Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume III

121. Interagency Study⁰

Washington, September 28, 1960.

UNITED STATES AND ALLIED CAPABILITIES FOR LIMITED MILITARY OPERATIONS TO 1 JULY 1962

[Here follow a table of contents and an introduction, both in the Supplement.]

II—Over-All Conclusions

1. U.S. capabilities in conjunction with those of our allies are generally adequate to conduct any one of the limited military operations studied but these capabilities are dependent on prompt action, as required in each case, to:

a. Initiate partial mobilization.

b. Augment existing military lift capabilities.

c. Expand the war production base.

d. Waive financial limitations.

2. The U.S. over-all capability for general war would be degraded initially by any one of the five limited military operations studied, except Berlin, although not to an unacceptable degree. The capability of the U.S. nuclear retaliatory forces for general war would in no case studied, be seriously affected.

3. Although U.S. capabilities might, in some circumstances, be adequate to conduct two of these limited military operations simultaneously, the U.S. over-all capability for general war would, in such circumstances, be degraded to an unacceptable degree.

4. On the basis of the assumptions utilized, the five studies did not indicate a need for change in existing deployments of U.S. forces.

5. Substantial conventional forces—ground, sea and air—were required in all cases studied whether or not nuclear weapons were employed.

6. From the U.S. military point of view, the desirability of initiating the use of nuclear weapons varied in the five cases studied. In Berlin, Iran, and Laos, their use would not provide a clear military advantage. However, use of [5 lines of source text not declassified].

7. Anticipation of the need to initiate a limited military operation along with the earliest possible decisions on its character and objectives, including possible restrictions on weapons systems to be employed, will substantially enhance U.S. and allied capabilities to respond rapidly to the threat.

8. Limited military operations to achieve national objectives are based on a careful balance of political and military considerations which may require restraints on the use of military force. Such restraints may seriously handicap the conduct of military operations and must be kept under continuous review for the purpose of considering their possible revision, where necessary, to achieve established national objectives. The closest possible coordination of political and military decisions and actions will enhance our capability to conduct limited military operations effectively.

9. From a military point of view, it would not be advantageous for U.S. and allied forces to initiate the use of lethal CW/BW agents, principally because current programs provide only a limited capability and because our allies lack protective equipment and training.

10. U.S. employment of non-lethal CW/BW agents would, under certain circumstances, enhance the capabilities of U.S. and allied forces.

11. The United States and its allies presently do not have an adequate capability for counter-guerrilla type limited military operations.

12. If fully committed and used in optimum fashion, the U.S. military airlift, including reserve and national guard, is adequate when augmented from civilian sources for effective support of the individual operations studied in Iran, Laos or Korea, but is not adequate to support two such operations simultaneously.

13. An augmentation of existing sea-lift capabilities would be required in all cases except Berlin. This would vary from a rather small augmentation of existing cargo lift in the Pacific for the Offshore Islands to an extensive augmentation of cargo and passenger lift for Korea—including a transfer from the Atlantic to the Pacific of passenger transports.

14. World-wide strategic communications are adequate to support all operations studied except in Southeast Asia, where they would require considerable U.S. augmentation.

15. Pre-stockage of supplies in the European and Far East areas substantially enhances our capabilities to respond promptly and effectively. Although present pre-stocks in the Eastern Mediterranean and in Southeast Asia are minimal and add little to our capabilities to respond, programmed pre-stocks will partially correct this deficiency by 1962.

16. Transit rights and bases in Italy and Turkey are essential to U.S. limited military operations in Iran. Additional over flight, staging and operational rights in advance of U.S. deployment would enhance our ability to deploy forces rapidly.

17. Transit rights and logistic bases are essential in Japan, Okinawa and the Philippines for the timely and sustained support of operations in the Western Pacific. In addition, similar rights are essential in Thailand, Laos and South Vietnam for successful operations in Southeast Asia.

18. Existing logistic support facilities and air bases in Southeast Asia are inadequate to support sustained operations of U.S. and allied forces. The timing and extent of operations in this area are almost entirely dependent upon the effectiveness of corrective measures to rectify deficiencies.

19. In all cases studied, some degree of mobilization was required, ranging from a modest mobilization of selected reserve units in the Berlin case to a total mobilization of the 1,000,000-man Ready Reserve for Korea.

20. An expansion of the war production base would be required in the event of hostilities in Korea, the Offshore Islands or Laos in order to prevent a dangerous degradation of war reserves in PACOM and CONUS. In the case of Korea and Laos, six months would be required to re-establish these reserves to required levels. In the case of Berlin and Iran, it would be desirable to make preparations for the rapid expansion of the war production base.

[Here follow 131 pages of case studies, annexes, and a terms of reference. The latter is in the Supplement.]

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Records of the Office of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Top Secret. The study is the enclosure to a memorandum from Lay to the National Security Council and a joint memorandum from Gates, Dulles, and Merchant to Gray, both dated September 28. According to the latter, the study was prepared by representatives of the Departments of State and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency. Both are in the Supplement.