Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Central and Southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI

185. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany¹

Washington, January 30, 1957—1:20 p.m.

2075. Bonn’s 2747; Berlin’s 726.²

1. As indicated Deptel 1989³ State and Defense view is that pending further developments in field of Berlin access it would be preferable not adopt any new procedure re military convoys which would involve returning convoy to point of origin rather than submit to Soviet demand to see identification cards of enlisted personnel riding in convoy.

2. As general rule we believe that taking of measures vis-à-vis Soviets which could have effect of partial self-imposed blockade should be reserved for cases of significant interference by Soviets with Berlin access including, of course, any line of conduct their part which subjected Allied travel or shipment of supplies to such serious inconvenience that it would be tantamount to significant interference with right of access, or which imposed unacceptable conditions on exercise of such right.

3. In determining whether a particular Soviet measure constitutes significant interference with Berlin access, believe we should keep in mind possible Soviet motives in imposing measures in question. While motives for recent Soviet course of action not yet clear there seem at least these main possibilities: (a) Soviets may merely wish make their presence felt by ordering general tightening-up of security precautions in East Zone, with resulting unevenness in implementation these orders at lower levels; (b) Soviets may wish establish position they have right to determine who can travel or what we can take into Berlin; (c) more particularly, Soviets may be carefully laying basis for making case at future date that Berlin travel by non-military personnel except perhaps those attached to Berlin Commandant is not covered by Four-Power Agreements and must therefore be regulated and controlled by GDR.

4. Furthermore believe we must continually bear in mind certain basic aspects our own position, viz. (a) we must maintain principle that Ambassadors and Commanding Generals have right make final determination what individuals are authorized travel to and from Berlin, and what supplies are required, in connection with our occupation responsibilities there; (b) we have legal basis for maintaining that any restrictions imposed by Soviets on Berlin access which go beyond those existing on March 1, 1948 are violation of Four-Power Agreements; and (c) it is of great importance maintain to maximum possible extent tripartite solidarity and uniformity of practice in field of Berlin access. Further factor is that particular Soviet action and problem of counteraction if any to be taken by us should be viewed within context of general status over-all East-West relations existing at the time rather than on basis purely local considerations.

5. In determining extent to which we wish make issue of any Soviet demand or line of action in given case, particularly where partial self-blockade would be involved, we think we should be prepared apply test also whether under all the circumstances Soviet position is on its face sufficiently unwarranted or unreasonable to ensure us full support Western public opinion, especially in US and in Germany, should serious consequences ensue from our refusal to go along with Soviet action. Type of case which would in our view meet this test would include Soviet insistence on boarding military train or attempting to remove passenger from train, or demand to inspect interiors of closed vehicles in military convoy or to line up train passenger inside train for inspection of documentation through train windows. On other hand we do not feel Soviet demand to see identification cards US enlisted personnel riding in military convoys meets requirements above test. This particularly true in view precedent we ourselves have already established in case recent US convoys and insistence British practice in past of showing identity cards upon request.

6. Above not intended of course to preclude reacting promptly by protest or query to Soviet departures from established practice which although not of character individually to interfere with our right of access might cumulatively result in significant erosion of our position.

7. Additional problem to be decided in each case where Soviets create difficulty re Berlin access is extent to which publicity should be given to matter. We recognize publicity can be of considerable value, if used wisely and selectively, as effective instrument for inducing Soviet retreat in particular instances. This especially true if it appears clearly that Soviets have been responsible for difficulty in question and that it cannot reasonably be attributed to some act or delinquency on our part. On other hand would be inadvisable to create crisis atmosphere in weak or wrong kind of case. Must always be remembered that developments which emphasize to public mind vulnerability of access to Berlin can adversely affect morale of city and, by discouraging customers in outside world from placing orders in Berlin, undermine our fundamental objective of maintaining and further developing Berlin’s economic well-being. Moreover, current resumption cold war atmosphere makes threat of publicity less effective than at time Soviets sensitive to anything inconsistent with “peaceful co-existence.”

8. We have considered advisability using recent Pushkin statement (Berlin’s 712 sent Bonn 623)⁴ that Soviets seeking merely to return to 1953 (or 1952) status as basis for Ambassador sending communication to Pushkin. This could welcome Pushkin’s statement that no intention to restrict in any way right of Allies to run military trains or interfere with Allied communications with Berlin; note that Pushkin reference to 1953 date not clear to us inasmuch as legally significant date is March 1, 1948, date used in 1949 agreement ending Berlin blockade (has Embassy or USAREUR any explanation Pushkin’s use of 1953 date?); point out that in view of his statement, however, practices of that time as well as March 1, 1948 have been examined; bring to his attention that showing of identity cards of enlisted personnel of military convoys, of passports for travelers on military trains, etc, had not been practiced at either time; and conclude that in view of this he would modify present Soviet divergences former practices accordingly. Such a communication if sent would presumably best avoid detailed legal discussion but would make clear for the record and for whatever effect it might have on Soviets our annoyance with arbitrary and meaningless harassments of recent months. Pushkin reaction to this letter might have some bearing on our view re measures to be taken in future. On other hand if letter sent to Pushkin he would inevitably feel under pressure to justify past interferences and to document his reference to “ten choice cases of abuse” with resultant hardening of Soviet position. Question whether this desirable at present time when volume of Soviet harassments has declined. However above points might be made orally to Pushkin by Ambassador should occasion for presenting them arise.

9. Request Embassy and USAREUR discuss and comment.

10. Defense concurs.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/1–1957. Confidential. Drafted by Creel and Lisle on January 29, cleared with the Department of Defense and Reinstein, and approved by Beam. Repeated to Berlin, London, Moscow, and Paris.
2. Telegram 2747 from Bonn reported that the British refused to change convoy practices on the grounds that Western action might provoke the Soviets into a full review of the access question. (Ibid., 762.0221/1–1957) Telegram 726 from Berlin reviewed the procedures in effect in 1952–1953. The Soviets were not permitted to search Allied trucks at that time, nor were they shown the identification cards of enlisted personnel in American convoys, but the British and French had shown the cards. (Ibid., 762.0221/1–1657)
3. Telegram 1989 replied to telegram 2747 and stated that a more complete statement of the U.S. views would be forthcoming. (Ibid., 762.0221/1–1957)
4. Supra.