Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Central and Southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI

194. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, United States Army, Europe (Hodes) to the Embassy in Germany¹

Paris, April 23, 1957—7:50 p.m.

SX 2936. Reference Berlin to Bonn 907.²

1. The position of the Soviets with reference to access to Berlin, if correctly represented by Kotsiuba in reference message, calls for a strong stand by the three Western military commanders and Ambassadors. While USAREUR positions have been set forth in numerous messages to Bonn the last 5 months, it appears appropriate to restate them with specific reference to points introduced Kotsiuba discussion.

2. While some of Kotsiuba’s points are merely refinements of restrictions which we have had to bear since November 1956 the underlying concept appears to be that the Soviet military will permit only those whom they consider to be pure members of the occupation of West Berlin to travel under Soviet supervision and documentation. This would mean that members of forces and their dependents stationed in Berlin, and those officials (military for sure and diplomatic perhaps) who actually have bona fide business connected with the occupation will be passed by the Soviet military. All others will travel, or not travel, as determined by the GDR. By inference today and actuality tomorrow, the Soviets will determine appropriateness of any official visit to Berlin.

3. This appears as the second step toward the strangling of West Berlin. The first step was successfully taken last November.

4. The basic underlying premise Kotsiuba introduces is totally unacceptable to USAREUR even though some details of the proposed changes in procedure are not objectionable.

5. Specific proposals suggested by Kotsiuba which are not objectionable are these:

(a) Uniform format for Russian translation of travel order.

(b) Limiting authority to issue travel orders to American Embassy, USAREUR and USCOB.

(c) The list of specific data desired in Russian translations as enumerated in paragraph 3c, reference message, is already being provided except “nature of duties” and “purpose of travel”. USAREUR does not propose to permit the Soviets to monitor the nature of duty for which personnel present to Berlin.³

(d) The submission in advance of Russian translation format to Kotsiuba. USAREUR does not object to coordinating this format since these translations are solely for Soviet consumption. It is, however, inappropriate to submit them for Soviet approval. The time restriction of 1 May is unreasonable.⁴

6. The following points made by Kotsiuba are objectionable:

(a) Only two persons authorized to sign orders for each authority. This restriction cuts across established US military practice of the Commander in Chief delegating authority. While this is objectionable, we can live with this restriction. It is possible to amend our procedures to assure that Russian translation of orders do not carry a variety of headings and signatures.

(b) German translation of travel orders. Only US forces and Soviet military are concerned. No German, West or East, has occasion to read these orders.⁵

(c) Documentation outlined in paragraph 6, reference message: Except for persons traveling and individuals on the Autobahn, USAREUR has always objected to showing Soviets anything except Russian translation of travel orders. For lack of fully coordinated US, French, and British stand on this matter, we have been forced to accept a compromise. However, we are still protesting this action by the Soviets as violation of the Allied access to Berlin guaranteed by the Soviet Government in the New York Agreement. Return to the strongest position and not retreat to a new concession is urgently recommended.⁶

(d) Soviet audacity in proposing that they determine type of personnel to travel to and necessity for their business in West Berlin is a most serious threat to the fundamental right of access.⁷

7. The strongest possible position is urgently recommended.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/2–2357. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Berlin and Washington. The source text is the Department of State copy.
2. Document 191.
3. Next to this paragraph in the source text is the handwritten notation: “State agrees not to provide this.”
4. Next to this paragraph in the source text is the handwritten notation: “State agrees for info only.”
5. Next to this paragraph in the source text is the handwritten notation: “State agrees this out.”
6. Next to this paragraph in the source text is the handwritten notation: “State agrees this out.”
7. Next to this paragraph in the source text is the handwritten notation: “State agrees.”