Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Central and Southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI

189. Telegram From the Mission in Berlin to the Department of State¹

Berlin, March 15, 1957—8 p.m.

915. From Trimble.

1. My call on Pushkin this morning at Soviet Embassy in East Berlin took place in reasonably friendly atmosphere.² Although definitely not a jovial type, he appeared relaxed and well-briefed on general line to follow. However, he was weak in certain details and on occasion resorted to vague and even contradictory language.

2. After initial exchange of pleasantries, I opened discussion by welcoming Pushkin’s affirmation of January 11 to Conant that the Ambassador and our military commanders have arthority to determine who shall be documented with travel orders.³ I recalled Conant’s letter to Pushkin of May 5, 1955⁴ stating that when designated as Ambassador former had been entrusted by the President with authority exercised in capacity of High Commissioner as successor to Military Governor. There could therefore be no doubt of American Ambassador’s right to determine whom he shall document for travel either by military train or Autobahn. I noted that, despite assurances given by Pushkin, there have recently been Soviet efforts to interfere with right of access of personnel with travel orders issued by Ambassador or military commanders. Since there accordingly appeared to have been some misunderstanding, I would be grateful if Pushkin could see to it that instructions were issued to avert such interference in the future.

3. I continued that, in conversation with Conant, Pushkin had referred to procedures of 1952-53 stating Soviets were merely reverting to practices of that period. We had made study and could not find any evidence that during 1952-53 any other practices were in effect than those being observed prior to Soviet changes of last November. Legally significant date is actually March 1, 1948, date cited in 1949 agreements. Conceivably possible source of misunderstanding was old form of Embassy travel orders. This form was now changed and samples of new form had been supplied to Soviet Deputy Commandant in Berlin. I concluded opening remarks be giving Pushkin sample of new form and expressing hope this would end questioning of travel orders issued under authority of Ambassador.

4. In response Pushkin stated that he recalled letter received in May 1955 from Ambassador Conant after abolition of High Commission. He had not intention of questioning duties and functions of American Ambassador in Bonn. As far as he was concerned, he (Pushkin) had no responsibility for travel of persons to and from West Berlin. WHen Soviet High Commission was abolished all such matters were referred to military authorities. This procedure was agreed upon in Bolz–Zorin exchange of letters. If his memory was correct, he continued, he had written Ambassador Conant regarding this change of functions.⁵

5. Although strictly speaking, therefore, Berlin travel questions were within competence of Soviet military authorities, he was prepared to discuss subject and would inform Soviet military authorities regarding our conversation. Position of Soviets was that agreements should be respected and they expected friends from other countries to abide by same principle. If one did not violate agreements all would go well. Question was not by whom travel orders were issued, since right of Ambassador to issue orders not questioned, but to whom they were issued. In accordance with Soviet-American agreements, he continued, not every American national has right to travel to West Berlin. Only persons who belong to American administration in Germany had such right. This was quite clear and Soviet military authorities would cause no difficulty if principle were observed.

6. Regarding his conversation with Ambassador Conant on control of American trains, Pushkin claimed that reference to 1952 date was based on misunderstanding. He had merely explained to Dr. Conant and British Ambassador Hoyer Millar that new circumstances had arisen since then in connection with trains (presumably alleged Allied violations which had come to attention of Soviets). Ambassadors Conant and Hoyer Millar had seemed to think that the Soviets were instituting a new procedure. Actually they were merely carrying out Four Power agreements which gave to Soviets right to control travel to and from Berlin. Within framework of this right to control, they could give up all controls if they wished or strengthen tnem if necessary. Under all circumstances, assurance of normal movement of trains remained. Pushkin emphasized that, as he had told Conant, there was a form of control prior to 1952 carried out by Soviet military authorities. They had entered trains and checked passenger and freight documents. In 1952—though he was not certain of timing—

Soviets had reduced their controls to a minimum, not as a result of negotiations with US but by unilateral action. He was not sure now what basis of this decision was; perhaps it was confidence that Americans were fulfilling their obligations conscientiously under agreements. He had been informed by Soviet military authorities that these obligations had been and were being violated by movement of improper persons on trains. This involved violation both of agreements with Soviets and also of Soviet agreement with GDR which could not be disregarded. Actually controls which military had reestablished were not so severe as those prior 1952. Although controls had aroused protest on part of Americans, there was really no basis for such objections. This was essentially what he had told Ambassador Conant and Hoyer Millar. Soviet authorities had no intention of violating any agreement. Soviet military authorities had explained situation to him in this way and he had no reason for doubting them.

7. In response I stated that I had come to Pushkin on the assumption that, as in the analogous case of our Ambassador in Bonn, he represented the highest Soviet authority in Soviet Zone. Pushkin interjected this was not quite the case; the Soviet system was somewhat different. Moreover, I continued, as he knew, we do not recognize the German authorities in the Soviet Zone (his only reaction to this was a wry expression). US also repects agreements; I could not accept his contention that we violated them. However, Ambasadors and military commanders have right to determine to whom travel orders are to be issued. We recognize Soviet Government can control train traffic in Soviet Zone but this does not include determination of who should receive travel orders. I welcomed Pushkin’s statement that there was no desire on part of Soviet authorities to interfere with normal movement of trains.

8. I denied that physical checking of passengers was ever carried out in past by Soviet officials; at most, train commanders gave train manifests to Soviet officer. Pushkin interjected that “that” is what he meant by control (presumably he was referring to presentation manifest). He then corrected himself by adding that it was difficult for him to state precisely what form “other controls” and assumed in past but they had been carried out. I commented that we had checked the records and could find no evidence of this.

9. Moreover, I added, we could not agree that there had been violations on our part in view of the undoubted authority of the military commanders and the Ambassador to determine who should receive travel orders. I would hope that in raising subject with appropriate military authorities Pushkin would do all he could to avoid future interferences of kind we have suffered in last few months.

10. Pushkin then conceded that we were quite correct in claiming that American authorities have right to determine who gets travel orders but with one qualification. Only those persons who belong to “American administration in Germany” were entitled to them. This was consistent with agreements, and was purpose of entire train, Autobahn and plane connection of Berlin to Western Germany provided at end of war.

11. To this I responded that right of Ambassador and military commanders to document travelers included right to document anyone they considered necessary and important for our occupation of Berlin. Pushkin replied that this concept did not correspond to agreements or their “spirit.” I stated that was our interpretation of them, and that, as he knew, our right to be in Berlin derived from conquest. He did not challenge latter remark and merely repeated that we should interpret agreements in accordance with their spirit. He recommended their study and said this would convince us. I said we had studied them and had come to the conclusions already stated. After some 40 minutes, I broke off discussion at this point by welcoming chance to make call and exchange views and by expressing hope he would give attention to our views and thus avert future difficulties.

12. In our opinion most significant features of foregiong discussion were: (a) Pushkin’s statement, repeated on several occasions, that Soviets considered legitimate travelers to Berlin to be those connected with American administration in Germany. At no point did he take extreme position, which we had thought he might, that only those associated with Berlin garrison fell within theis category, (b) He made no attempt to challenge right of the Ambassador or military commanders to issue travel orders, (c) He made no reference to any specific conpilation of alleged abuses in use of military trains and Autobahn, perhaps because this would have been inconsistent with his denial of direct competence to deal with subject of Berlin travel, (d) He affirmed that Soviets have no intention of interfering with movement of military trains.

13. Hillenbrand, who accompanied me, shares my impression, as does Gufler, that Soviets do not wish to precipitate crisis at this time over Berlin access. They seem convinced they have a point but are apparently not sure how hard and how far they wish to press it. We believe that discussion with Pushkin has served useful purpose and laid groundwork for possible later airing of subject by Ambassador Bruce in light of factual situation at that time.⁶

1. Source: Department of State, Central files, 762.0221/3–1557. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Bonn, London, Moscow, Paris, and USAREUR.
2. Following Pushkin’s failure to meet Conant, the Embassy in Bonn tried to arrange a meeting between Trimble and Pushkin. On March 12, Trimble reported that the meeting had been set for March 14 and that the British and French had concurred in his approach. (Ibid., 762.0221/3–1257)
3. See Document 184.
4. A copy of this letter was transmitted in telegram 3441 from Bonn, May 7. (Department of State, Central Files, 121.62A/5–755)
5. Pushkin informed Conant on September 24, 1955, that the Soviet High Commission for Germany had been abolished. (Telegram 250 from Berlin, September 24, 1955; ibid., 762.0221/9–2455)
6. On March 25, Gufler reported that the French had had a similar conversation with Kotsiuba concerning French travelers to Berlin. The meeting was friendly, and, after reviewing several cases of Soviet denials, the French had proceeded along lines similar to those of Trimble. Kotsiuba’s replies were similar to Pushkin’s, but the French had the definite feeling that the Soviets were rethinking their position perhaps as a result of the Trimble–Pushkin meeting. (Telegram 940 from Berlin, March 25; ibid., 762,0221/3–2557)