Pursuant to the discussion in your office on the morning of December 3,
1956, S/P and NEA have collaborated in a revision of the proposal for a
new Middle Eastern grouping. We believe you will find the concept set
forth in the attached paper more in accord with your views. (Tab A)
To contain the present situation in the Middle East and to counter Soviet
penetration, a major US move is required which will have a dramatic
impact and develop support in the area. The present proposal is
conceived as the core of a coordinated program. Other aspects were
outlined in the paper entitled “Program to Counter Soviet Penetration in
the Middle East” which was put before you at the December 3 conference
and which is now being revised for submission to you under separate
memorandum.2
[Tab A]
PROPOSAL FOR A NEW GROUPING OF MIDDLE EASTERN STATES
One of the essential prerequisites for countering Soviet penetration
in the Middle East and moving toward stability and progress in the
area is the creation of a framework for cohesion and cooperation
among the Middle Eastern states that have some comprehension of the
Soviet menace. This framework will have to accord with the basic
drives of the area—which is to say that in addition to being
anti-Communist it will also have to be anti-imperialist and
pro-nationalist. It will, also, unfortunately, have to recognize the
strong anti-Israel sentiments of most of the area states.
None of the existing Middle Eastern groupings provides such a
framework. This paper accordingly proposes that the US take the
initiative in stimulating certain of the area states to undertake
the establishment of a new, ostensibly indigenous grouping. It also
proposes that the US (1) give a unilateral commitment to support the
members of this grouping against Communist aggression and (2)
provide substantial economic and some military assistance to the
members.
Inadequacy of Existing Middle Eastern Groupings
Existing Middle Eastern groupings include the Arab League and its
subsidiary organizations, the Egypt–Syria–Saudi Arabia (ESS) axis with its subsidiary military
arrangements with Yemen and Jordan, and the Baghdad Pact.
The Arab League is anti-imperialist, pro-nationalist and, above all
else, anti-Israel. It has shown few signs of being anti-Communist.
[2½ lines of source text not
declassified] It has been a battleground of inter-Arab
rivalries and has been able to reach a consensus only in opposition
to Israel. There is no reason to assume that it can break old habits
in any near future.
[Page 378]
The ESS axis exists to combat first
Israel and second the UK and France.
Far from being anti-Communist, its two principal members, Egypt and
Syria, look to the USSR for arms
and political support. The axis is, in fact, primarily a vehicle for
the extension of Egyptian—i.e. Nasser’s—influence and control over other Arab
states.
The Baghdad Pact is regarded by most of the non-member area states as
a vehicle for the extension of UK
influence and control in the Middle East. Some elements within three
of the member states, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan, share this view. Some
of the Arab states, moreover, consider that the Baghdad Pact is
pro-Israel or, at best, neutral in the Israel-Arab dispute. There is
little likelihood that any refurbishing of the Pact, including US
adherence, would remove the pro-UK,
pro-Israel coloration it has in the eyes of many Middle
Easterners.
Elements of New Middle Eastern Grouping
Participants
One of the objectives of bringing about the establishment of a new
Middle Eastern grouping is to submerge the Baghdad Pact in the new,
and larger, body. It is essential, therefore, that the four area
Pact members, Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan, be initiators and
founding members of the new group. Saudi Arabia and Lebanon should
also be founding members.
Saudi Arabia’s attitude may well be the key factor in determining
whether a new grouping can be established. King Saud is increasingly aware of the
Communist menance, being particularly disturbed by the trend of
events in Syria and Jordan. He is also increasingly distrustful of
Nasser’s ultimate
objectives in the Arab world. His relations with Iraq have shown
some improvement, and there seems to be real cordiality between him
and the Pakistani leaders. These factors taken together provide a
favorable atmosphere for pressing the merits of a new area grouping
with Saud. His decision will,
however, be based on his estimate of the extent of our interest in
and potential assistance to the group and its members, particularly
Saudi Arabia.
The potential field of membership of the new grouping extends from
Pakistan westward to Morocco, excluding Israel. Initially, however,
the founding members should invite only Libya, Egypt, Sudan,
Ethiopia, Yemen, Jordan and Syria to join. An invitation to
Afghanistan would probably be rejected in view of that country’s
unresolved problems with Pakistan and its heavy economic involvement
with the USSR. Invitations to
Tunisa and Morocco would tend directly to involve the new grouping
in the Algerian issue and would unnecessarily arouse the French.
[Page 379]
Both Egypt and Syria have publicly committed themselves to a
“neutralist” position which has a strong anti-anti-Communist flavor.
Dependent as the present governments of both countries have become
on the USSR for arms and political
support, it is doubtful that they would accept the invitation to
join a new, anti-Communist area grouping. Their rejection of the
invitation would serve to isolate them from the rest of the area and
to emphasize their close ties with the Soviet bloc. In the unlikely
event that the two countries did accept the invitation, this in
itself would constitute a rebuff for the USSR and a notable reversal of recent Egyptian and
Syrian positions.
The isolation of Egypt and Syria would be complete if Jordan and
Yemen could be induced to accept their invitations. The prospects of
their doing so are not too encouraging, but Saudi Arabia might be
able to bring them into line.
Charter
The documentary basis of the new grouping would be a Middle East
Charter. The Charter would specifically recognize the danger posed
by international Communism and express a determination to cooperate
in self defense against this threat. It would also set forth other
basic principles which the Middle Eastern states believe should
govern their relations with each other and the rest of the
world.
A draft Charter is attached at Tab A.8 The language used is intended to appeal to
indigenous Middle Eastern attitudes and beliefs.
Organization
Having agreed upon the language of a Middle East Charter, the
participating Middle Eastern states would proceed to form an
organization to “further the purposes of the Charter”. It is
probable that either the Arab League or Baghdad Pact structure would
provide a model. There would presumably be a council and subordinate
committees. Among the latter we would hope to see economic,
counter-subversion and military committees. It would undoubtedly be
wise if participation in the military committee were optional. These
committees should take over the functions of the parallel Baghdad
Pact committees.
Timing
The developing situation in the Middle East calls for urgency in
launching the new grouping, and the meeting of the Baghdad Pact
Council scheduled for January 28, 1957, in effect imposes a definite
terminal date. Unless by that time appreciable progress has been
made
[Page 380]
toward the
establishment of the new group, we may be faced with the
alternatives of US adherence to the Baghdad Pact or its collapse. A
suggested time schedule for action on the new grouping is attached
at Tab B.9
US Role
Persuading Founding
Members
The US will have to convince the area Baghdad Pact members that their
interests will be served by submerging the Pact in a larger Middle
Eastern grouping. We shall also have to support vigorously their
approaches to Saudi Arabia and Lebanon to enroll these two countries
among the founding members. Our trump cards will be our willingness
to make a unilateral declaration of protection of the members from
Communist aggression and to extend them substantial economic
aid.
Our support will again be required when invitations are addressed to
other area states, some of which will base their decision to accept
or reject the invitation on their estimate of US interest in the
project. [3 lines of source text not
declassified]
Declaration of Protection
Having made clear through confidential diplomatic channels beforehand
that we would take the step, when the Middle Eastern states have met
and agreed on their Charter, we should announce that we would view
any threat by international Communism against the independence or
territorial integrity of the participating states as seriously
endangering international peace and would consult with them in the
event of Communist attack on any member with a view to taking
appropriate measures in accordance with our constitutional
processes. A draft declaration is attached at Tab C.10
It would, of course, be necessary to consult with Congressional
leaders in advance of taking this step. After the event and should
Congressional reaction be encouraging, we might seek a joint
resolution endorsing the Executive’s action.
Economic Assistance
We should be prepared to provide substantially increased economic aid
to the members of the new grouping in the Middle East. This will
require early consultation with Congressional leaders as its
[Page 381]
financial implications
exceed present availabilities under the Mutual Security Act.
Legislation would not be introduced until after the Middle Eastern
states had adopted their Charter.
The emphasis of our economic assistance would be on increasing the
basic economic potential of the member states and of encouraging
regional projects. Simplified ways of administering the aid program
should be sought, tailored to the special characteristics of the
Middle Eastern situation and of this proposed new grouping.
Military Assistance
While we do not desire that the new grouping have a markedly military
aspect, we must recognize that many of the members will make demands
on us for military assistance. We should be prepared to meet such
demands as are based on requirements to maintain internal security
and to permit limited resistance to aggression. Few of the potential
members have the capability of providing forces that would be of
real value against the USSR.
Psychological Program
The proclaiming of the Middle East Charter should have a significant
psychological impact in the area. We should be prepared to assist
the subscribing area states to exploit this initial advantage with a
view to cementing the new grouping and to countering the appeal of
Communist and “Third bloc” propaganda. We shall wish to give
continuing support to this type of psychological offensive and to
utilize our own information and cultural programs to strengthen the
ties between the Charter signatories and the West.
US Participation
We would prefer that participation in the Charter and the
organization set up thereunder be limited to the Middle Eastern
states. If there were a strong desire among them for our
participation, however, we should be prepared to subscribe to the
Charter and, if necessary, join the organization. Our participation
would, of course, raise the issue of participation by other non-area
states. We should take the position that such participation could
only occur by invitation of the Middle Eastern member states.
Other Considerations
Attitude of UK and France
The UK and France will probably not be
enthusiastic about the formation of a new Middle Eastern grouping
from which they would be excluded, initially at least, and which
would undoubtedly have a
[Page 382]
strong anti-colonial bias. We should have to convince them that it
was worth paying this price to bring about a larger, anti-Communist
grouping in the area. We could point to the isolation of Egypt and
Syria and to the likelihood that over time the new grouping would
evolve into a vehicle for effective cooperation with the West.
Attitude of Israel
Israel will protest the creation of a new Middle Eastern grouping
from which it is excluded and will renew its demands for some type
of US guarantee. Israel’s recent attack on Egypt leaves us in a
better position to resist such demands and to maintain the position,
stated by the Secretary in August 1955, that we would guarantee
Israel’s security in the context of a general Arab-Israel
settlement.
Attitude of the USSR
We must anticipate a strong Soviet reaction, the intensity of which
will increase with the success of the new Middle Eastern grouping.
However, Embassy Moscow believes that in the absence of a renewal of
hostilities in the Middle East the USSR would be unlikely to intervene militarily in the
area, even if the US joined the Baghdad Pact. We believe that the
establishment of the new grouping is unlikely to cause the USSR to resort to more drastic
measures than US adherence to the Pact.
We can expect that the USSR would
intensify its efforts to maintain and expand its influence in Egypt
and Syria, and that these two countries, isolated as they would be,
would be receptive to the Soviet effort. This situation emphasizes
the necessity of other measures in the Middle East, such as a UN arms embargo against the parties to
the Israel-Arab Armistice Agreements of 1949, to restrict Soviet
capabilities with respect to Egypt and Syria. If these other
measures can be brought into play, Egypt and Syria may in time find
that they have no alternative, under their present or successor
governments, to joining their neighbors in the new area
grouping.
