Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume III

125. Memorandum of Discussion at the 462d Meeting of the National Security Council⁰

Washington, October 6, 1960.

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. Strategic Target Planning Staff

The President said he had received good reports on the Target Center operations in Omaha. The fact that the Strategic Target Planning Staff was set up in Omaha, however, placed an additional burden on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, giving them the responsibility of keeping themselves informed on the operation of the Staff. He believed both technical and military elements should be watched very closely by the JCS in the development of the Omaha Center. The JCS had a special responsibility to inform themselves periodically about this operation.

General Lemnitzer said that very able and high-ranking military officers were keeping in touch with the Omaha Staff. He intended to visit the Omaha Center himself very soon. Secretary Gates said he would soon receive a brief on the subject from General Power. The President said the JCS had a great responsibility in this field because a great delegation of authority was involved.

The National Security Council:¹

Noted the President’s statement that, while he has received encouraging reports on the activities of the Strategic Target Planning Staff in Omaha, he believes that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have a special responsibility for keeping fully informed technically and militarily on the development of this Strategic Target Planning Staff.

Note: The above action, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for appropriate implementation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.²

2. U.S. and Allied Capabilities for Limited Military Operations to July 1, 1962³ (Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Capabilities of Forces for Limited Military Operations,” dated June 18, 1958; NSC Action No. 1934;⁴ Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated September 28, 1960⁵)

Mr. Gray introduced this subject to the Council by reading the first three paragraphs of his briefing note, a copy of which is filed in the Minutes of this Meeting and another copy of which is attached to this Memorandum.⁶ Mr. Gray then introduced Assistant Secretary of Defense Irwin to make a presentation consisting of a summary of the 135-page report on the subject transmitted by the reference memorandum of September 28, 1960. (A copy of Mr. Irwin’s presentation is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another copy is attached to this Memorandum.)⁷

At the close of Mr. Irwin’s presentation, the President said he was interested in the difference of judgment as to whether we should use nuclear weapons immediately in responding to limited war situations which we could not otherwise handle, or whether we should come to the use of nuclear weapons gradually through a process of moves and counter-moves by our forces and the enemy forces. His own feeling was that if we were dependent on and armed with nuclear weapons, we should use them from the outset in the same manner that we would use any other weapon. If we were uncertain whether an enemy aggression can be stopped without the use of nuclear weapons, then we would need to use such weapons.

Mr. Irwin said there were two views on this subject. One view was that we should use nuclear weapons immediately when limited war hostilities broke out. Another view was that we should not use nuclear weapons because their use would create an impossible political situation with our allies; accordingly, we should wait until events force us to use nuclear weapons. Any study of limited war generally contains a compromise between these two views.

Secretary Anderson said he was impressed by our deficiencies with respect to guerrilla warfare. He felt that a great many situations in this hemisphere, as well as in other parts of the world, would call for U.S. action against guerrilla forces. Secretary Gates said steps were being taken to correct this deficiency, which had been high-lighted by the situation in Vietnam. The Army had recently dispatched training teams to Vietnam with the goal of training 4000 anti-guerrilla fighters who can be instructors for training additional forces. Capable anti-guerrilla teams have also been sent to Laos. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are reviewing their programs to determine whether enough effort is being devoted to counter-guerrilla operations. General Lemnitzer reported that extensive counter-guerrilla training was underway. An Army school at Fort Bragg initiates training and doctrine. Special counter-guerrilla groups are deployed to various areas.

The President said one of the most important and serious problems posed by the limited war study was how to stop limited wars from becoming general wars. Lincoln had said the way to kill a snake was to scotch its head. The President would, in general, be against a decision to attack the USSR in order to stop a limited Soviet aggression. He referred to the assumption in the limited war study that 5,000 Soviet volunteers had appeared in Iran. He thought that in such a situation, the Soviets would probably send an ultimatum referring to “the gravest consequences” if U.S. troops entered the struggle. This would pose a serious problem of decision. Ultimately, some President might have to decide that it was his duty to strike the first blow against the USSR in response to such an ultimatum.

Mr. Dillon felt the limited war study represented a step forward. The study had opened certain doors but also strongly suggested proceeding further. In his view, the Laos and Iran situations depicted in the study were not realistic. However, he believed the Offshore Islands and Korean situations in the study were realistic. It was clear that the U.S. did not have the [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. With respect to the Offshore Islands, there had been no war-gaming of the proposition that once we use air-to-air nuclear weapons, the enemy might also use them. In such an event, we do not know what would happen. There has been no realistic examination of a two-way limited nuclear war in the Korean and Offshore Island areas. Mr. Dillon believed that such a war should be studied urgently. He felt it was possible to assume now that enemy use of nuclear weapons in either of these areas meant Soviet involvement, because the nuclear weapons used by the enemy would be Soviet weapons. Some years hence, however, the Chinese Communists would have a nuclear capability of their own. They might not be as cautious about a world conflagration as the Soviets are and may be more willing to use nuclear weapons in limited hostilities. In view of the forthcoming nuclear capability of the Chinese Communists, Mr. Dillon felt that a net evaluation study of some kind should be initiated to provide information on whether or not [2 lines of source text not declassified]. If such a study indicated that in a situation of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in these areas we would be placed at a disadvantage, this conclusion would strongly reinforce the grave doubts which the State Department has about [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] the Far East. We must rely on bases provided by our allies in the Far East; there is a serious question whether we can rely on such bases [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Mr. Dillon felt that it should be very clear that [2 lines of source text not declassified]. If we needed to strengthen our conventional military posture, we could do so by the time the Chinese Communists attain a nuclear capability. Mr. Dillon, in conclusion, said that the study left many questions unanswered and he hoped that some answers could be discovered by a new net evaluation exercise in time to produce a legacy to place before the incoming administration.

The President referred to the idea that both sides might use air-to-air nuclear weapons in the Offshore Islands area. He recalled that in 1953 a decision had been made in this room to use nuclear weapons if the enemy refused an armistice in Korea. Of course, the relative stocks of nuclear weapons made such a decision easier at that time. The President felt that if we became involved in the use of air-to-air nuclear weapons in a limited war, we would need to hit the enemy air bases. The enemy would then retaliate with larger nuclear weapons from farther back, whereupon we would attack these more remote bases. The reciprocal blows would tend to become bigger and bigger.

Mr. Dillon thought that in the event of limited hostilities with the Chinese Communists, their lack of sophisticated weapons might lead them to drop some crude nuclear bomb on Guam. Secretary Gates wondered how it would be possible to fight the Chinese Communists without nuclear weapons in view of the vast reservoir of manpower in China. Secretary Dillon said we might defend in a limited war by conventional means when we would not be able to take the offensive. In the case of the Offshore Islands, we might have to decide whether we would rather lose the Islands or start a nuclear war. The President said this would be a difficult decision for a President who has to decide under the Congressional Resolution whether an attack on the Offshore Islands is a prelude to an attack on Formosa. In making this decision the President would have to pay a great deal of attention to the past performance of the Chinese Communists. Khrushchev had told him (the President) that Chiang Kai-shek was only a rebellious general, a traitor to the constituted government of China. The President had replied that his views and those of Khrushchev’s were so different that there was no need of discussing the subject.

Mr. Dillon believed that hostilities over the Offshore Islands would represent our weakest case before the world. Mr. Gates said that would also be our weakest case domestically. Mr. Dillon noted that one major political party in the U.S. says we should not defend the Offshore Islands. The President said that might be good policy if it were possible to talk Chiang Kai-shek out of defending the Offshore Islands.

Mr. Dillon said the situation posed the problem of using nuclear weapons if such use might lead to a general war over the Offshore Islands. He did not know how long it would take to complete a study based on the assumption that both sides used nuclear weapons over the Offshore Islands. Secretary Gates said such studies usually depended on their basic assumptions, especially when we attributed to the enemy capabilities he does not now have. These matters were difficult to war-game but he believed it would be possible for three or four situations to be studied and analyzed. He wondered, however, if the existing study did not cover the point. Mr. Dillon said the present study did not go into detail in assuming that both sides used nuclear weapons. Mr. Gray said the study assumed we would use nuclear weapons and the enemy would not. The study expresses no opinion on what would happen next. Mr. Gray wondered whether we could maintain control of the air if both sides used nuclear air defense weapons in a limited war. If we could not maintain air superiority under these conditions, then would we have to strike at the source of air power, i.e., bases? Such a strike would raise the ante considerably. Mr. Dillon was suggesting that the JCS further examine the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons by both sides.

General Lemnitzer said this problem had not been war-gamed. The outcome of each step of a war-game would depend on the amount of enemy force assumed and the assumed U.S. reaction. The President said that with respect to the Offshore Islands, the assumption should be made that Taiwan had been attacked. Mr. Irwin said the existing study had assumed that the attack on the Offshore Islands was within the context of the ultimate Chinese Communist goal of taking Taiwan. The President said that in deciding on U.S. action, a President would have to determine whether an attack on the Offshore Islands was part of a continuing attack leading to an attack on Taiwan.

Mr. Irwin said the existing study assumed an attack on Taiwan. He believed the study suggested by Mr. Dillon would be helpful but would pose a difficult question; that is, if only air-to-air weapons were used and there was no net advantage in their use, should the U.S. use nuclear weapons against bases, should the U.S. use nuclear weapons at all, should the U.S. build up conventional forces in view of the fact that even if the U.S. had very large conventional forces, the enemy could still initiate nuclear war? The study suggested by Mr. Dillon would get into difficult questions of force levels and budgets. Many issues would be raised and none of them would be simple.

Mr. Dillon felt a new study might help clarify the thinking of all concerned. If the study indicated that general war is the only way to defend the Offshore Islands, then we might have to re-examine some of our previous decisions on the subject. Mr. Irwin said that if we did not defend the Offshore Islands, Soviet aggression in Laos, Berlin, and elsewhere in the world would be the inevitable result.

Secretary Anderson agreed with the previous comments that the Offshore Island case was our weakest case. However, he believed it was right to defend the Offshore Islands because such defense shows the world that, regardless of the smallness of the geographic unit, we maintain our principles.

Mr. Dillon said the scenario in the present limited war study indicates that the immediate objective of enemy operations in the Offshore Islands area is to bring about the surrender of Quemoy. The optimum enemy objective is to take Taiwan. Secretary Gates said that the late Secretary Dulles had once described the symbolism of defending the Islands, a point which the public sometimes misses in asking why we are thinking about fighting over these little scraps of real estate. The President recalled that the late Secretary Dulles, Walter Robertson, and Admiral Radford had once gone to Formosa to try to persuade Chiang Kai-shek that it was silly to ask the West to defend the Offshore Islands. Secretary Dulles had reported back, however, that we had to keep Formosa and that Formosa would be lost if the Islands were lost, because the loss of the Islands would undermine the morale of Formosa. Mr. Dillon said the decision made at that time as to the defense of the Offshore Islands would be harder to make now because of the balance of nuclear capabilities in the world. Governor Hoegh believed that opinion in the U.S. was firmly in favor of defending Quemoy and Matsu.

The President said it had not yet been decided whether we would defend the Offshore Islands. The President could not declare war; he did, however, have authority to make decisions under the Congressional Resolution relating to the Offshore Islands. He believed the U.S. public favored any action which shows that we are standing firmly against Khrushchev. Vital U.S. interests would not be lost by losing territory such as the Offshore Islands [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] unless the loss of such territory indicated that we were so weak we would not defend our vital interests. The President then asked whether there had been any conversations with our allies on this subject. The presentation by Mr. Irwin had pointed out that we must have bases in order to engage in limited wars. Secretary Gates said that we have recently had conversations with the British about joint use of such bases as Singapore. The President recalled that a year ago Macmillan had remarked that it would be difficult to get the U.K. to go to war for two million miserable Germans who had been against the U.K. in two wars. Mr. Dillon said the same considerations applied to the Offshore Islands. The U.K. would cheer if the U.S. successfully defended the Islands but would not help.

Mr. Dulles estimated that a capability by the Chinese Communists in air-to-air nuclear weapons was many years in the future, unless the Soviets provide the Chinese with warheads and equipment. The Chinese Communists will have some nuclear capabilities in three to five years but these capabilities will not be sophisticated enough to produce air-to-air weapons. Mr. Dulles observed that at the present time the Soviets would not give the Chinese Communists a plugged nickel.

Mr. Gray called attention to the fact that the importance of prompt action regarding mobilization and an expansion of the war production base had been sharply illustrated by the limited war study. He thought it was necessary that the Council be sure that the U.S. was in a position to fight a limited war. General Lemnitzer thought that mobilization actions would depend on the size of the limited war. Ammunition stocks were a key factor since we had only a modest reserve. In the event of a large limited war, we would have to start production immediately. The President asked whether ammunition was not in production at all times for replacement for the amounts expended in training. General Lemnitzer said this was a stop-and-go operation. We build up our ammunition reserves, use them up, and then replace them. The President said he supposed building up ammunition reserves could be carried too far because of deterioration of stocks and changes in weapons. Secretary Gates noted that a new mobilization base concept had been presented to the NSC last summer. This new base was not financed in any budget, however. Defense had not built up a big stock of matériel along the lines of World War II or Korean War inventories.

Mr. Dillon asked Mr. Gates whether it would not be helpful if three or four limited war situations were studied further. Mr. Gates agreed that such a study might be helpful but added that the results might be controversial because of the assumptions problem. Mr. McCone felt that a great deal depended on whether we assume the use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield only or on bases also. He wondered how a limited war in Korea could be conducted under the threat of a surprise enemy use of nuclear weapons against a port such as Pusan, where one nuclear bomb would destroy the whole operation. General Lemnitzer said that in the Korean War we took a calculated risk. [2 lines of source text not declassified]

Mr. Gray said the Record of Actions would reflect a request by the President that Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff should evaluate our capabilities for conducting a limited war in Korea and the Offshore Islands areas on the assumption that both sides used nuclear weapons. Mr. Gray also suggested that the JCS be requested to look at the possible deficiencies in limited war capabilities suggested by the study, with particular reference to Southeast Asia, airlift, and mobilization planning. General Lemnitzer agreed to the studies proposed, provided agreement on the assumptions could be reached.

At this point the President left the meeting.

The National Security Council:⁸

a. Noted and discussed the memorandum by the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject and the study attached thereto (transmitted by the reference memorandum of September 28, 1960), prepared by representatives of the Departments of State and Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency, pursuant to agreement between the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; as summarized at the meeting by Mr. John N. Irwin II, Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs).

b. Noted the directive by the President that the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff undertake, in consultation as appropriate with other departments and agencies, a study for presentation to the NSC of U.S. and allied military capabilities for conducting limited military operations in Korea and the Taiwan/Offshore Islands area, based on the assumption that both the U.S. and the enemy employ nuclear weapons under varying conditions. The study should be designed to answer the question of whether in these or similar limited military operations, there is more advantage to the U.S. from a military point of view in the use of nuclear weapons by both sides or by neither side.

c. Requested the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare a report for early presentation to the NSC commenting on possibly deficiencies in the U.S. posture for limited military operations that are indicated by the study attached to the reference memorandum dated September 28, 1960, with particular reference to capabilities in Southeast Asia, air and sea lift capabilities, and mobilization base plans.

d. Noted that the Department of Defense is taking actions to improve the capability for counter-guerrilla type limited military operations, referred to in the study attached to the reference memorandum dated September 28, 1960.

Note: The actions in b, c and d above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for appropriate implementation, with a target date of December 15, 1960, for completion of the study and report referred to in b and c above.

[Here follows Agenda Item 3. “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security.”]

Marion W. Boggs

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Boggs. For another account of this meeting, see Kistiakowsky, A Scientist at the White House, pp. 399—00.
1. The following paragraph and note constitute NSC Action No. 2316, approved by the President on October 17. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
2. According to Goodpaster’s November 9 memorandum of Lemnitzer’s conference with the President on November 7, Lemnitzer reported that “requirements for targeting need to be very carefully scrutinized because if they go up, force requirements will also rise. Judgment remains the most important element in the process, despite casual statements that it is a completely objective and mechanical process. He said that the JCS will follow this matter closely.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries)
3. General Polk also prepared a memorandum, dated October 10, of the discussion on this item. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2170) See the Supplement.
4. See footnotes 1 and 8, Document 27.
5. See the source note, Document 121.
6. See the Supplement.
7. Not printed.
8. The following paragraphs and note constitute NSC Action No. 2317, approved by the President on October 17. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)