Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume III

111. National Intelligence Estimate⁰

Washington, August 1, 1960.

NIE 11–8–60

SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR LONG RANGE ATTACK THROUGH MID–1965

The Problem

To estimate probable trends in the strength and deployment of Soviet air and missile weapon systems suitable for long range attack, through mid-1965. The weapon systems considered are heavy and medium bombers, related air-to-surface missiles, ground-launched missiles with ranges of 700 nautical miles or more, and submarine-launched missiles.

Conclusions

1. Since the adoption of NIE 11–8–59, “Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack Through Mid-1964,” dated 9 February 1960,¹ we have made an extensive re-examination of all available evidence bearing on Soviet production and deployment of ICBMs. The conclusions resulting from this re-examination are, in brief (Paras. 13–14):

a. Soviet series production of ICBMs probably began in early 1959, but we have no direct evidence of the present or planned future rate of production.² ³

b. As yet, we can identify no ICBM-related troop training activities, nor can we positively identify any operational launching site, as distinguished from the known test range facilities.

c. We still estimate a Soviet initial ICBM operational capability with a few—say 10—series produced missiles as of 1 January 1960.⁴ ⁵

2. Since there is insufficient direct evidence to establish the scale and pace of the present Soviet ICBM production and deployment program,⁶ we have based our estimate in part on various indirect forms of evidence and on argument and analysis deduced from more general considerations. These latter include such things as the strategic ideas which appear to govern Soviet military policy, our appreciation of the strategic capabilities which Soviet military planners might expect to derive from given numbers of ICBMs, our general knowledge of Soviet military production practices, and our sense of the tempo at which the present program is being conducted. (Para. 15)

3. The Soviets have strong incentives to build a substantial ICBM force. The ICBM provides them for the first time with an efficient means of delivering a heavy weight of attack on the US. What we know of Soviet strategic ideas suggests that the ICBM is thought of primarily in terms of deterrence, and of pre-emptive or retaliatory attack should deterrence fail, rather than primarily in terms of the deliberate initiation of general war. These terms, however, provide no quantitative definition of Soviet ICBM force goals.⁷ (Paras. 16–23, 29)

4. As an approach to an appreciation of Soviet ICBM requirements, we have computed the numbers of Soviet ICBMs on launchers theoretically required for an initial salvo designed to inflict severe damage on SAC bomber bases and other installations directly related to immediate US nuclear retaliatory capabilities. Uncertainty regarding the inputs, and the sensitivity of the computations to variations in the assumptions made with respect to them, render the numerical results too various to provide a reliable basis for estimating Soviet ICBM force goals. Moreover, regardless of the results of any corresponding Soviet calculations, there are operational factors (such as Soviet problems in achieving simultaneity of salvo, and the mobility of US retaliatory forces) which would tend to reduce their confidence in their ability, with any given number of ICBMs, to destroy or neutralize US retaliatory forces through attack on fixed installations such as bomber bases.⁷ ⁸ (Paras. 24–29, including footnotes to para. 28b, and Annex A)

5. We have also examined the tasks and problems involved in the production and deployment of ICBMs through the elaboration of three illustrative Soviet programs. They represent the range of judgments, based on the direct and indirect evidence available to us, regarding the scale and tempo of Soviet effort. These illustrative programs are summarized, in the chart below,⁹ in terms of the numbers of operational ICBM launchers¹⁰ which each would provide. (Paras. 30–42, and Annex B)

6. With reference to the illustrative programs presented above, the members of the United States Intelligence Board have concluded as follows (Para. 43):¹¹

a. The Director of Central Intelligence considers that program “A” should be regarded as the nearest approximation of the actual Soviet program.

b. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes that program “B” approximates the most likely Soviet program.

c. The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, and the Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, believe that through 1961 the Soviet program is likely to fall towards the high side of the range defined by illustrative programs “A” and “B,” and, in the light of factors discussed in paragraph 8, they consider that in the 1962–1963 period it will continue to grow within the “A”-“B” range.

d. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, and the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department of the Navy, believe that illustrative program “C” most nearly approximates the actual Soviet program.

7. It is notable that the potential threat posed by programs “A” and “B” is substantially the same through 1960. Before the end of the year, either would provide a capability to inflict massive destruction on the principal US metropolitan areas. At the beginning of 1961, either would provide sufficient ICBMs and launchers to threaten the SAC operational air base system. Thereafter, the threat posed by program “B” would increase more rapidly than that of program “A.” By about mid-1961, program “B” would provide Soviet planners with a high assurance of being able to severely damage most of the SAC air base system in an initial salvo, whereas program “A” would reach this point late in the year. The considerably smaller program “C” would provide a capability to inflict massive destruction on the principal US metropolitan areas sometime in 1961. (Para. 44)

8. The present Soviet ICBM program is, of course, subject to change as the period progresses. Soviet planning for the period beyond 1961 will be substantially affected by the actual development of US retaliatory forces, the prospects for a greatly improved Soviet ICBM, and the prospects, on each side, for an effective defense against ICBMs, as well as the general development of the world situation and of relations between the US and the USSR. Our estimates for future years must be reviewed in the light of such developments and of such additional evidence as we may obtain regarding the actual progress of the Soviet program. They must therefore be regarded as highly tentative. For these reasons, we have not projected even a tentative estimate beyond 1963.¹² (Para. 45)

9. We continue to estimate that with relatively modest programs in 700 and 1,100 n.m. ballistic missiles the Soviets will acquire, by 1960 or 1961, a force of medium range missiles capable of seriously threatening the major Western landbased retaliatory targets within their range. (Para. 46–51)

10. We estimate that the USSR now has a limited capability to launch ballistic missiles from about a dozen long range, conventionally-powered submarines. The Soviets will probably increase this force gradually over the next year or two, and then introduce a weapon system capable of delivering ballistic missiles against land targets from a submerged nuclear-powered submarine. While we believe the Soviets would employ submarine-launched missiles against selected US targets, their planning does not appear to contemplate delivery of the main weight of an attack by this means. (Paras. 65–70)

11. The announced Soviet force reductions will probably bring some reduction in Long Range Aviation strength, but in 1965 the USSR will probably still retain a substantial bomber force. Even after a formidable ICBM capability has been established, the USSR will require long range bombers for a variety of purposes, including attacks on difficult land targets, reconnaissance, and operations against carrier task forces at sea. Air-to-surface missiles will be available in increasing quantity. The Soviets will probably introduce a new medium bomber capable of supersonic “dash,” and we estimate that they are developing a long range, super-sonic cruise-type vehicle, but Bisons and Badgers will remain the most numerous of Soviet long range aerodynamic delivery vehicles. (Paras. 52–64)

12. Our numerical estimates of Soviet heavy and medium bombers in Long Range Aviation, medium range ballistic missiles, and missile-launching submarines are set forth in the following table:

	Mid-1960	Mid-1961	Mid-1962	Mid-1963	Mid-1964	Mid-1965
Bombers and Tankers13
Heavy	135	150	140	130	120	100
Mediuma	1,100	950	800	800	800	750
Ballistic Missiles
700 n.m.
Operational Inventory	250	350	450	450	450	450
Launchers14	110	150	150	150	150	150
1,100 n.m.
Operational Inventory	80	160	240	300	300	300
Launchers14	50	100	100	100	100	100
Missile Submarines
“Z” Classb	4	4	4	4	4	4
“G” Classc	9	14	18	18	18	18
Nucleard	0	0	2	6	10	14

[Here follow the Discussion section and three annexes, totaling 28 pages.]

0. Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Top Secret. A note on the cover sheet reads in part: “Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The following Intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Joint Staff, and NSA.” The U.S. Intelligence Board concurred on August 1 except the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside his jurisdiction.
1. Document 88.
2. Series production means production of missiles of like type in accordance with a planned buildup rate. The date of commencement of series production is defined as the date of completion of the first missile in the series. [Footnote in the source text.]
3. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, believes that there is no evidence to indicate that ICBMs have been produced in the Soviet Union in numbers larger than are required by the continuing R & D activities. He therefore believes that this conclusion is misleading in that it may be interpreted to imply that ICBMs for operational deployment or inventory started to become available in 1959. See his footnote to paragraph 13 a. [Footnote in the source text.]
4. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, believes that as of 1 January 1960 the Soviets had only an emergency capability to launch a few ICBMs against North America. These ICBMs probably would have had to have been launched from R & D facilities. However, he believes that, for planning purposes, it is prudent to assume that the IOC had occurred by 1 January 1960. [Footnote in the source text.]
5. The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department of the Navy, believes that there is insufficient information to judge that, as of 1 January 1960, the conditions for IOC (that is, the date at which a few—say 10—series produced ICBMs could have been placed in the hands of one or more trained units at existing launching facilities) had been met. [Footnote in the source text.]
6. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, believes that the direct evidence upon which to base an estimate of present Soviet ICBM strength is of major significance. He believes that much of this evidence constitutes negative indications and, therefore, that its rejection as insufficient leads to unrealistic over-estimation. See his footnote to paragraph 15. [Footnote in the source text.]
7. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, does not concur in Conclusions 3 and 4. He believes that Soviet military doctrine, history, and behavior warrant the judgment that the USSR will strive to achieve a capability for decision which has as its basis the exploitation or application of military force, and he does not believe that the Soviets would be content with conceptual levels of pre-emptive attack and deterrence. Thus, he believes that the Soviet rulers would endeavor to achieve a military superiority over the US and would direct Soviet planners to assess those military requirements which would enable them either to force their will on the US through threat of destruction or to launch such a devastating attack that the US as a world power would cease to exist. [Footnote in the source text.]
7. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, does not concur in Conclusions 3 and 4. He believes that Soviet military doctrine, history, and behavior warrant the judgment that the USSR will strive to achieve a capability for decision which has as its basis the exploitation or application of military force, and he does not believe that the Soviets would be content with conceptual levels of pre-emptive attack and deterrence. Thus, he believes that the Soviet rulers would endeavor to achieve a military superiority over the US and would direct Soviet planners to assess those military requirements which would enable them either to force their will on the US through threat of destruction or to launch such a devastating attack that the US as a world power would cease to exist. [Footnote in the source text.]
8. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, believes that operational considerations which extend beyond the computations of the number of ICBMs required to inflict severe damage on certain static targets would prohibit Soviet military planners from accepting with confidence any calculation that a certain number of ICBMs would be sufficient, in conjunction with the operations of other Soviet forces, to reduce the weight of a US retaliatory attack to an acceptable level. See his footnote to paragraph 29. [Footnote in the source text.]
9. Not printed. This chart and the accompanying numbers were also included in Annex A, “Soviet Military Forces and Capabilities,” to NIE 11–4–60, “Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1960–1965,” dated December 1, 1960. (Department of State, INR–NIE Files) The number of operational ICBM launchers projected by mid-1963 for Program A was 400, for Program B 700, and for Program C 200.
10. The number of launchers is a good measure of the amount of activity involved in a given ICBM program, since it includes all of the facilities, in addition to the missiles themselves, which are necessary to the operational weapon system. Included are ground guidance facilities; test, check-out, and maintenance equipment; fueling and storage facilities; and housing and general purpose equipment. [Footnote in the source text.]
11. For a more extended expression of some of these views, see footnotes to paragraph 43. [Footnote in the source text.]
12. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes that, despite the difficulties engendered by consideration of the factors enumerated, an estimate beyond 1963 can be made. He believes that, lacking contradictory information, the rates of increase shown in program “B” should be continued through 1965. [Footnote in the source text.]
13. [Here follows a footnote in the source text with the dissenting view of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, on the number of bombers and tankers. He believed that the number of both heavy and medium bombers and tankers would be higher from mid-1962 onward.]
14. Probably including a few new supersonic “dash” bombers in 1961, building up to perhaps 100 by 1963–1964.
14. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes that each operational missile would be provided with a launcher. [Footnote in the source text.]
15. Each “Z” class submarine would probably carry two missiles.
16. Each “G” class submarine would probably carry about six missiles.
17. Each nuclear-powered submarine would probably carry 6–12 missiles.