Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Central and Southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI

193. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, April 23, 1957—7 p.m.

4102. Reference: Berlin’s 907 and 908.² Following are preliminary comments on situation posed by Kotsiuba démarche.

While a few of Kotsiuba’s demands could probably be met (e.g., greater uniformity of travel orders), question arises whether Three Powers would wish comply with even these demands under pressure of what is tantamount to Soviet ultimatum, at least as regards effective date. More difficult problem is extent, if any, to which we would be prepared to meet other demands, such as those concerning only two signatories each for agencies issuing travel orders, “nature of duties” of traveller, purpose of travel, etc., some of which obviously infringe basic position that it is right of three Ambassadors and military commanders, and not of Soviets, to determine who shall be authorized for travel to Berlin. We would presumably be prepared, in order to keep military trains running and Autobahn open for travel, to continue some limitations on categories of personnel authorized to travel; but presumably we would not be prepared to let Soviets know we were imposing such limitations nor to agree to all their demands regarding documentation and data to be contained therein.

Given ultimatum date of May 1, early action by Three Powers obviously necessary. On assumption Kotsiuba makes démarche to British and French similar to that made to Hillenbrand, several possibilities occur to us:

1. Three political advisers Berlin might inform Kotsiuba in writing that position of Three Powers already made clear, i.e., that Ambassadors and military commanders have right to determine who shall be authorized for travel to Berlin; that this procedure worked satisfactorily until Soviets instituted new procedures last November; and that we cannot accept Soviet attempts to impose restrictions on our right of access to Berlin which was established by Quadripartite Agreement and reaffirmed by New York and Paris Agreements 1949.

2. Similar communication might be sent instead from three Ambassadors to Pushkin with reference, in British and US letters, to Hoyer Millar’s and Trimble’s talks with Pushkin in January and March, respectively.³

3. Either of above communications might include additional statement to effect that we would be willing to study possibility of clarifying and making more uniform our travel orders and other travel documentation, but that for obvious technical reasons this cannot be done by May 1 and would, in fact, require at least several months.

4. Three political advisers Berlin might see Kotsiuba together this week and communicate orally substance of 1 through 3 above.

Alternative 4 has perhaps several advantages in that it seems preferable at this stage to keep discussion on oral basis and not evoke written statement of Soviet demands; also because further talk with Kotsiuba might afford (a) indication whether, as suggested paragraph 5 Berlin’s 908, there any flexibility in Soviet position and (b) some clarification of their motive in specifying May 1 as cut-off date.

Regarding this date and Kotsiuba’s “proposal” that German as well as Russian translations of travel orders be presented, we agree suggestion contained paragraph 4 Berlin’s 908, but also believe there good possibility that Soviets intend in near future to turn over control of checkpoints on Autobahn and rail routes to East Germans, and that revised procedures they demanding by May 1 is preparatory to such move.

We hope discuss situation with British and French here tomorrow if they have by then reports of their Berlin representatives’ talks with Kotsiuba.⁴ Would therefore appreciate comments soonest on four possibilities suggested above.⁵

Bruce

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/4–2357. Confidential; Niact. Repeated to Berlin, London, Moscow, Paris, and USAREUR.
2. Document 191 and supra.
3. See Documents 184 and 189.
4. On April 23, Gufler reported that Kotsiuba had repeated almost verbatim the statement he had made to Hillenbrand on April 20. The three Western political advisers then agreed on the following three recommendations in formulating the Allied position: 1) an entirely negative reply should be avoided if possible; 2) it would be undesirable to become involved in a discussion of the categories of travelers; and 3) perhaps a new tripartite stamp could be used as an Allied counterproposal to test whether the Soviets were interested in a reasonable settlement or wanted complete acceptance of their demands. (Telegram 1028 from Berlin; Department of State, Central Files, 862B.181/4–2357)
5. Telegram 4102 was received in Washington at 2:22 p.m. on April 23. Five hours later, the Department of State replied that course 4 seemed to be the best alternative, but would comment further after receipt of the report on the British and French talks with Kotsiuba. (Telegram 2999 to Bonn; ibid., 762.0221/4–2357)