165. Informal Record of a Meeting, Secretary Dulles’ Office, Department of State, Washington, December 7, 1956, 11 a.m.1
PARTICIPANTS
- The Secretary
- The Under Secretary
- Mr. Murphy
- Mr. Henderson
- Mr. MacArthur
- Mr. Phleger
- Mr. Bowie
- Mr. Rountree
- Mr. Wilcox
- Mr. McCardle
- Mr. Allen Dulles (for part of meeting)
- Mr. Wilkins
- Mr. Jones (WE)
- Mr. Sisco
- Mr. Memminger
- Mr. Burdett
- Mr. Mathews
- Mr. Greene (S/S)
SUBJECT
- Middle East
The meeting considered NEA’s revised proposal for a new Middle East grouping (S/S Staff Study 7928) and had before it a paper on countering Soviet penetration2 and a recommendation by Mr. Rountree that the Secretary discuss the question of the Baghdad Pact with the British at Paris.3 The Secretary was particularly interested in connection with the proposal for the Middle East Charter in the question whether the concept would or should include both the Arab countries and the stronger, but non-Arab Muslim countries, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. There was considerable discussion of this point and of the relationship to it of India’s attitude and activities. Mr. Bowie suggested that the problem is to find a vehicle for meeting the desire of the Arab Governments, particularly Saudi Arabia and Iraq, for a convincing demonstration of US intention to make its power felt in the area in a manner which would not smack of imperialism and which would leave the initiative to local countries.
Mr. Henderson expounded the thought that the Baghdad Pact is symbolic of their decision to associate themselves with the West. As it includes the UK, which has recently been involved in Egypt, the Baghdad Pact has become a rallying point for domestic opposition to some of the governments in whose stability we are most interested. It is important, therefore, that we reaffirm our support for the Pact.
[Page 394]Mr. Hoover expressed a preference for the bilateral approach mentioned in Mr. Murphy’s dissenting memorandum.4
The Secretary observed that it was not a good idea to undertake a government-to-government commitment such as US adherence to the Baghdad Pact simply to bolster one man and his government, e.g. Nuri; if bolstering him is desirable, other ways should be found to do it. Mr. Rountree noted that it is not proposed that the US pursue the Middle East Charter as an alternative to joining the Baghdad Pact unless preliminary soundings show that Saudi Arabia would be willing to participate in the Charter. He recommended that before sounding out the Saudis the Secretary should go over the ground with the British, perhaps in Paris next week.
The Secretary indicated his approval of the recommendation in Mr. Rountree’s memorandum, i.e., that the question of our adherence and the Charter idea should be discussed with the British at Paris.
He also wondered whether our first problem of getting Egypt to agree to some sort of international supervision over the Suez Canal would be helped or hindered by whatever we do on the Baghdad Pact or the Middle East Charter. In response to Mr. Rountree’s suggestion that it was not proposed to go ahead with new steps on the Pact or with the Charter until the Suez Canal problem is settled, the Secretary said that in his view the Suez agreement would be slow in coming and therefore the question is whether the situation in the area will hold together until Suez is buttoned up. On balance, he was inclined to think that over the next few months, while an effort is being made to solve the Suez question, we should try to deal with the other questions on a bilateral basis and thus should not try the Charter idea yet. We should also continue to support the Baghdad Pact and in fact should give it more support than we have in the past. He added that he thought the odds against the Charter idea are very great. He agreed that the Saudis are the key but thought they would be unlikely to come along quickly, and their readiness may in due course depend on the outcome of our base negotiations. He also considered an important element in the Saudi attitude the large number of Egyptians who have penetrated the Saudi Government.
In a discussion of other aspects of the Middle East problem, the Secretary:
- (1)
- Agreed that the US resolution on Suez which has been introduced in the UN5 should remain in abeyance for the time being to allow the Secretary-General time to continue to try to work out a solution with the British, French and Egyptians;
- (2)
- Expressed general agreement with Mr. Phleger’s account of manner in which IBRD planned to assist SYG with funds for Canal clearance and agreed that the US Government should continue to block Egyptian balances in this country until the question of payment for clearing the Canal is settled;
- (3)
- Asked that some kind of resolution, if not exactly the one which the US has already introduced, on the Arab-Israeli dispute6 be brought before the General Assembly before the latter recesses for Christmas;
- (4)
- Asked that consideration be given to giving the Egyptians in writing a statement pointing out that the US has, at the cost of considerable difficulty with its traditional friends and Allies, stood by its pledged word in respect to the Middle East and we would, therefore, like to know from the Egyptians that they intend to adjust their behavior and particularly to stop the many provocative actions which lead to the British and French intervention in the first place. The Secretary felt the timing of this operation might be at about the completion of the British and French withdrawal from Egypt.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.80/12–756. Secret. Drafted by Greene.↩
- Documents 160 and 161.↩
- Supra.↩
- Document 157.↩
- Reference is to the draft resolution introduced in the U.N. General Assembly on November 3. (U.N. Doc. A/3273) For text, see the editorial note, vol. XVI, p. 960.↩
- Reference is to the draft resolution introduced in the U.N. General Assembly on November 3. (U.N. Doc. A/3272) For text, see ibid.↩