Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

49. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 23, 1955¹

Washington, June 23, 1955

SUBJECT

• Middle East Defense

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The Under Secretary of State
  • Mr. Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State
  • Mr. Jernegan, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA
  • Mr. Elbrick, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EUR
  • Mr. Mathews, Policy Planning Staff
• Observers
  • Mr. Roger Ernst, Defense
  • Col. George T. Powers, 3rd, JCS
• Great Britain
  • The British Ambassador
  • Mr. Ronald Bailey, Counselor, British Embassy
  • Col. Fitzgeorge Balfour, British Representative, NATO

The Under Secretary opened the meeting at 3:00 p.m. with a brief statement indicating that the U.S. welcomed the UK initiative for the present talks, emphasizing the importance of US-UK collaboration in the Middle East and expressing US interest in UK views concerning the Middle East in view of the UK’s long and intimate association with the area. He stated that the US had been reviewing its own position toward the problems of Middle East defense but had as yet reached no firm conclusions. He suggested that the discussions begin with the presentation of UK views pursuant to the agenda which the UK had proposed earlier and which was acceptable to the US. In conclusion, the Under Secretary pointed out that these talks were informal, explanatory, and secret and that neither Government would be committed by them.

The Ambassador agreed to begin the discussions by presenting the UK position on the several agenda items and said that it was clearly understood on the UK side that the talks were informal, explanatory and secret. Although it was also understood that the talks were primarily political, it would be necessary to refer to strategic and military aspects of the Middle East defense problem. Points of US-UK disagreement could be identified, and the Ambassador hoped that it would be possible to reach some understanding on steps to be taken to create an effective defense capability in the Middle East.

The Under Secretary said that the US would like to have a recess of about a week after the presentation of UK views in order that further consideration could be given to the US position. The Ambassador indicated some concern, stating that in the UK view some of the issues that he intended to raise required attention in a matter of days rather than weeks.

Agenda Item 1(a): The Soviet Threat to the Middle East in Peace

The Ambassador then began his exposition of the UK appreciation of the situation in the Middle East under agenda item 1(a). Communist activity in the area had increased during the past two years, the emphasis being on the development of Soviet bloc-Middle East trade and the exploitation of united front tactics. The USSR is, however, not yet in a position to make a major effort in the area, and there is no evidence that it intends to resort to military action. The ultimate Soviet objective is to absorb as much as possible of the area into the Communist orbit. The presence of foreign (i.e. UK) forces in the Middle East is an impediment to this objective, and the USSR accordingly is working to eliminate those forces. It is also resisting the formation of defensive systems in the area and cooperating with extreme nationalist elements to reduce Western influence.

The Ambassador cited as factors favoring the USSR the establishment of the state of Israel which had created bitter and lasting Arab resentment against the US and UK, the political backwardness and lack of effective governmental organization, particularly in the field of internal security, that characterizes the area and the prevailing social conditions—mal-distribution of wealth, lack of land reform, etc. Factors favoring the West are the historic ties between the area and various Western powers—e.g. UK-Jordan, the generally prevailing Moslem religion and Arab solidarity. The last two factors are of doubtful value as Islam is probably not a lasting bulwark against Communism and Arab solidarity expresses itself in hostility to Israel rather than in awareness of the Soviet threat.

The Ambassador briefly reviewed the UK appreciation of the situation in certain of the Middle East countries:

Iraq: The Government is stable and Communist subversion is not a present danger.

Israel: The Government is stable and strongly anti-Communist. Internal security against Communist subversion is good, but Israel is susceptible to Soviet pressure because of its concern for the Jews still behind the Iron Curtain.

Syria: The situation is generally unstable and unsatisfactory. There is a possibility of a left-wing coup with Communist participation. The USSR has been giving particular attention to Syria.

Jordan: The UK is a little concerned. Social conditions are bad, and the presence of large numbers of Palestine refugees is unsettling. The Arab Legion is, however, a solid anti-Communist factor.

Lebanon: The situation is fairly satisfactory. The Communist Party is illegal but internal security is not too good.

Egypt: Although Nasser and the RCC seem to be in control of the situation, disquieting possibilities exist. The Communists and the Moslem Brotherhood may make an alliance against the Government. The failure of the Government’s economic policy to raise the standard of living may lead to increasing unrest.

Iran: The situation is better than it was. However, although the Tudeh Party has been suppressed, the Government has not attacked the social conditions that favor the appeal of Communism.

The Ambassador commented that he had not covered Saudi Arabia, which seemed in any case to be peripheral in terms of Middle East defense, but he would welcome US views.

The Ambassador concluded his presentation under agenda item 1(a) by suggesting that the USSR may step up its activities in the Middle East as a consequence of possible concern over the implications of the Turk-Iraqi Pact. The two countries that will probably be most worrying to the US and UK in the near future are Syria and Jordan.

The Under Secretary stated that the US estimate of the situation in the Middle East was much the same as that of the UK although there were perhaps some variations in detail. He went on to say that the US had been giving some thought to increasing counter-subversion activities in the area including the training of internal security forces. This might be a cheaper way of buying security in the Middle East than building up the military forces. UK capabilities would probably be greater than those of the US in some countries and this subject might be further explored in the course of these talks.

Mr. Jernegan commented that he agreed almost 100% with the UK appreciation. He said that the US had received some reports indicating increased Communist activity in Kuwait and Bahrein and asked whether the UK had any pertinent information. Mr. Bailey replied that Kuwait and Bahrein were important transit points and that a number of Communists did pass through. Mr. Jernegan also commented on the fact that the USSR seemed to be holding back on the exploitation of the Israeli issue in the Middle East. He wondered whether the Kremlin was awaiting the proper moment when circumstances might appear to make the full-scale exploitation of the Israeli issue decisive in swinging the Arabs away from the West. The Ambassador thought this very likely.

With reference to Saudi Arabia, the Under Secretary and Mr. Jernegan indicated that there were evidences of Communist activity in the country but these did not in the US view constitute a serious current threat.

Mr. Murphy inquired concerning the activities of the Soviet Ambassador in Cairo with particular reference to Nasser’s intimations that Egypt might buy arms from the USSR. The ensuing discussion revealed that the US considers Nasser and his associates somewhat more susceptible to Soviet diplomatic blandishments than does the UK, and that the UK seems generally less disturbed than the US by Soviet diplomatic activities in the area. The Ambassador did, however, remark that the UK had no complacency about the existing situation in any part of the Middle East.

Agenda Item 1(b): The Soviet Threat to the Middle East in War

After briefly recapitulating the agreed US-UK estimate of the global Soviet threat in war, the Ambassador stated that the UK considered that Soviet war-time objectives in the Middle East would be to reduce the air threat to the USSR posed by Western bases in the area, to prevent the build-up of Western forces in the area, to secure the Bosphorus and Dardenellas and to deny Middle East oil to the West. The USSR would pursue these objectives by air strikes against Western bases, a campaign against Western Turkey and Thrace (this would be a NATO concern), a campaign against Iran and Iraq and a holding attack against Western forces in eastern Turkey. The UK assumes that there would be strong Western opposition in Turkey and Iraq but weak opposition in Iran where only Iranian forces would be engaged. The UK also assumes that both sides would use nuclear weapons from the outset but has not estimated the effects of Western nuclear attacks on the USSR. The Ambassador concluded by recapitulating the estimate of Soviet forces and capabilities contained in the US-UK-Turkey military study on Middle East defense completed in London in February 1955.

Mr. Jernegan pointed out that the London report did not deal with the Soviet capability in eastern Iran and Pakistan and inquired whether the UK had any pertinent estimates. Colonel Balfour replied that the UK did not.

Mr. Murphy asked what use the USSR was expected to make of strategic bombing in the Middle East, referring specifically to Turkey as a possible target. The Ambassador replied that the UK considered that the USSR would use its strategic air force only against Western air bases and possibly the Suez Canal and the Turkish port of Iskenderun. Elsewhere in Turkey, the USSR was expected to rely on tactical air forces. The Under Secretary remarked that the USSR would hardly use its strategic air force against oil fields.

The Under Secretary raised the possibility of localized Soviet aggression in the Middle East, citing as an example Soviet intervention in the event of internal disturbances in Iran. The Ambassador said that the UK does not foresee such limited Soviet military designs in the area and, in the specific case of Iran, does not consider that the USSR would intervene in internal disturbances by direct aggression across the frontier.

Agenda Item 2: Political and Strategic Aims in the Middle East

The Ambassador stated that the Middle East is of extreme importance to the UK for the following reasons:

(1) It is the focal point of commonwealth land, sea and air communication;

(2) It is a good base area against the USSR in war;

(3) It has large oil resources;

(4) It protects NATO’s right flank;

(5) It denies the Soviets access to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean;

(6) It bars the way to Africa; and

(7) The UK has great economic interests in the area.

UK aims in the area are twofold: to resist Soviet expansion and to promote orderly and stable conditions, good relations among the countries of the area and between them and the West, and a drawing together of the area states for common defense. The last aim will not, in the UK view, be achieved unless the US and UK support indigenous initiatives for common defense by action in the Middle East.

The Under Secretary asked whether supporting action in other areas could not meet the need. The Ambassador replied that he was not referring to war but to necessary action in peace. The UK believes that the area states will require visible evidence of US and UK support which could take the form of association with a regional defense pact or the supply of arms.

The Under Secretary said that although US interests and aims in the Middle East might be stated somewhat differently, they would come out generally about the same as those outlined by the Ambassador. The latter added that it had been the UK view for some time that the achievement of effective defense and other aims in the Middle East depended upon US-UK collaboration. The Under Secretary remarked that aside from the general and obvious need for US-UK collaboration there was in the Middle East the additional reason of preventing the area states from playing us off against each other.

Agenda Item 3: The Political Factors in the Establishment of a Defense Organization

The Ambassador stated that the UK purpose in the present talks is to reach general understanding with the US on the political framework of Middle East defense, the roles of the area states and the roles of the US, the UK and France.

As regards the political framework, two existing arrangements to defend the Middle East against aggression, the Arab League Security Pact (ALSP) and the Turk-Iraqi Pact, must be considered. There might, the Ambassador pointed out, be a third, the Egypt-Syria-Saudi Arabia Pact (ESS), although the UK had the impression that this was still in the realm of talk. Mr. Jernegan said that information available to the US indicated that ESS was in difficulties and might not materialize.

The Ambassador continued in the sense that the UK wrote off ALSP as ineffective, held together only by hostility to Israel and not open to Western membership. The Under Secretary and Mr. Jernegan indicated US concurrence.

The Turk-Iraqi Pact, the Ambassador said, provides a much better foundation for effective Middle East defense. It is linked to the West through Turkey and the UK, already members; its terms provide for special agreement among the members; it covers the Russian front; and it has in Iraq air fields and bases available to the UK including provision for prestocking. The UK wishes to build up the pact by the adherence of other area states.

The Ambassador went on to say that the Turk-Iraqi Pact in fact carries on the “northern tier” concept originally suggested by the US. The UK fears that the momentum behind this concept and the Pact is slowing down. There have been no recent adherences to the Pact and because of sharp adverse reaction to its creation from Egypt and Israel, the US and UK have not encouraged Lebanon and Jordan to join. The initial area enthusiasm is waning, and the impression is growing in the Middle East that the US is not as strong in its support of the Pact as it was at the outset. The UK considers that there is immediate need to give renewed momentum to the Pact and desires further discussion of this point during the present talks.

The Ambassador referred to the importance of obtaining the adherence of a fourth state to the Pact in order that the Ministerial Council provided for by the Pact might be established. Pakistan seems the most likely fourth member, to be followed later by Iran. Although the UK was aware of the difficulties confronting the US, both in the Middle East and domestically, in reaching a decision on US adherence to the Pact, the UK hoped that the US would find it possible to adhere and would welcome any indication of US intention that could be given in the course of the present talks.

The Under Secretary said that the US was at this time unable to express any view on the possibilities of its adherence.

[1 paragraph (3½ lines of source text) not declassified]

With reference to ESS the Ambassador commented that this would be even more of a minus than ALSP. ESS would be directed not only against Israel but also against Iraq and the Turk-Iraq Pact. There would be no possibility of Western participation. [1½ lines of source text not declassified] The Ambassador asked that it might be desirable, however, to discuss later in the present talks what the US and UK should do if ESS did come into being.

Regarding Pakistani accession to the Turk-Iraqi Pact, the UK believes there would be some help from Pakistan in the Middle East in time of war, and that there are important political values involved, particularly in influencing the Arabs. The UK is willing to disregard the inevitable Indian reaction. In response from a query from the Under Secretary as to the role the Pakistanis could play in Middle East defense, the Ambassador expressed the opinion that they might provide a division for the Zagros defense line although this would depend on the state of the Kashmir problem. In any case, the UK thought Pakistan could play a part and should be encouraged to do so. Mr. Jernegan stated that the US was urging the Pakistanis to adhere to the Pact.

The UK would like Iran in the Pact but would leave the timing to Iran. Great political advantages would flow from Iranian adherence, particularly in giving the Pact a greater area coloration and in influencing the Arabs. The UK would, however, want to see Iranian forces considerably strengthened before it got involved in extensive military commitments in Iran. Clearly, the Shah expects to get additional military aid from the US and commitments from his neighbors before he joins. The Pact won’t gain much from Iranian forces. In case of an attack, the Shah would probably leave the country and the civil government collapse. The West could probably not get bases or prestocking rights in Iran in view of the Shah’s recent assurances to the Soviet Ambassador regarding foreign bases in Iran. The UK would not want to give its war plans to Iran. Although the prospects of Iranian adherence would not cause any Soviet military action, the USSR might try to frighten Iran and might cause the Shah to back away from the Pact, resulting in an end situation less good than the present.

After a brief discussion of US and UK participation in the forthcoming Turk-Iraq-Iranian-Pakistani staff talks, the Under Secretary and the Ambassador agreed to exchange views on the appropriate rank of US and UK observers when the Embassy has received instructions from London.

The Under Secretary, Mr. Murphy and Mr. Jernegan indicated some dissent from the UK appreciation of Iran. The Under Secretary suggested that Iran might be on the verge of a rebirth and that the Iranian economic position would probably soon be better than that of Turkey, or Pakistan. He had noted, however, that the Soviet peace offensive seems to have had more effect in Iran than elsewhere in the area. He said that the US hoped to keep the Shah bolstered although we recognized that he was getting himself in an exposed position by appointing a personal Prime Minister like Ala. He also emphasized that Iran’s political posture depends on the backing Iran feels it has and that participation in the Turk-Iraqi Pact would have an important psychological effect.

Mr. Murphy pointed out that the Shah does not expect that all of Iran would or could be defended in war. Mr. Jernegan asked whether now might not be the time to move for Iranian adherence to the Pact and expressed puzzlement at the low UK military rating of Iran since the vital Zagros passes are in Iran. He thought that there were significant advantages in close military relations with Iran that would permit prearrangements for the defense of the passes, and that the UK military commitment to Iran could be limited under the terms of the Pact.

The Ambassador commented on the foregoing US views in the sense that the UK is concerned over symptoms of drift in Iran and feels that the Shah is not doing too well. The UK Ambassador to Iran has been instructed to prod the Shah. Mr. Bailey observed that the Zagros passes were practically in Iraq, but the Ambassador agreed in principle with Mr. Jemegan’s views on the desirability of prearranging the defense of the passes through close military relations with Iran.

Mr. Murphy asked if a supply question would arise with Iranian adherence to the Pact. The Ambassador replied that the Shah would certainly expect increased assistance. The UK could not meet this demand and the US would have to provide the aid.

The Ambassador commented that with a military training mission in Iran, the US would be better able to assess the military capability of the Iranians than the UK. He asked how the mission was getting on. Mr. Jernegan replied that the mission was now up to a strength of about 200 but it was still too early to assess results. The Under Secretary observed that the Iranians were cooperating well with the mission.

As he was departing, the Ambassador said that he was prepared to discuss the recommendations contained in the US-UK-Turkey military report of last February if the US side so desired.

The Under Secretary and the Ambassador agreed to resume the talks at 2:30 p.m., June 24.

1. Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 66 D 70. Top Secret. Drafted by Mathews.