Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume III

109. Memorandum of Discussion at the 453d Meeting of the National Security Council⁰

Newport, Rhode Island, July 25, 1960.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and Agenda Item 1, “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security.”]

2. Measures To Enhance US. Military Readiness

Secretary Gates said that for the last month he had been collaborating with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in an analysis of the defense program. For the last ten days intensive work had been going on with respect to our military readiness in the light of the international situation. Another factor in the defense program at present was the slippage in Atlas construction. At the end of the year we would have twelve Atlas instead of the planned thirty. It was true that the Atlas in question was a soft Atlas and therefore the slippage was not quite as serious as it might seem at first glance. However, the slippage was a matter to be concerned about in relation to future construction problems for hardened Atlas and Titan squadrons. Research on construction problems was now going on. Mr. Gates said he had also examined the Congressional add-ons to the Defense budget and was prepared to make recommendations to the President that some add-ons be accepted, that others be rejected, and that some of the money provided by Congress should be used for purposes different from the purposes suggested by Congress.

Mr. Gates then summarized his proposed changes in the defense program as follows: the deployment of two more aircraft carriers to the fleet; the retention in operational status of three to five B–47 wings which were about to be phased out; an increased dispersal of B–47s; increased dollars for airborne alert capabilities; a slightly increased effort in the reconnaissance satellite program; and an increase in army readiness. Mr. Gates said all these items fell in the category of military personnel and M & O (Maintenance and Operation) money. These items could be carried on a temporary basis for a twelve month period if additional personnel and funds were made available. A complicating factor in the funding situation was the $215 million the Defense Department would have to spend due to the pay increase for government employees. If the whole package he had suggested were adopted, we would be spending $500 million more this year of which $215 million would be due to the pay increase for government employees and $95 million would be attributable to National Guard. Accordingly, our expenditures for military readiness would only amount to $250 million. In this program we would be committing ourselves to the extent of about a billion dollars. We would be rejecting some of the Congressional add-ons but would be taking about the sum of the Congressional add-ons although for different purposes. Secretary Gates said these suggestions raised a difficult question of political timing. Each member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had examined a long list of possible measures and had set up a list of priorities. He felt that in the light of the international situation, an enhancement of our visible readiness, especially in view of the slippage in missiles, was desirable. The President asked whether the strikes which had affected missile construction were settled so that by the expenditure of more money we could make up for lost time. Secretary Gates said the labor problems were practically settled. The slippage, however, had been due partly to jurisdictional labor disputes, partly to the newness of the programs, partly to the speed with which we were attempting to build missiles, and partly to certain features of army and air force organization. Secretary Gates said he was gravely concerned about the possibility of slippage with respect to the hardened missile sites which were due to become operational next year.

The President said the question of military readiness came up because of our desire to display visible, additional strength. He was unable to see how acceleration of the satellite program showed visible, additional strength. He doubted whether satellites gave the Soviet or the American people an impression of military strength. We were talking not about our own confidence in our strength but about taking actions which would promote the confidence of the American people and the Free World in our strength and would warn the Soviet Bloc. If we could accelerate the production of Polaris and do something about our alertness, we might be giving visible evidence of our military readiness. He suggested that we might lay down two additional Polaris submarines a year and added that the Atlas slippage was certainly unfortunate. Secretary Gates said his recommendations had been perhaps somewhat confusing because he had tried to recommend in one package what to do with Congressional add-ons and what to do from the standpoint of pure readiness actions. The President believed we were trying to take a cold war action which would make our people calmer and the enemy more respectful.

Secretary Gates said the readiness measures he had suggested would require about 45,000 more men in the armed services. He had ordered a five per cent reduction in all headquarters staffs including the Pentagon. The additional personnel would be for the purpose of manning the aircraft carriers to be deployed to the fleet and the B–47s which would be retained in operational status. Enhanced readiness could not be achieved without additional personnel and expenditures. Maintenance and Operations money would be required immediately; the case thus differed from long-lead time items with respect to which expenditures could be adjusted over several years.

The President remarked that in terms of percentages the number of additional men for the armed services referred to by Secretary Gates did not seem very significant. However, it would be significant if we could say that we were laying down four Polaris submarines a year instead of two. He had been told that the final objective of the Polaris program was forty submarines. Admiral Burke said the target was fifty submarines. The President said the number seemed to be going up. Admiral Burke replied that fifty had always been the largest number mentioned. The President said he had been told that we would keep two-thirds of our Polaris submarines on station at all times. As far as he could tell, we had a nearly invulnerable base in our Polaris submarines. He supposed the Polaris program could be speeded up by agreement with Congress.

Secretary Gates said the Polaris program was a long-lead time program. The President said he had been told that the long-lead time item in connection with the Polaris submarines was the reactor. Secretary Gates believed that we had stepped the Polaris program up to the maximum extent last April. The President asked why we could not accelerate the production of Polaris missiles even if they could not be put on submarines immediately. He felt that we could not get 45,000 additional men into action immediately. Secretary Gates said many of the additional men would operate the aircraft carriers to be deployed to the fleet, the planes on these carriers and the B–47s which would be retained in commission. The President said he could appreciate the retention of the B–47s as a visible readiness measure. However, the world today thinks we already have the most powerful navy in the world so that the deployment of two additional aircraft carriers might not impress the world.

Secretary Gates felt he had perhaps introduced an element of confusion by mentioning the pay increase for government employees, but he had thought it necessary to propose a package of recommendations. The cost of his recommendations would not be very different from the cost of the Congressional program but the money would be spent for different purposes.

The President asked how much slippage in Atlas missile construction there was in terms of time. Secretary Gates replied the slippage amounted to six months. Secretary Douglas said the Atlas squadron which was supposed to become operational at Warren Air Force Base had been delayed while the squadron which should have been operational now at Moffat Air Force Base would not be ready until January. The President inquired again whether this slippage was due to the recent strikes. Secretary Douglas said not entirely. For a year missile construction has been harassed by some labor trouble but the other reasons for slippage previously mentioned by Secretary Gates were also important.

Dr. Kistiakowsky believed that if an immediate and visible gesture were desired, a second Atlas squadron at Warren could be made operational within a month if we were willing to sacrifice the requirement to use the automatic check-out equipment. This check-out equipment was designed to indicate why a missile could not be launched whenever there was a failure to launch it. Without the check-out equipment, the missile is somewhat less reliable but if we were willing to accept less reliability temporarily, an additional Atlas squadron could be made operational within the next few weeks and another one could be made operational at Offutt Base in December. The President asked whether the automatic check-out equipment could be added to the missile complex when it was available or would it have to be integrated with the missile when it was installed. Dr. Kistiakowsky said the automatic check-out equipment could be added later. The President said Dr. Kistiakowsky’s suggestion seemed to him a very worthwhile one. He would dispense with the automatic check-out for the present and make the additional Atlas squadrons operational.

Secretary Douglas said fifteen or twenty soft Atlas missiles would not be significant during the next few months. He believed the retention of the B–47s would provide the U.S. with greater striking power. Secretary Gates said political difficulties would be created when it became publicly known that our Atlas program had slipped from thirty to twelve missiles. He did not believe the delay could be compensated for by eliminating the automatic check-out. The President said he had thought the delay was in the check-out equipment. Dr. Kistiakowsky said the delay could be attributed to the check-out equipment only at the Warren Base. We could gain only a month or two by declaring the Atlas operational now without the check-out equipment.

Secretary Herter asked how much the missile construction program had been held up by bidding on contracts. Secretary Gates replied that such bidding had caused considerable delay. The President believed we should by-pass fly-by-night operators and give contracts for missile construction only to reliable firms.

Admiral Burke said the Joint Chiefs of Staff had assembled a long list of possible measures in order to determine what measures would significantly add to our capabilities. Some of the measures suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff were visible. The retention of the B–47s was a visible measure but an acceleration of the Samos program was not. Army modernization, while not a spectacular measure, was an important one. An increase in army manpower was not very visible but it would increase readiness and capabilities. The President said the only hostilities the U.S. was really concerned about was an all-out atomic attack. He believed that we should be taking military actions which would convince the American people and the Soviet Bloc that our retaliatory power has been sharpened and speeded up. He was in favor of army modernization but felt the U.S. need not be afraid of brush-fire wars. We could say that we have fought such wars before and could do it again. We should be more concerned about the possibility of a rain of missiles on the U.S. and about becoming so weak that the enemy can attack us with impunity. Such a situation of weakness would affect the mental attitude of both the U.S. and the USSR. We would not have become so concerned about this matter at the present time except for recent Soviet threats. He had no objection to some modernization in the army but noted that the army has no retaliatory weapon.

Secretary Gates said he had been looking at the situation involving immediate gaps in our defenses, that is, those which would exist during the next twelve months. The situation for the next three or four years looks very promising.

The President said we would have to tell the public that we have miscalculated the rate of production of new weapons and that it would be necessary to continue to rely on some of the older weapons which we had thought we could phase out. Secretary Gates agreed but said he did not know how best to handle this question politically. The President thought we might have to declare that our production schedules had been erroneous all the time. Secretary Gates recalled that we had repeatedly said that we would look at our military readiness situation on a month by month basis. Threats by the USSR have recently been increasing. Secretary Douglas noted that our military forces had already been developed to a high state of readiness. The President said that when the missile slippage becomes known, the Democrats will make quite a point of previous estimates that a number of Atlases would be ready at this time. It would be desirable to inform Congressional Leaders of the slippage in secrecy but unfortunately the secrecy would not be kept. Secretary Douglas said the slippage had already been reported in a rather spectacular fashion but no difficulty had resulted. The President said a long delay was an entirely different thing from a short delay. Secretary Gates said Congress in its defense program had been concentrating on long-lead time items when it talked in terms of spending an additional $3 billion. There was a great difference between immediate readiness measures and long-lead time measures. Congress had not been talking about readiness measures.

The President said the only honest course of action was to say that we were wrong about our production estimates, even though we would be taking somewhat the Symington-Rockefeller line in bringing this matter to the public attention during the political campaign. In view of the enormous slippage in missile construction, the first thing to do is to deploy Atlas squadrons whether or not they have the automatic checkout. Secretary Douglas said such deployment would only save a month. He did not believe it was necessary to describe the Atlas slippage as enormous. For the future he could not tell what would happen to the program for hardened missile bases.

Secretary Dillon asked why it was necessary to say that B–47 wings were being retained and carriers deployed because of slippage in missile construction. He felt these military readiness measures were being taken on account of the recent threats made by Khrushchev. The President said we should also say that we are retaining ships and planes because we have arrived at a more realistic time schedule for missile production. He felt that army modernization should not be advertised as a deterrent. The army will be used in some small war, in Cuba or elsewhere. We need not specify the amounts of money necessary for these military readiness measures. We can say that because of Khrushchev’s threats, we are keeping certain carriers in commission, obtaining more nuclear-powered submarines, retaining B–47s, and taking various other measures and that the bill will be presented to Congress next spring. Secretary Douglas said this would present no problem except with respect to the pay of personnel. Secretary Gates said the Bureau of the Budget might be asked to make an advance apportionment of money for these military readiness measures but this would mean that the deficit would later have to be replaced. Mr. Staats said this action would require a report to Congress. The President said he would like to ask Congress to authorize expenditures for these military readiness measures within certain broad limits, with a report on specific expenditures to be made to Congress subsequently.

Secretary Herter felt the program summarized by the Secretary of Defense was a good program from the standpoint of visibility. He believed that army modernization would be very useful psychologically in view of the situation in Cuba and the Congo.

Secretary Gates said that if Congress re-opened the whole defense question when it came back to Washington in August, we could say that in changing the defense program we would give priority to retaliatory readiness but would not be averse to taking a look at other possible measures. The President said he would like to make some new weapons available more rapidly. He wondered whether the Polaris program could be speeded up by spending more money. Secretary Anderson asked whether Secretary Gates was to activate additional carriers or to keep some carriers active. Secretary Gates said the proposal was to deploy an additional carrier to the Sixth Fleet and an additional carrier to the Seventh Fleet.

The President believed the Secretary of Defense should make up a program of readiness measures and have a meeting with Congressional Leaders of both parties from the committees on foreign affairs and defense. Congressional Leaders should be told that in accordance with our continuing review of the military program, we wished to make some changes. For example, we do not wish to make the transition from old weapons to new weapons too fast. Therefore, we will keep two carriers in commission and will retain three wings of B–47s which were being phased out. We will indicate that we want to maintain and improve our military strength and that this will mean more M&O funds and personnel. The President cautioned, however, that the personnel figure should not be made too large lest it become next year’s floor. He felt that some day with the use of machinery we ought to be able to cut down on military personnel. The program presented to the Congressional Leaders should be couched in general terms as a continuation of the “new look” of the first years of this Administration. By presenting such a program we would not be surrendering to false programs put forward by political figures for their own purposes.

Mr. Gray said that the Mutual Security Program was an important consideration in any assumption of increased threats and truculence by the USSR. Secretary Gates said the Mutual Security Program as passed by Congress was $200 million short of the amount requested. The fight for adequate funds would be continued.

The President said that in the talk he would give to the Republican Convention, he would say he was planning to hold a conference with the Congressional Leaders to review the world situation and make such changes in programs as might be appropriate.¹

Secretary Gates said it might be prudent to take certain readiness actions immediately without waiting to consult with Congress, provided such consultation could be legally postponed. Admiral Burke believed ships could be deployed immediately and that personnel could be paid immediately but that a deficit at the end of the year would be created. The President said we would have to request additional funds from Congress for such deficiencies as might occur in M&O and personnel costs.

Secretary Douglas said that even though we emphasized our retaliatory capability, it might be well to mention the Congo and similar situations in talking about military readiness. The President agreed that the whole international situation should be emphasized. Secretary Douglas said the Congo airlift and possible action in the Formosa Strait might require additional expenditures. Admiral Burke believed the communists would deploy their strong arm squads throughout Latin America and use them as they had used them in the Congo to weaken governments or even take over governments if opportunity offered. He felt such operations would take place in Africa, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand with increasing rapidity. The President wondered how additional army forces could combat this kind of communist activity. Admiral Burke said we would have to face a series of annoying little actions in many places in the world and would have to be prepared to react rapidly.

Secretary Gates said that in his recommendations he had not priced out air defense. Some visible military readiness could be achieved by measures to create a stronger air defense posture through slowing down or stopping phase-outs. Also he had not discussed the possibility of putting tactical air commands in Europe on the alert. Under the President’s idea of visible measures, such an alert might be desirable.

The National Security Council:²

a. Discussed the subject on the basis of suggestions presented at the meeting by the Secretary of Defense after consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of State.

b. Noted the President’s authorization to the Secretary of Defense to develop, in the light of the current international situation, a program of measures along the general lines discussed in the meeting which will visibly enhance the military readiness of the United States and provide evidence of U.S. firmness, thereby promoting the confidence of the American people and the Free World and serving as a warning to the Soviet Bloc.

Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for appropriate implementation.³

[Here follow the remaining agenda items on the Organization of American States, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic]

Marion W. Boggs

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Boggs on July 28.
1. In the course of his address delivered on July 26 to the Republican National Convention at Chicago, Eisenhower reviewed U.S. defense policy, emphasized the “frequent and erratic” changes in Soviet attitudes, and stated his intention to meet with Congressional leaders. “And depending on developments in the meantime, I shall make such recommendations for changes in our own national programs as may then seem appropriate.” The address is printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–61, pp. 594–599.
2. The following paragraphs and note constitute NSC Action No. 2272, approved by the President on August 3. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
3. In a Special Message to the Congress upon its reconvening on August 8, the President outlined modifications in the Defense program, including both readiness measures and alterations in long-range procurement, and stated that the Department of Defense would carry them out “with its available resources insofar as possible.” He noted that a “modest increase in military personnel and in operation and maintenance funds may prove to be necessary to carry out the readiness measures. If such an increase should be required, I shall promptly request the necessary funds.” The address is printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–61, pp. 613–616.