157. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) and the Assistant Secretary’s Special Assistant (Burdett)1
Since our conversation Saturday evening2 at Mr. Hoover’s house, I have read carefully and given some thought to the attached paper, “Proposal for a New Grouping of Middle Eastern States”.3 Reading the revised paper, I found myself in considerable doubt as to the wisdom of the proposed course of action. I am inclined to question whether the organization of an additional international grouping in the area will really help achieve American objectives. In other words, I think I appreciate the purpose but do not agree that the suggested method will achieve it.
It was certainly to some extent American inspiration which helped create the Baghdad Pact. Now, because we feel it has developed a reputation of being an instrument of UK policy we seek to “submerge” the Baghdad Alliance in a new grouping which is generally vague in character and which I believe will arouse the suspicions of countries in the area and certainly those outside the area. It will be an unwieldy grouping at the best.
One of the key elements is Saud. He has urged us not to adhere to the Baghdad Pact. I doubt his receptivity to the present scheme. He and other Moslems could well regard the proposal as a project of American power politics.
Even though we may consider that Israel is at present not in a good posture to oppose such a scheme, a suggestion to group all of the States in the area except Israel would give rise to strident opposition in some quarters, unless it were accomplished by provision for Israeli security.
Do we really want or need to build up a new grouping? Cannot our influence be used so that the Baghdad Pact will not be known just as an instrumentality of UK policy? If we give the Baghdad Pact membership substantial support and encouragement, why should the Baghdad Pact crumble away?
[Page 369]The approach which seems preferable to me is a bilateral one and I think one of the keys to it is the relationship we build up with Saudi Arabia. I favor an active stand and substantial bilateralism in the area and that relates not only to Saudi Arabia but to Jordan and Lebanon as well as the Baghdad Pact membership.
I do not pretend that I have made a profound study of this problem, but these are my reactions and the reason why I do not concur in the present paper.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.80/12–356. Secret. Copies were sent to Dulles, Hoover, and Henderson. The date 12–3–56 is written in hand on the source text.↩
- December 1.↩
- Not found attached, but presumably the “Proposal for Middle East Charter” cited in footnote 2, supra.↩