Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume III

108. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower⁰

Newport, Rhode Island, July 19, 1960, 3:15 p.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

• Secretary Herter, Mr. Bohlen,¹ Mr. Kohler,² Mr. Wilcox,³ Mr. Hagerty, General Goodpaster

[Here follows discussion of the United Nations, Cuba, the Congo, and the Soviet shooting down of a U.S. RB–47.]

Mr. Herter then said that the question should be considered why the Soviets are taking the line that they have been taking. Their action gives real grounds for concern, since they are deliberately engaging in saber-rattling. He said that he and his associates, particularly Mr. Bohlen, have been giving some thought as to how best to handle this situation. One action that they have thought of is to work for something of major psychological effect through bringing our defense forces to a greater state of readiness. He asked Mr. Bohlen to outline this line of thought. Mr. Bohlen said the Soviet actions were now going beyond their usual ugly, angry reaction to every event they dislike. There has been a considerable shift in the Soviet behavior, evidenced by widespread campaign of inciting violence and disorder all around the world. He said that the threat to use force is something new in the Soviet tactics. This has now become something more than just words and needs to be met with more than words, since polemics and arguments are something they love for creating tension and disturbing world affairs. He said he had been casting about for some action that might quiet them down and show the world that the Soviets are not in position to rule the roost.⁴

At this point the President asked in what specific military fields this could be done which would have real significance. He commented that everyone knows that if we added to our ICBM program it would be three years before the additional items were actually off the line. Mr. Bohlen said another possibility is to put SAC on airborne alert. The President said the Air Force itself is opposed to this, adding that SAC did not want it. I commented that the Air Force staff, including General White and General LeMay, have not wanted to do this but that General Power has been pressing for it. The President said he gave no weight to Power’s views. Mr. Bohlen said that even if the use of the funds is not spelled out, just requesting them would show that we are not being frightened or cowed. He thought we might consider adding to our airlift. The President said he thought that additional airlift is perhaps the least significant need. What he thought he could do was ask authorization from the Congress to start spending available funds more rapidly because of the RB–47 incident, the Congo, Cuba, etc. Perhaps he could put more Atlases in production, and put more of the Air Force on air alert. Mr. Herter asked whether he might talk to Defense about this. The President went on to say that he did not like too much the idea of adding Atlases because it is practically an obsolete weapon. He would be more interested in the Minuteman, but again it is several years until the first of these will appear. Mr. Bohlen suggested he might simply ask the Congress for added money for defense and economic aid. The President said the crux of the matter is to decide what would carry sufficient credibility to create the psychological effect desired. Mr. Bohlen said he thought the Soviets are well aware the military balance is definitely against them. It is just possible, however, that they think our hands are tied during the pre-election period.

The President said he might ask for up to 100 additional ICBMs or perhaps $500 million for speed-up of weapons systems already proven and for increasing the degree of alertness. In response to the Secretary’s question, he asked that the Secretary meet with the Secretary of Defense, Gordon Gray, Mr. Harr and myself.⁵ He commented that he could state his intention even prior to the reconvening of the Congress, and bring out that, because of Soviet truculence and arrogance, he proposes to put a certain increase of funds into defense. These funds would be used to get things we want more quickly or additional things that are useful, and would not go into waste. Mr. Bohlen thought this could be done in a sober and deliberate way without kicking off a war scare. There was question as to whether anything could be done in the field of IRBMs. Mr. Kohler said that the MRBM has some possibility, although we are far from having worked out political arrangements. The President said that the meeting he spoke of should be held soon and asked that the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense not go down in their organization below an echelon they could trust since we do not want this getting to the press in a distorted way.

In further discussion Mr. Bohlen said there are two hypotheses with regard to this change of Soviet line. The first, which he does not believe, is that they might have decided this is the best year for a show-down—that the correlation of forces is in their favor, and that the U.S. is paralyzed because of the forthcoming election. The second, which he is inclined to favor, is that they are having a good deal of trouble with Peiping and are adopting a militant line in order to cut out the Chinese. There was a suggestion that the President make a public statement on this matter, whether by live address or by “tape” within the next few days. I suggested that this should preferably come after the convention, rather than before as some seem to be contemplating, on the ground that the President should not be doing two dissimilar things before the American people at the same time. If he were to speak now he would have to change his approach at the Convention and then revert to this, and this would be confusing. After discussion the President thought that there could be a mention by Mr. Herter of concern over this problem before he left Newport later the same afternoon, that the President might mention it briefly but clearly at the Convention, and then make his speech on it later. The President asked whether it might be a good move to take the U.S. dependents out of Berlin. Mr. Kohler thought that this action would frighten the Berliners and that panic might result which would damage and erode our position. He said that Mr. Merchant has been conducting a study of countermeasures, possible alert steps, and contingency planning. The President confirmed that Mr. Herter should say we are taking a serious look at the Soviet line of action.

[Here follows discussion of Berlin, the RB–47 incident, nuclear testing, Taiwan, and Latin America.]

The President told Mr. Herter that, if we are thinking of a Presidential speech on the foreign situation in about two weeks, we should build up to it by a series of comments and references, beginning with the Secretary’s own comment today about the change in the Soviet attitude, and the fact that this had received extended consideration during his meeting with the President.

G.
Brigadier General, General, USA

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster. The President was on a working vacation in Newport, July 7–26.
1. Charles E. Bohlen, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.
2. Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.
3. Francis O. Wilcox, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs.
4. The Department of State officials left a 4-page written summary of Department views with the President. This summary explicitly recommended an increase in the Defense budget, but did not specify an amount. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Material) See the Supplement.
5. In a July 20 memorandum to Gates, Herter suggested that these officials meet after the NSC meeting on July 21. (Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers) No record of this meeting has been found, nor were Defense program alterations or increases discussed at the NSC meeting. (Memorandum of discussion at the NSC meeting by Robert H. Johnson, July 21; ibid., Whitman File, NSC Records)