Office of the Historian

48. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Elbrick) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover)1

Washington, June 21, 1955.

SUBJECT

  • Middle East Defense Study by State-Defense Working Group2

The recommendations of the Middle East Defense study are aimed at achieving two objectives both of which we support strongly:

1.
to foster the internal stability and Westward orientation of the Middle Eastern countries, and to strengthen their determination to resist Communist aggression and subversion;
2.
to help the region to develop its military strength so that it will be able to defend itself against attack.

As we see it, these objectives have direct bearing on the security of the United States since their accomplishment would deter the Soviets from aggression in Europe as well as the Middle East. In case of war the right flank of NATO, the Mediterranean and North Africa would be secured against Soviet attack, a possible springboard for counter-attack would be provided, and some of the oil resources of the Middle East might be saved for the West.

In present circumstances we believe that the first objective deserves high priority. For that reason we fully endorse United States adherence to the Turk-Iraqi Pact at the appropriate time, and after preparation of our NATO partners. We also endorse continued economic assistance, related wherever possible to programs of social and economic reform which are essential to the internal stability of the Middle Eastern countries. Finally, we recognize that some measure of military aid is also required to achieve the first objective.

[Page 103]

However in the implementation of the second objective we believe that any United States program of assistance for the build-up of Middle East defenses should be worked out in a balanced relation to the other security arrangements in which the United States is participating. It is essential that the continued build-up of the strength and effectiveness of established defense arrangements, like NATO for example, should not be prejudiced by the diversion of essential resources away from them. This inter-relationship among the various United States programs should be made clear in any eventual presentation of a Middle East military aid program to the Budget Bureau and the Congress.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/6–2155. Top Secret. Drafted by Leonard Unger.↩
  2. Document 43.↩