Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

43. Memorandum From the State-Defense Working Group on Middle East Defense to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover) and the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Anderson)¹

Washington, June 6, 1955.

SUBJECT

• U.S. Position Regarding Middle East Defense

1. The State–Defense working group which you established has prepared a report on the above subject which is contained at Tab A.² The key points made in this study are:

a. U.S. security interests require the development of a Middle East defense arrangement and an effective military capability in the area.

b. The U.S. should induce the Iranians to participate in the Turk-Iraqi Pact by offering to support Iranian military programs, including possibly an infantry division, if called for in regional defense plans. Pakistan adherence is expected shortly.

c. The U.S. should adhere to the Turk-Iraqi Pact. A Manila Pact-type of commitment may be required.

d. Under the proposed Pact an organization would be set up consisting of a Ministerial Council and such subordinate functional agencies as are appropriate.

e. [2¾ lines of source text not declassified] Preliminary estimates indicate that ground force requirements can be provided by the nations of the area and the U.K., with U.S. and U.K. assistance; that naval forces might be supplied by the U.K. and the indigenous countries; but that the bulk of the air force requirements will have to be provided by the U.S. or U.K. from military resources available at the time.

f. Potentially, U.S. military assistance in support of the defense effort might amount to $1.5 to $2.0 billion. If programmed over a five year period, the annual amount required would be $300–$400 million. While this is considerably higher than presently contemplated programs for the five year period beginning in FY 56, it is close to the present levels of military aid for the area. The total of all other forms of U.S. assistance to the area is estimated at $2.2 billion for a five year period, $1.9 billion of which is, however, required to satisfy existing commitments or plans, including aid to Turkey, not directly related to the defense of the Middle East.

Thus, taking $4.0 billion as the probable gross cost over the five year period, the gross annual amount for all forms of U.S. aid would be $800 million. However, approximately $500 million would be required even if no regional defense plan were undertaken. The net cost of the plan, therefore, would be about $300 million annually.

2. The report at Tab A has been reviewed in terms of existing NSC policy (NSC 5428,³ 5510/1,⁴ 5504,⁵ 5409⁶) and found to be generally consistent therewith although in many instances it develops further the courses of action contained in the basic policy. A requirement, however, does exist for NSC agreement prior to actual participation in a Middle East defense arrangement. An analysis of the relationship between the working group study and NSC policy is contained at Tab B.⁷

3. In view of the forthcoming conversations with the U.K. on this subject, Tab C⁸ contains an analysis of the probable U.K. position and Tab D contains suggestions as to the tactics to be followed by the U.S. in such discussions.

4. The working group study as outlined above will require considerable activity on the part of the U.S. and other governments if there are to be set in motion international actions leading toward the attainment of U.S. objectives on a timely basis. Specifically, it is considered that U.S. adherence to the Turk-Iraqi Pact should be consummated at an early date. This means that prompt action will be required to:

a. Determine U.K. views and obtain assurance of their cooperation.

b. Secure NSC agreement to U.S. adherence.

c. Conduct necessary preliminary Congressional consultations.

d. Secure Pakistani and Iranian adherence to the Turk-Iraqi Pact.

e. Negotiate the terms of U.S. adherence.

f. Take measures designed to avoid Israeli opposition to the above arrangements, including possibly a U.S. offer to enter into a defense pact against aggression from outside the region.

5. Recommendations: It is recommended that you:

a. Approve⁹ the working group paper at Tab A as a suitable basis for preliminary, informal discussion with the U.K. as outlined in the tactics paper at Tab D.

b. Accept the working group report, subject to amendment following the discussions with the U.K., for submission to the NSC and agreement by the NSC on U.S. participation.

c. Inform the President, prior to discussions with the U.K., of the possible developments outlined in this memorandum.

Tab A

U.S. POSITION REGARDING MIDDLE EAST DEFENSE¹⁰

Introduction and Summary of Conclusions

On the instructions of Under Secretary of State Hoover and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Anderson, the working group, composed of representatives of State, Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has made a survey of the political, economic, and military problems involved in planning a defense of the Middle East. It has endeavored, first, to determine what our political and military objectives should be in that region and, second, what political, economic, and military measures would be necessary to achieve those objectives, so far as they relate to the security of the area. Finally, it has attempted to estimate the resources which would be required, in terms of manpower, military equipment, construction, and economic support.

The group has kept in mind current U.S. policy, commitments, and existing limitations on U.S. military and economic resources but has assumed that it was not estopped from suggesting additional commitments or envisaging the possibility of new allocations or reallocations of resources.

The group has understood that while its primary function was to assist in clarifying U.S. policy and plans for the defense of the Middle East, its secondary function was to prepare for informal general political talks with the British Government on this subject.

The full results of the group’s work are contained in the attached study. Its essential conclusions are summarized below.

Conclusions

1. Objectives

The political objectives of the United States in the Middle East are to deny control of the region and its resources to the communists and to assure its cooperation with the West, and the availability of its resources, in time of peace and war. Additional objectives should be to give the Middle Eastern states a sense of security, to develop a defense arrangement which would deter aggression from outside the area, and ultimately to assure the effective defense of the region.

The military objectives are to protect the right flank of NATO, defend the Turkish Straits, assure the use by the West of Middle Eastern base sites, control the eastern Mediterranean, defend the Cairo-Suez-Aden areas, and hold the Persian Gulf and contiguous oil-bearing areas.

2. Strategy

[2½ lines of source text not declassified] Successful execution of this defensive strategy would also facilitate the execution of subsequent strategic actions.

Such a strategy would be compatible with the achievement of our political objectives. Close political and military coordination with and among the several states of the area would be required.

Desirable extensions to this strategy would include the defense of West Pakistan and defensive delaying actions to the north and east of the Zagros.

3. Forces Required.

Preliminary analysis indicates that a minimum of 7-1/3 divisions plus substantial tactical air forces and naval forces are required. Five divisions, in varying stages of equipment, training, and manpower are currently available in the area or committed, from Iraq, Jordan, and the United Kingdom. Very little of the necessary air and naval forces is currently available in the area or committed. (See Section IV of the study.)

4. Sources of Additional Forces Required

The deficit in ground forces can be made up by raising additional units in Iraq and Iran. Jordan, Egypt, Pakistan, Ethiopia, and South Africa are other potential long-term sources. [3¾ lines of source text not declassified]

A small portion of the air deficit could be provided by a build-up of indigenous forces; most of the air units, however, would have to come from U.S. and U.K. forces available at the time. The U.K. and indigenous states might be able to provide naval forces.

5. Base and Other Facilities Required

Two primary lines of communications will be required to support the defensive operations envisaged, one from the head of the Persian Gulf and one from the eastern Mediterranean (Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon). Air bases will be required in most of the countries of the area, secondary naval bases in several.

6. Political Requirements

U.S.-U.K. participation and cooperation are essential. The participation and cooperation of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Jordan are also required. To provide the necessary bases and lines of communication, the eventual cooperation of Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt will also be required and that of Saudi Arabia would be desirable. The cooperation of Israel would be helpful but not essential. The cooperation of Pakistan [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] is not only desirable from the military point of view but is also important politically to complete the “Northern Tier” and to contribute to the developing regional defense consciousness of the area states.

A regional defense organization is necessary to coordinate planning and eventual execution of the defense. It is important to bring its members into planning at an early stage, in order to realize the full potential of each Middle Eastern participant.

An overall command structure is neither essential nor desirable in the initial stages of development of this defense organization.

7. Political Feasibility

It should be politically feasible to obtain the cooperation required. A nucleus already exists in the Turk-Iraqi Pact and the Turk-Pakistani Pact. This is supplemented by the Anglo-Jordanian treaty, the Anglo-Egyptian treaty, and the existence of British-controlled territories at Cyprus, in the Persian Gulf, at Aden, and in East Africa. The “Northern Tier” can be completed in the fairly near future by the adherence of Pakistan and Iran to the Turk-Iraqi Pact.

The Arab-Israel dispute poses an obstacle, but it is not an insuperable barrier to the development of an effective regional organization. Israel’s cooperation is not essential and that of the Arabs (other than Iraq) can be deferred to a later stage. If significant improvement in Arab-Israel relations could be obtained in the next six or eight months, the problem would largely disappear. If not, it should still be possible to offer sufficient inducement to the Arab States (Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt) to get them either to join the Turk-Iraqi pact or to agree to some other formula for cooperation in defense matters.

8. U.S. Participation

It will be politically necessary for the U.S. to adhere, probably within a year at most, to a Middle East defense organization. It will also be militarily necessary, so that we may be in a position to influence defense planning and preparations. (See Section VI, paragraph 2, of the study.) The best procedure is to adhere to the existing Turk-Iraqi Pact.

The timing of U.S. adherence depends upon political developments, primarily in connection with the Arab-Israel dispute. It should, in any case, follow that of Pakistan and Iran. If there were prospects of a real relaxation of Arab-Israel tensions, our adherence should be delayed until that had been achieved, in order not to arouse Israeli resentment or reduce the inducements we might be able to offer to both sides. If there were no such prospects, we should adhere without too much delay, in order to maintain momentum in the regional defense build-up. Simultaneously with our adherence to the regional Pact we should offer to enter into a defense arrangement with Israel against aggression from outside the area.

9. Costs

The costs may be divided into four categories: a. those involved in building up indigenous regional defense forces; b. those involved in construction of bases, LOCs, and other facilities; c. those involved in current military and economic aid programs in Turkey, Pakistan, and other states in the area, which will probably be continued regardless of regional defense planning; and d. those involved in extending special military and economic aid to certain states (Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel) as inducements to obtain their cooperation or acquiescence in the defense arrangements.

The costs to the U.S. are roughly estimated in Section VII of the report. They come to an approximate grand total of $4.0 billion, or an average over a five-year period of $800 million per annum. If we eliminate those which the U.S. would expect to incur in any case, for political or military reasons not directly related to Middle East defense, the total directly chargeable to Middle East defense is reduced to approximately $1.5 billion and the annual average to $300 million.

10. General Conclusions

It is politically and militarily feasible and necessary to plan for and carry out a defense of the Middle East.

The cost to the U.S. is low in comparison to the advantages which can be achieved.

It is in the security interest of the United States to establish a defense in the Middle East, in cooperation with the British and the states of the area. Even though considerable time and effort will be required to create such a defense, there are substantial advantages in making a prompt beginning. These include:

a) rational and efficient utilization of U.S. aid funds in the area;

b) an improved political orientation of the area;

c) maintenance of the newly achieved momentum in the area toward regional defense;

d) greater resistance to Soviet pressures and subversions;

e) a further deterrent to Soviet aggression.

[Here follow the 57-page report containing a discussion of each of the items mentioned above; Annex I, text of the Turko-Iraqi Pact of February 24, 1955; and Annex II, text of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty of September 8, 1954.]

Tab B

RELATIONSHIP TO APPROVED NSC POLICY STATEMENTS¹¹

This study is based upon the general courses of action set forth in paragraph 13 and the specific courses of action with respect to area defense set forth in paragraph 17 of NSC 5428, “United States Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Near East.” The policy proposals contained in the study are consistent with the cited paragraphs except that—

1. the military assistance proposed for Iraq may exceed the “limited military assistance” contemplated by paragraph 13.g.,

2. certain proposals reflect the fact of U.K. adherence to the Turk-Iraqi Pact although paragraph 17.b envisaged the “development of the ‘northern tier’ concept as an indigenous movement, not linked formally at this time with the Western powers”,

3. the Turk-Pakistani Pact is displaced by the later Turk-Iraqi Pact as the framework of the “northern tier” although paragraph 17.c. contemplated that Iraq and Iran would adhere to the former pact, and

4. the proposal for U.S. adherence to the Turk-Iraqi Pact requires consideration by the NSC at a later stage pursuant to paragraph 17.g.

The working group is of the opinion that the inconsistencies indicated in 2. and 3. preceding are of form rather than of substance. The U.K. adherence to the Turk-Iraqi Pact is not wholly incompatible with the indigenous character of the “northern tier” development in view of the existence of British colonies in the area and the British role of protecting power for the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms. The Turk-Iraqi Pact was not in existence when NSC 5428 was approved. Had it existed, it would certainly have been chosen as the framework of the “northern tier” in preference to the Turk-Pakistani Pact as the provisions of the Turk-Iraqi Pact provide a better foundation for regional defense arrangements. Nothing proposed in the study is inconsistent with the terms of the Turk-Pakistani Pact or with its continued existence.

The proposals in this study are not directly related to, but do not conflict with, the courses of action with respect to the Arab-Israeli problem set forth in paragraphs 10, 11 and 20.c. of the Supplementary Statement of NSC 5428.

Those portions of the study relating to Turkey are in accord with NSC 5510/1, “U.S. Policy on Turkey”, and particularly with paragraph 16 concerning the encouragement of Turkish participation in regional security agreements. Similarly, proposals affecting Iran are consistent with NSC 5504, “U.S. Policy Toward Iran”, particularly paragraphs 20, 21 and 22 dealing with Iran’s military strength and participation in regional defense arrangements.

In so far as the study relates to Pakistan it is compatible with paragraphs 27, 28, 49, 50 and 51 of NSC 5409, “United States Policy Toward South Asia”.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/6–655. Top Secret. The members of the Working Group were listed at the end of this memorandum. Department of State members were John J. Jernegan, Ben F. Dixon, Elbert G. Mathews, and Leonard Unger; Department of Defense members were R. Ernest, Colonel J. Masters, Colonel R. Akers, and Lieutenant Colonel J. Patterson.
2. The report consists of a six-page “Introduction and Summary of Conclusions”, 57 pages of text, and two annexes. The, “Introduction and Summary of Conclusions” is printed below as Tab A. Comments made on this report by various bureaus in the Department of State and by other agencies are Ibid., 780.5.
3. Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. IX, Part 1, pp. 525–536.
4. Vol. XXIV, pp. 620–628.
5. Document 291.
6. Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. XI, Part 2, pp. 1089–1117.
7. Printed below.
8. Neither Tab C nor Tab D is printed.
9. It is considered appropriate that the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff be solicited prior to the approval of this report. [Footnote in the source text.]
10. Top Secret.
11. Top Secret.