Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Central and Southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI

188. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, February 5, 1957—4 p.m.

2975. I welcome guidance contained Deptel 2075² on Berlin access. Following are my comments on certain portions of that message and Berlin’s 677.³

1. I had also given some consideration to desirability of sending communication to Pushkin on access matters and especially in regard to recent incident involving two Embassy staff members who were at first turned back from Autobahn on basis that their travel orders, issued by Embassy, were not valid. Have been inclined, however, to keep written communications at a minimum out of concern as Dept has suggested, that Soviets might thereby be stimulated to confirm in writing a firm clarification of their present position from which it might be the more difficult to withdraw. If by any chance this is a temporary phase of tightened security precautions which has been caused by events in satellites and which may eventually pass, feel it wiser in most cases to deal orally with Soviet authorities and try to avoid pressing them into taking rigid positions. I had therefore decided to take advantage of farewell calls in Berlin Feb 14 to see Pushkin and bring up again recent access difficulties. In addition to points made in paragraph eight of Deptel, will also endeavor to remove any doubt from Pushkin’s mind about my status as successor to Military Governor and High Commissioner in Germany and my consequent authority to issue travel orders to Berlin. This approach was discussed with General Hodes yesterday.

2. While we have been willing to try to work out some acceptable form of passport stamp indicating traveler is entitled to entry into and exit from Berlin, have always had reservations as to how far this would really meet our problem. Basis of Soviet position appears to be, as nearly as we can understand inconsistent Soviet statements this subject, that only members of forces have right of access and consequently that only military authorities have right to issue orders. Forces stamp is only superficial evidence of status Soviets are looking for, and I doubt that we would solve this basic problem for long, if at all, by providing Embassy personnel with stamps similar in appearance and wording to forces stamp. Nevertheless, I am willing to try again to reach tripartite agreement on passport stamp but would suggest that this be delayed until after forthcoming discussion with Pushkin to see if any further clarification is made at that time.

In this connection and regarding Berlin’s suggestion that British and French documentation may be more efficacious in averting difficulties, should be pointed out that British have imposed a kind of self-blockade since beginning of access difficulties and are not permitting any personnel who do not possess forces stamp to travel to Berlin either by military train or Autobahn (ourtel 2521)⁴ although this prevents all Embassy personnel from traveling. Believe it is this fact, in case of British at least, which has minimized difficulties for them rather than difference in documentation.

3. I have something of same misgivings about utility of amending Embassy’s travel orders, since no change in formulation really affects basic principle of Ambassador’s right to determine who may travel to and from Berlin. Fundamental point made by Soviets in recent refusal to acknowledge validity of Embassy’s travel orders on Autobahn was that they were not issued by military authorities, and I suspect their later reference to signing official as “tourist” agent was merely diversionary device. There certainly appears no objection, however, to changing formula of signature on travel orders and we intend to modify it along lines of Berlin’s suggestion. For time being, remain opposed to use of formula linking traveler to Berlin occupation, but this question can be reviewed again in light of discussion with Pushkin.

4. Department’s attention is drawn to fact that three Embassies here have divergent policies at present for dealing with any attempt by Soviet authorities to confiscate passports from passengers on military trains. Continue believe we should turn back trains in such instance and, although believe possibility of confiscation is remote, consider it desirable to have uniform tripartite instruction on access procedures. If Dept has reexamined this matter (Deptel 1876),⁵ Appreciate instructions.⁶

Conant

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/2–557. Confidential. Repeated to Berlin, London, Moscow, and Paris.
2. Document 185.
3. Telegram 677 reviewed various aspects of travel to Berlin, stated that travelers going to the city under orders issued by the Embassy in Bonn would likely continue to experience difficulty, but assumed that eventually the Soviets would recognize the Ambassador’s right to issue travel orders for Berlin. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/2–157)
4. Telegram 2521 from Bonn reported that the three Western Allies had met on January 31 to work out the form for a stamp on travel orders issued by the Ambassadors for personnel going to Berlin. (Ibid., 762.0221/12–3156)
5. Telegram 1876 informed the Embassy in Bonn that the Department of State wanted to defer setting a definite policy in the eventuality that the Soviets confiscated the passports of travelers going to Berlin. (Ibid., 762.0221/1–757).
6. On February 8, Conant reported that Pushkin had been recalled to Moscow for about 10 days and would not be able to keep his appointment. (Telegram 798 from Berlin; Ibid., 033.6162A/2–857)