Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume III

113. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower⁰

Washington, August 11, 1960.

OTHERS PRESENT

• Secretaries Gates, Douglas, General Twining, Admiral Burke, Colonel Eisenhower, General Goodpaster

Secretary Gates said he had asked for the meeting with the President to give him a report concerning targeting and retaliatory strike planning. This is a matter on which there has been a split in the JCS for a long period. Mr. Gates has decided to resolve the matter and has prepared documents giving his solution to the problem. The essential points in his mind are first, that there should not be a single command over the entire strategic effort, both SAC and Polaris and other elements. There should, however, be a national target policy. Further, the Joint Staff is not equipped to develop an integrated targeting plan. Therefore he proposes that a “Director of Strategic Target Planning” be designated who would develop such a plan and submit it to the JCS. He proposes that this designation be given, as an additional duty, to the officer serving as Commander-in-Chief, SAC. He added that he thinks this system will work and that it will put the JCS effectively in supervision over SAC where this has not existed previously. He proposes to have a meeting with unified and specified commanders in Omaha in December at which the initial plan would be very thoroughly weighed and reviewed.

The President asked whether the Commander of SAC is appointed by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force or is subject to Presidential Appointment on recommendation of the JCS and Secretary of Defense. Mr. Gates informed him that the latter is the case. Mr. Gates then said that Admiral Burke was in disagreement with the solution Mr. Gates was putting forward and had asked for the opportunity to be present to make a formal appeal to the President. Admiral Burke then presented his views in the matter, as set forth in the attached paper.

The President said he agreed that we cannot devise a completely rigid plan that excludes our allies. Also, he agreed that if the JCS lack the facilities to develop the plan, they lack some of the power to review it. The essential question seemed to him to be whether the plan should be developed in the Joint Staff or somewhere else. He did not see much merit in the argument that the command authority of the unified commanders will be impaired under the scheme proposed, because this impairment is common to either scheme, if the scheme produces an effective integrated plan. Admiral Burke commented that the nature of the plan would be rather different depending on whether it were done in the Joint Staff or at Omaha. The President said that he did not agree. He said that the matter is one of coordination of forces and timing. He foresaw, for example, the use of attacks against targets in coastal areas in order to facilitate deep penetration by our aircraft. In his opinion, the initial operations of the future impose a requirement for greater rigidity in planning than in past methods. He recalled that he had put forward the idea of a separate missile command a few years ago, and still thought that would have been a preferable system. It was not adopted, but the necessity for rigid control is still there.

The President said there was one feature of Admiral Burke’s remarks he was inclined to favor. That is the idea of getting busy and working up a plan on a trial basis during the coming months, and then meeting to see what it looks like. Admiral Burke pressed this point, saying he had no objection to the preparation of a plan, but thought there should not be a firm decision now that such a unit will be created on a permanent or continuing basis. General Twining spoke strongly against this proposal saying that there are some of the Services who would try to make this trial effort fail—and would succeed, as they have succeeded in obstructing any really effective coordination of target planning over the past ten years.

The President commented to the effect that Admiral Burke seemed to think a great reversal of existing methods is involved here. He recalled that a suggestion had been brought to him some time back that SAC exercise overall command of all retaliatory forces and that he had turned it down—principally for the reason that it is not yet clear what the future composition of our forces will be. Here the question is simply one of effective planning, and the difference is the more limited one of having coordination directly under JCS, or more indirectly through an agent in Omaha.

The President said one thing is very clear in his mind and that is that the strategic and retaliatory effort is different from the others in which unified commanders are engaged. Integration of this effort into a single operation has to be accomplished somewhere. He recognized that SAC has a particular and unique method of strike planning; even so, the difference between putting this function one place and another is that it is going under a man with a somewhat specialized approach.

General Twining repeated that we have tried to coordinate separate activities in this field for ten years, and have failed utterly. The plan must specify which targets are to be hit and when they are to be hit. The Polaris is about to join this effort. It is a purely strategic weapon, and we must do something about it to integrate it with other attack means. He said the crux of the problem is as it has been for nearly twenty years, that the Navy is completely opposed to serving under a single commander. Admiral Burke commented that all Navy combat forces at this time are under unified commanders, and that this is not true of either of the other services. The President commented that of course the Army’s Reserve Corps in the U.S. and the Reserve Tactical Air Forces cannot logically be put under unified commanders.

Secretary Douglas said he wanted the President to know of the deep and objective study that had been given to this problem by Secretary Gates. He thought that Mr. Gates had come up with a fine solution that should eliminate the haphazard duplication now existing among target systems. At the present time he thought there are as many as 200–300 targets that are subject to attack by duplicating systems. The central and basic question in his mind is whether we are to have an integrated attack plan. Admiral Burke said that he supports an integrated plan. Mr. Gates said that Admiral Burke really doesn’t mean that, because specific detail is the essence of a real and effective integrated plan. Admiral Burke said that he objects to great detail of the kind that would be set out in a plan prepared by SAC.

The President said that there are certain kinds of strikes that required detailed planning and execution if the whole operation is to succeed. For others, particularly those subsequent to the initial strike, niceties of timing are not so important, and more leeway is allowed. Such leeway could be put into the plan. Admiral Burke said that if a unified commander antes up his forces in order to have them incorporated in the plan, they will then be “frozen” and not available to him. On the other hand, if he does not ante them up he will have no assurance that important targets will be hit early enough to avoid threat to his forces otherwise engaged. On this point General Twining said that the priority listing of targets is the key. The President said that if we put large forces outside of the plan, we defeat the whole concept of our retaliatory effort, which takes priority over everything else.

The President then went on to say that he thought too much emotion was being displayed over this question and in fact in the present discussion. He did not think that this is a good way to respond to serious military problems, nor did it speak too well of the ability of good men to get together and work out solutions in the nation’s interest. He thought that dedicated men, casting out any thought but the good of the United States, ought to be able to solve this problem. He thought the question was simply one of method of achieving an integrated, effective plan. The group indicated that there was more to the question than simply method; there was disagreement as to the need for an integrated plan. The President said he was very clear on this question. For the first strike, there must be rigid planning, and it must be obeyed to the letter. After the initial strike, increased flexibility will be needed and should be incorporated in the plan.

The President said he was not persuaded by the statements of several people that an effort to prepare a trial plan will necessarily fail. Mr. Gates said that, to get an effective plan, it is necessary to assign responsibilities, rather than to attempt to do something on a “one time” basis. Admiral Burke said the thing to do is for each commander to send a man out to Omaha, participate in making up a target list, and writing policy, etc., but not to make a firm decision to continue this organization. General Twining said he would have to speak frankly and say that if it were announced that this effort were a trial effort, the Navy would sabotage it. General Twining said the whole question, once it is decided to have an effective plan, is whether to have it in the JCS or in Omaha. The President said he thought it was wrong to say the effort was sabotaged. He said he did not know anyone in the services who would do such a thing. He added that he would like to give further thought to the question of a trial run.

Mr. Gates said he wanted to come back to what was to him the fundamental difference. Admiral Burke did not want a detailed plan. Admiral Burke said he agreed with this statement—that he did not want a lot of detail in the plan. Mr. Gates said the essence of the plan is to specify the necessary detail. Mr. Gates said he would propose to go ahead, and come back in December to the JCS and the President for review of the plan as prepared.

Admiral Burke said he thought the plan could simply be an assignment of tasks, not in specific detail, to each of the unified and specified commanders affected. The President strongly disagreed, saying he did not think it is sufficient to assign retaliatory missions from the JCS to the different commanders. This whole thing has to be on a completely integrated basis. It must be firmly laid on. The initial strike must be simultaneous. Since there is no question in his mind about this principle, the agreement before him must be simply one of method of achieving such a plan. He said that he was inclined to try out the preparation of such a plan. He went on to say that a difference as limited as this could not in his judgment account for the amount of emotion that was manifest and that there must be something still concealed.

Mr. Gates said the point is that Admiral Burke wants a coordinated, not an integrated, plan. He repeated that the essence of an integrated plan is the pinning down of details. The President said he was inclined to agree that you cannot have a plan for the second strike which is completely firm. But you can and must have a firm plan for the first strike. He came back again to his thought that the matter is one of organizational method, on which the key question is where is the best talent to be found without training more people. What gives him more concern in the present situation is the schism over the method of conducting the first two hours or so of war. However, he thought the people he has to appoint to take major responsibilities in this field should be able to find a solution to this problem. Nothing has been brought forward that would indicate a solution to be impossible. He recognized that there seems to be a lot of emotion connected with the question and this means the task is a difficult one for those involved. His idea is to go ahead with an approach along the lines outlined by Mr. Gates, and make a final decision in the matter prior to January twentieth. He is completely ready to take the responsibility for the decision.

The President said that, if Admiral Burke accepts the premise—as he understands he does—that for the first strike no unified commander does other than what he is told to do, the matter is then capable, in his opinion, of resolution. If we move in this way, Admiral Burke can at any time come in to see him and show what in his judgment is wrong with the procedures. The purpose of the plan is to specify force and timing for the first strike. For that strike, it is not possible to equivocate. Admiral Burke said that the JCS would not, in his opinion, be able to review or analyze the plan and the target list in one or two, or even three, days at Omaha. The President said he saw no need to limit their review to such a short time. This is something that has to be done and they should take as much time as is needed. General Twining spoke strongly again in favor of making a decision to establish these arrangements, let the work go forward under these arrangements, and then if they do not work, or do not work satisfactorily, throw them out. The President said this is one point on which he is uneasy. He does not like the idea of making what seems to be a firm decision, and then a few months later having the matter come to the President to reverse his previous decision.

The President said that everyone owes it to our country to try to make arrangements work. He did not think, however, that a decision should be demanded of the President on establishing the arrangements. He recognized that Admiral Burke thinks that SAC will be too dominating in the process established. The whole question is one of method, however, since there seems to be agreement regarding the needs of the first strike. Mr. Douglas commented that these new arrangements will give more control over SAC than has ever been true before and that the means of preventing SAC from being too dominating are available. The President said he had no objection to it being said that this is the President’s plan. He thinks that something must be done before he leaves office, because we do not want to leave his successor with the monstrosity we now see in prospect as Polaris and other new weapons come into operating status. At the same time he wanted to test the idea very thoroughly. He thinks the question is a tremendously important one. He doesn’t think that the essential differences—which really relate only to method—are great enough to cause all the furor that they seem to be causing. He therefore thought that the method should be set up, and tested out. It should not be given such categorical approval on his part that a later decision to discontinue it would destroy confidence in the soundness of his judgment and approval in such things. Accordingly he thought the instructions should be issued on the authority of the Secretary of Defense.¹ At the same time it should be understood that the results of the plan would be tested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the results would be reported to the Secretary of Defense and the President in December. On the matter of having a completely integrated plan for the first strike, there could be no question.

There was then brief discussion on other subjects after General Twining, Admiral Burke and Mr. Douglas left the office. Mr. Gates told the President first that Dr. York has had a heart attack of substantial severity, which will knock him out for four months or so at a minimum. Mr. Gates will study what to do about filling the gap during this period. The President and Mr. Gates agreed that Dr. York should be kept in his job while he is hospitalized. The President asked Mr. Gates to talk to Dr. Kistiakowsky about the problem and see what suggestions he might have.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated personnel matters.]

G.
Brigadier General, USA

Attachment

²

Draft Letter From the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke) to President Eisenhower

Washington, August 11, 1960.

Mr. President: This is not a compromise. I did not ask to see you lightly, Mr. President. This is a problem of tremendous weight which will have a far-reaching effect on our military forces and the issue is more important than any in which I have been involved before.

I am gravely concerned over this proposal. My chief concern lies in three areas.

• First—the authority, responsibilities and functioning of the JCS.
• Second—is the effect the proposal will have on the ability of the Unified Commanders to carry out their missions under the situation with which they will be faced at the beginning of hostilities.
• Third—the effect on our NATO allies.

This proposal is a radical departure from previous practice. I am fearful that if the responsibility and the authority for making a national target list and for making a single operational plan is delegated to a single commander—for all the commanders’ forces, the JCS will have lost control over operations at the beginning of a general war, even though they will be given the opportunity to review and approve the national target list and the operational plan.

I know that is not the intent of this proposal. The intent of the proposal is that the JCS will exercise control, but this will not be the result in fact.

1. JCS have great responsibilities for strategic direction of war. Planning for initial nuclear exchange in a general war is the most important element of general war planning. U.S. force levels, atomic weapon requirements, allocation of atomic weapons, deployments of our own U.S. forces, operation of our allies’ forces and U.S. military budgets are all greatly influenced by the National Target List developed and the operational plans to strike the target on that list.

2. I believe that the JCS should retain in their hands, not only basic responsibility for directing effort in general war, but the means for generating the basic plans and for controlling the development of these plans directly—that is—control directly and not through another intermediate agency.

The proposal to place responsibility for the preparation of the National Target List and the Single Integrated Operation Plan, two very important documents, in the hands of SAC, as an agency of the JCS, is made because of the belief that the Joint Staff does not have the capability to prepare either of these documents. If the JCS and the Joint Staff do not have the capability to prepare these documents, their capability to review them adequately and to pass judgment on them is just as questionable.

Should target list and operational plans be prepared by another agency, JCS will not have knowledge of target lists or action being proposed in operational plans until the report is submitted. They will then be faced with checking both, which will require about the same type of work and nearly the same amount as the original preparation—or—the alternative of accepting the lists and plans “as is” along with the generated requirements stemming from these two documents of atomic weapons, delivery vehicles, and force levels and essentially deployments of forces. My next concern is whether a single commander as the agency of the JCS, even though served by his joint staff, can develop and maintain a National Target List and a single integrated operational plan in which there will be a determination for each of the targets to be struck by all committed atomic capable forces of all unified commanders and in which there will be a determination of the amount of effort and weight of attack to be used against each target on the list and which plan will integrate the individual strikes for mutual support through establishment of details such as attack corridors, timing, ECM etc. and still permit the unified commanders to carry out their missions with their forces.

1. We now have a sound unified command structure. The diverse and multipurpose forces assigned to Unified Commanders are deployed and ready. Threatening targets are nearby—and can be hit quickly and effectively.

2. The missions and forces of each of the Unified Commanders will differ from each other. Their plans must be different. SAC has essentially a single mission and largely single purpose forces. The Unified Commanders have a variety of tasks—and multipurpose forces.

3. In spite of participation by representatives of the Unified Commanders in developing the SIOP, I fear it will result in using the methods and procedures now used by SAC—and which are suitable for SAC—on the multipurpose forces of the Unified Commanders—for which these methods and procedures are not suitable.

4. Our total military posture, together with our unified command structure and operational plans, provide us now with capability to destroy USSR in war. We should seek improvement—yes—but this does not mean an abrupt departure from a system that has given us superiority—and that with a good margin of safety.

Unified Commanders have great responsibility. Should another agency be assigned a major portion of the nuclear strike planning responsibility of the Unified Commanders, it would cut into the heart of the Unified Commanders’ responsibility. It would force them to revise their own plans to conform to a master plan prepared by another Commander. If master strike plans changed frequently, as I fear they will do, the other plans would be in constant state of flux—and no plans would be stable. This is contrary to sound planning and control procedure. Unified Commanders exercising control of forces should retain the responsibility for planning for their employment. I believe the Unified Commanders should be given tasks to accomplish by the JCS and be permitted to accomplish those tasks in best manner with forces which have been assigned to them. Unified Commanders should have prerogative of changing their plans quickly to meet the varying threats and changing circumstances.

This proposal will affect our NATO allies, and I think adversely. NATO nations are exhibiting more and more desire to have nuclear weapons and a nuclear delivery capability and to participate in the planning for their use. As NATO nations create a greater capability for nuclear delivery and if they are to commit these forces to NATO, it is advisable that we do not create a procedure in the United States which might cause them to accelerate their impulse to develop and maintain their own individual national nuclear capability which would not be committed to NATO and over which the United States would not have any influence.

I believe that the Joint Staff can make out a suitable National Target List and can make out suitable operational plans and keep them up to date, with the same help from the Unified Commander that will be provided to SAC under this proposal. If the Joint Staff can not do this job—how can they plan for general war at all? In any case, I believe that the Unified and specified commanders should be consulted before the final decision is made to make a radical departure from the present system.

There are differences of opinion as to what the results will be if this proposal is put into effect.

It is a radical departure from the present procedures.

Nobody can know now what the effects of this proposal will be:

(1) on the way the Joint Chiefs carry out their responsibilities;

(2) on the operations and effectiveness of fulfilling their missions of the forces assigned to the Unified Commanders—

(3) and on our NATO allies.

No target list has yet been developed under this procedure.

No single integrated operational plan has ever been developed.

There are different opinions as to how these will look after they are developed by this method.

I would hope that before a final decision is made to go to this completely different system that

SAC, with the help of the Unified Commanders, and with a joint staff, make out a complete National Target List in exactly the way it would be done in the future and submit it to the JCS for complete and thorough review, and that SAC again with help of a joint staff, and the Unified Commanders make out their idea of single integrated operational plan and submit it to the JCS for review in detail by the Joint Staff and the JCS.

If this is done before final decision is made we’ll all know more about what the results will look like before we jump off the deep end.

If the results are reasonable, if the results can be checked by the JCS, if the forces of the Unified Commanders can be operated by the Unified Commanders effectively in carrying out all their missions, if it works all right with NATO, then—we can all buy it.

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on August 13. Another memorandum of this conversation by Admiral Burke, dated August 11, and Burke’s memorandum of conversation with Gates on the SIOP held on August 15, are in the Naval Historical Center, Burke Papers, NSTL/SIOP Briefing Folder. Both are in the Supplement.

1. On August 16, Gates authorized establishment of a National Strategic Target Planning Staff (NSTPS), later called the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS). (History and Research Division, Headquarters Strategic Air Command, History of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff: Background and Preparation of SIOP–62, undated; released by the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in April 1980, p. 10) To implement this decision, the JCS on August 19 issued the National Strategic Target Planning and Attack Policy and appointed General Power as Director of Strategic Target Planning. (Memoranda from the JCS to Power, August 19 and 23; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CCS 3205 Target Systems (17 Aug 59) Sec. 6) A draft of the National Strategic Planning and Attack Policy is Tab A to an undated draft memorandum from Gates to Twining on target coordination; both are enclosed with a letter from Gates to Goodpaster dated August 10. (Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records) See the Supplement.

   Further information on establishment and performance of the JSTPS is in the History of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff and in David A. Rosenberg, “The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945–1960,” International Security (7:4, Spring 1983), pp. 5–6 and 60–69.

2. Top Secret.