Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Central and Southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI

192. Telegram From the Mission in Berlin to the Embassy in Germany¹

Berlin, April 22, 1957—2 p.m.

908. Subject: Berlin access. Reference Berlin telegram sent Bonn 907 Dept 1025 USAREUR 144 20 April.² After French and British political advisers have had their meetings with Kotsiuba today and tomorrow and we have been able to compare notes, hope to be able to make some tripartite recommendations regarding latest formulation of Soviet position. Meanwhile following are some preliminary observations in addition to those contained in reference telegram:

1. Kotsiuba’s manner was pleasant and conciliatory, and he put on good initial act to show Soviets motivated mainly by desire to eliminate needless misunderstandings at checkpoints and confusions about Allied documentation procedures. However, content of his statement was dogmatically phrased, and there was always undercurrent of implication that “misunderstandings” could be eliminated only on terms he was proposing. As he proceeded with his long opening statement it seemed to become clearer that these were scarcely proposals intended for negotiation but Soviet conditions to be met by May 1. Under instructions in paragraph 5 Embtel sent Dept 3726 rptd USAREUR 485 Berlin 454,³ I did not consider myself to be in position to draw him out on specific points so as to verify whether or not this impression correct.

2. What Soviets appear to be attempting is to achieve their current objectives regarding Allied travel to Berlin by obtaining acceptance of documentation procedures which in effect embody those objectives. While that objective seems considerably mitigated in some respects from extreme statement of Soviet position last November and has taken account of protests by Allies (for example in broadening categories of “permissible” travelers and accepting issuance of travel orders by Ambassador), they appear to go far beyond what we are prepared to accept in way of narrowing down issuance of travel orders. Primary target of Soviets appears to be large miscellaneous category of travelers whom they label as “tourists” and “businessmen”. They seem to have in mind largely travelers originating in West and proceeding to Berlin, since practically all persons stationed in Berlin now given travel orders would seem to fall within “permissible” categories.

3. Although Soviet motive for individual rather than collective approach to three political advisers might be hope of bringing Allied unity, seems more probable they requested meeting with US first because they may feel, from such statistical analysis as they may have made, that movement of leave travelers to Berlin is primarily an American interest. Moreover, diversity of authorities issuing travel orders is limited to United States.

4. Only reason which occurs to us for Soviet demand that new travel orders contain German as well as Russian translation is that this connected with some gesture towards GDR, perhaps desire to be able to show that Soviets are narrowly interpreting categories of travelers they will continue to process apart from GDR controls at check points.

5. If in rather unlikely event it should develop that Soviets really wish to negotiate rather than dictate terms under which to end present unsatisfactory situation at border check points, essential issue posed is whether (a) some accommodations in form can be envisaged (e.g., restriction of travel order issuing authorities) without concession of any essential principle to enable Allies to make counterproposals or (b) Soviet statement must be rejected in total as intolerable effort, by proposing basic changes in documentation procedures, to achieve objectives they have failed to obtain by less clear-cut actions in past six months.

Hillenbrand

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 862B.181/4–2257. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, Moscow, Paris, and Washington. The source text is the Department of State copy.
2. Supra.
3. This telegram transmitted a nine-point tripartite paper on access. Paragraph 5 stated that if the Soviets tried to specify the categories of travelers whom they considered legitimate, the Western powers should make clear that it was their Ambassadors and military commanders who would determine who would be documented for travel to Berlin. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/3–2957)