Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

47. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Davis) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Anderson)¹

Washington, June 20, 1955.

SUBJECT:

• U.S. Position Regarding Middle East Defense

1. Attached hereto is an analysis relating the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, attached at Tab I, to the Report of the State-Defense working group.²

2. In addition to the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Bonesteel has reviewed the Working Group Report. He considers it to be, “a thorough and adequate analysis of what appears to be the ‘optimum’ plan for the defense of the Middle East and of the U.S. position with respect thereto”. He believes the concept may be somewhat “optimistic politically as well as from the standpoint of the budget”, and suggests that consideration might be given to the formulation of a somewhat less comprehensive plan, together with an assessment of its desirability should the optimum position prove to be unfeasible. Mr. McNeil’s office prepared the military cost estimates contained in the report and has reviewed the non-military cost estimates, and has found them satisfactory as orders of magnitude.

3. Three questions appear to remain for your consideration and judgment. They are critical:

(1) The need for, willingness, timing, and terms of U.S. adherence to the Turk-Iraqi Pact. A corollary is the need for and willingness of the U.S. to enter a US-Israel Defense Pact.

(2) The need for and timing of the establishment of multilateral defense organizational arrangements bringing the Northern Tier countries, the U.K. and the U.S. together in a combined effort at an early date.

(3) The need for the U.S. to recognize that Middle East defense— an acceptable political orientation and a potentially effective military posture—will require U.S. effort and expenditures. The expenditures may run as much as $300 million per annum, more than is presently projected for the area for the next five years.

4. It should be recognized that an affirmation position on the questions immediately above would not immediately involve the U.S. in specific financial or strategic commitments, since the program suggested will, under even the most favorable circumstances, take at least a year to launch and up to 8 years for implementation.

5. A meeting has been set up for you with Mr. Hoover in the latter’s office at 2:30 on Tuesday, June 21. It is understood that Admiral Radford will accompany you. I suggest that you discuss with him in advance the differences between the Joint Chiefs of Staff views and those in the Working Group report, which are as indicated in the attached analysis, generally that the Joint Chiefs of Staff approach is more conservative, which I am inclined to think is a good thing. At your meeting with Mr. Hoover I suggest you inform him of the views of the Department of Defense regarding the State-Defense Report and the tactics to be employed in the conversations with the United Kingdom. In addition, the names, status, and authority of the Defense observers should be determined.

6. For your information the first session of the talks with the United Kingdom is scheduled for 2:45, Thursday, June 23. This seems to me to be somewhat hasty and I believe a later date would permit development of a firmer U.S. position.

AC Davis

[Attachment]

AN ANALYSIS OF THE RELATION BETWEEN THE JCS VIEWS AND THE STATE-DEFENSE REPORT ON MIDDLE EAST DEFENSE

The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Report of the State-Defense Working Group on Middle East Defense are attached at Tab A. Significant points are as follows:

a. The JCS find acceptable Sections I, II and III of the Report dealing with politico-military objectives, strategy, and related strategic considerations.

b. The JCS and the Report view the estimated force requirements as indications of a general order of magnitude and not as definitive. The JCS correctly state that US/UK underwriting will be required if the force deficits are to be made up and the logistic complex provided.

[1 paragraph (5 lines of source text) not declassified]

In connection with ground forces, the JCS properly point out that committed Jordanian and United Kingdom units may not be readily available. The Working Group assigned an additional Infantry Division each to Iran and Iraq. The JCS believe that Iran should be given a more important role. There is no reason why such cannot be accomplished through US planning and in any multilateral Middle East planning which may take place.

c. With regard to political action needed to implement the strategy, the JCS considered that the steps delineated in the Report would constitute an acceptable pattern for the eventual establishment of a comprehensive regional defense organization, should future developments indicate that the establishment of such an organization were both feasible and necessary for an effective defense of the Middle East. They further believe that the completion of the Northern Tier is a suitable goal for the immediate future and that upon consummation of the Northern Tier Pact the United States “could not indefinitely abstain from adhering to it in some form”. On this issue the Working Group Report diverges, positing the essentiality of US adherence in the near future. The Working Group believed that for a variety of reasons the United States should join. Among these reasons are:

1. The UK has already joined and thus will have an unduly strong voice in influencing developments in the area including how US aid will be utilized.

2. Adherence at some later indeterminate time after the Pact has been established would make it extremely difficult for the United States to influence the language of the Pact. The precise phraseology may be of great importance to United States Senate ratification.

3. Finally, it was the view of the Working Group that non-adherence might be interpreted in the area as a reversal of US policy and a decision that the Middle East could not or would not be defended, thus precipitating a move by the area toward a neutral or pro-Soviet position.

Regarding organization, the JCS and the Working Group are in agreement opposing the establishment of an elaborate superstructure patterned along the lines of NATO. The JCS, however, state that they consider “a comprehensive Middle East defense arrangement, involving combined planning,” … [to be] …⁴ “premature”. The Working Group felt that there were important political and military benefits to be derived from commencing combined planning in the area. Such action would give the indigenous peoples a sense of solidarity, and would contribute to the developing regional defense consciousness of the states, those most aware of the Soviet menance being able by their participation in combined planning to influence other states less aware of the Soviet menace.

The JCS suggest that ultimate US adherence would be on the broadest basis possible, carrying no obligations for the earmarking of forces nor any implied commitment as to the financial support we might extend. The Working Group does not disagree with this, but believes strongly that the United States Government should enter into the Pact with its eyes open as to the probable amount of US effort and expenditure which would be required to create a viable defense structure in the Middle East, looking toward ultimate military effectiveness.

d. The Joint Chiefs of Staff state they have no basis for the revision of the costing of the force deficits and construction, etc. outlined in the report. They believe, however, that the whole concept is more elaborate than is now justified. They further believe that it is highly unlikely that funds of the magnitude suggested would be forthcoming from the Congress. The Working Group, contrarily, has suggested that for a maximum of approximately $300 million per annum, in addition to present aid program levels, a viable Middle East defense could be achieved. The Working Group has suggested in its covering memorandum that preliminary Congressional consultation should be undertaken prior to the negotiation of the terms of US adherence to the Northern Tier Pact. In view of the magnitude of expenditures made or contemplated in other major areas of the world, it is not unreasonable to assume that the Congress might be favorably disposed toward those suggested in the Working Group Report.

e. Regarding tactics for discussion with the United Kingdom, the JCS consider that Tab D of the Working Group Report is acceptable, provided the views of the JCS, where pertinent, are reflected in the presentation of the US position.

f. Regarding the general procedure outlined in the covering memorandum to you, the JCS recapitulate their views. Points not previously discussed in this memorandum meriting mention are:

• US-Israel Defense Pact—The JCS do not believe that the United States should undertake at this time a US-Israel Defense Pact. The Working Group concurs but believes that as a matter of political reality it may be absolutely necessary to secure the requisite votes in the US Senate for the United States to enter into a Pact with Israel simultaneously with United States entry into the Northern Tier.
• Adherence to the Northern Tier Pact—The JCS believe that the United States should encourage the development of the Northern Tier without commitment as to the form of eventual US association. The Working Group view that such encouragement could only be provided by US willingness to adhere, after Pakistan and Iran have joined. Additionally, the Working Group believed the US should be prepared for a commitment formulated along the lines of the SEATO commitment.
• Role of Turkey and Pakistan—The JCS believe that the United States should continue to place reliance upon these countries to further our plans in the Middle East while cooperating closely with the UK. The Working Group agrees but came to the conclusion that the actual military contribution of Turkey and Pakistan to the direct defense [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] would have to be limited. You are familiar with the current Turkish economic difficulties; Pakistan’s situation is no better.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/6–2255. Top Secret. The source text and the attachment are photostat copies attached to a June 22 transmittal memorandum from Scott to, Murphy, Jernegan, Mathews, and Elbrick. See footnote 1, Document 44. The source text indicates that a copy was sent to Admiral Radford.
2. Document 43. The memorandum containing the JCS views is Document 44.
4. Ellipses and brackets in the source text.