186. Memorandum of Discussion at the 311th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, January 31, 19571
[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and items 1–4.]
Germany, East Germany and Berlin (NSC 160/1; Supplement to NSC 160/ 1; NSC 5404/1;2 Progress Reports, dated December 5, 1956, by OCB on NSC 160/1, Supplement to NSC 160/1, and NSC 5404/ 13)
In the course of briefing the Council on the contents of these three policies, Mr. Cutler pointed out that a problem of interpretation of paragraph 10 of the policy on Berlin (NSC 5404/1) had arisen in the OCB, and that it would be desirable for the Council to clarify [Page 444] the interpretation of this paragraph. The matter concerned the effect of an East German attack on Berlin. Paragraph 10 spoke only of a Soviet attack on Berlin, and the paragraph indicated that if the USSR should attack Berlin the United States would have to act on the assumption that general war was imminent. Nothing specific was said as to whether the implications in paragraph 10 were also intended to apply to an East German attack on Berlin. Mr. Cutler pointed out that at least one member of the Planning Board had expressed the view that an East German attack on Berlin might not automatically necessitate assuming the imminence of general war, as was stated in paragraph 10 with regard to a Soviet attack. Mr. Cutler then requested Assistant Secretaty of State Bowie to comment on this problem. (Mr. Bowie had taken Secretary Dulles’ place when he left the meeting to keep his appointment with King Saud.)
Mr. Bowie stated that unhappily he had had no opportunity to talk with the Secretary of State about this problem and to ascertain his views about the implications of an East German attack on Berlin. However, he could say that lesser officials in the Department of State do not in general feel that it would be wise for the United States generally to equate a Soviet and an East German attack on Berlin, although this view did not deny that the United States might decide to equate these attacks.
After Assistant Secretary of Defense Gray had commented on the problem, the President stated that to him the matter seemed to come down to this: If the East Germans attacks with armed forces the armed forces of the United States anywhere in the world, the result would be war. However, if the East Germans attacked our forces the issue was not so clear. There certainly would be no automatic declaration of war, and we should be obliged to go to the Congress.
Mr. Bowie said that this was the State Department’s interpretation of thed problem, and Mr. Cutler said that he was satisfied that the problem of interpreting paragraph 10 had been cleared up and that our policy toward Berlin did not equate a Soviet and a satellite attack on Berlin.
The National Security Council:
- a.
- Noted and discussed the reference Progress Reports on the subject by the Operations Coordinating Board.
- b.
- Noted that the NSC Planning Board, following its review of Basic National Security Policy, will consider a review of policy on Germany, East Germany and Berlin, possibly within the context of a policy statement on Western Europe.
- c.
- Agreed that, because an attack on Berlin by East German forces alone might not necessarily carry the same implications as an attack by Soviet forces, the United States (in addition to resisting the initial attack) would consider at that time whether or not to treat [Page 445] such an attack in the manner stated in paragraph 10 of NSC 5404/1 with respect to an attack by Soviet forces.
Note: The action in c above as approved by the President, subsequently circulated to all holders of NSC 5404/1.
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Gleason on February 1.↩
- The Supplement to NSC 160/1 is printed as Document 230. For text of NSC 160/1, see Foreign Relations,, 1952–1954, vol. VII, Part 1, pp. 510–520. Regarding NSC 5404/1, see ibid., p. 1390.↩
- Documents 84, 231, and 182.↩