112. Editorial Note
On August 9, 1960, the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in SNIE 100–6-60, “Probable Reactions to U.S. Reconnaissance Satellite Programs.” This Special Estimate concluded that although there was “no doubt” that the Soviet Union did not want the United States to orbit military reconnaissance satellites over it, Soviet leaders might not “choose to react immediately to a US reconnaissance program” and were likely for some time to come to “have only a marginal capability under most favorable conditions for interference with US satellites.” The Soviets might stage a campaign of protest if they thought publicity given to the U.S. program threatened their prestige, but would “in any case, probably exert all efforts to neutralize the transmission of data from vehicles which might be providing useful intelligence.” Most Allied governments would probably support the U.S. program even in the case of negative Soviet reaction to it. (Department of State, INR–NIE Files) For text, see the Supplement.
See also Documents 115 and 117.