Forces Policy Council to which you will be invited.⁶ I recommend:

1. That you read the over-all conclusions of the study, pp. 4–8.

2. That you or Mr. Dillon attend the Armed Forces Policy Council meeting to discuss the attached study, and that the foregoing form the basis of the Department’s position at that meeting and at the NSC.

3. That you have in mind the points outlined above when you meet with the Armed Forces Policy Council, as suggested by Secretary Gates in response to your July 1 letter, to discuss the relationship of foreign policy considerations to the FY62 Defense budget.

0. Source: Department of State, G/PM Files: Lot 64 D 341. Top Secret. Sent through Under Secretary Dillon.
1. Not found attached; see Document 121.
2. See footnote 4, Document 27.
3. You will recall that Secretary Gates at the meeting last Friday morning indicated that there are shortages of conventional ammunition at the present time. [Footnote in the source text. No other record of this meeting on Friday, July 22, has been found.]
4. Not found.
5. See Document 125.
6. Irwin presented the limited war study to the Armed Forces Policy Council on September 27; see Document 121.