158. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, December 4, 1956, 10:30 a.m.1
SUBJECT
- Baghdad Pact
PARTICIPANTS
- The Ambassador of Turkey2
- The Ambassador of Iraq3
- The Ambassador of Iran4
- The Ambassador of Pakistan5
- The Secretary
- The Under Secretary
- Mr. Rountree
The Ambassadors of the four Asian members of the Baghdad Pact had asked urgently to see the Secretary prior to the latter’s departure for Paris. They wished to discuss the current serious situation in the Near East.
After preliminary comment, in which the Ambassadors expressed their happiness at the Secretary’s recovery, the Pakistani Ambassador said the group was particularly concerned with the situation in Iraq and Syria. They had discussed the matter among themselves and were convinced that any change in the Iraq Government would have serious repercussions for the whole free world since no other Iraq Government would have the strength to continue in the Baghdad Pact. The only way they could see of assuring that the situation would not [Page 370] become unmanageable would be for the U.S. to adhere to the Pact. If that was not possible, however, something else should be done although the Ambassadors were quite uncertain as to what that should be.
The Secretary referred to his press statement at Augusta in which he had mentioned the Baghdad Pact. He also mentioned the Department’s recent statement concerning our attitude toward the Pact and the security of its members. He felt the latter had gone a long way toward setting the record straight as to how we felt about the matter. Responding to the Pakistani Ambassador’s suggestion that we might intimate that we will join the Pact, he thought that would be a serious mistake if we were not actually prepared immediately to adhere. He said that we had given constant thought to adherence and that there were still many problems, one of which was the likelihood that there would be heavy pressure from Congress for a security arrangement with Israel if we should join the Baghdad Pact. He asked what the reaction of the Baghdad Pact countries would be in this eventuality. The Iraqi Ambassador replied that it seemed to him that Israel’s action in attacking Egypt had changed the situation completely, and that it would not be unreasonable to take the position that Israel did not in these circumstances deserve a security guaranty. In any event, he said, he would perceive of no objection to a security guaranty to Israel, as well as to other countries in the area, after a settlement of the Palestine problem. At the present time, however, he thought that any assurance to Israel “should not exceed the UN resolutions”. The Secretary observed that any pressure from the Senate would certainly be for more than assurances to Israel in that context.
The Secretary said he wished to make his attitude toward the matter quite clear. The U.S. wanted to salvage the Baghdad Pact and it is determined to support the member governments. We wanted to encourage all the Arab states in every way possible to recognize the Soviet danger and to oppose Soviet encroachment. The creation of the Pact was, in fact, an outgrowth of a suggestion which he had made regarding the northern tier. One of the problems involved in our own adherence was that the Pact had unfortunately become involved in area politics and was not universally viewed as an instrument solely to oppose communism and Soviet aggression. As he had previously indicated, the question of Israel also presented a problem in regard to our adhering. We recognized the importance to the four countries of the Pact, and recognized particularly this importance in the present political situation in Iraq. There was no question of our attitude toward the present Iraqi government; we wished to do everything possible to support it. However, he did not think that he could tell the Ambassadors today that he had resolved all of his doubts regarding American adherence to the Pact. He was giving thought to how our joint purposes [Page 371] could best be achieved in the area. Certainly the present situation was not satisfactory and something more must be done to cope with the threats of Soviet penetration. The Ambassadors need not have any concern that the U.S. presence and interest in the area would be amply demonstrated. The precise form in which this would come about, however, was now under study and he hoped to be in a position to pursue that with the interested governments in the near future.
The Iraqi Ambassador said he had just received another message from Prime Minister Nuri saying the Near East was at a crossroads and the Baghdad Pact was in a critical position. If the Pact should collapse, and if the present government should lose power, he felt a golden opportunity would be presented for the communists to make virtually unlimited progress toward their goals. Within a few years, he feared, all the area would be lost to the free world.
The Secretary replied that the Middle East was not going to be lost to the free world. The thought of war to prevent that would be terrible; everything possible should be done to avert any such situation. But the interdependence of the area on the West was so great that it would be unthinkable to have the area under Soviet control.
The Turkish Ambassador said that he felt the Iraqi Ambassador was in an awkward position to speak frankly with respect to Israel. His colleague could not feel free to advise the Secretary regarding a security guaranty to Israel. However, the Soviet danger was very great and if a guaranty to Israel was needed for the U.S. to adhere to the Baghdad Pact, the Turkish Ambassador felt certain that the Iraqi government would not raise a question in this regard.
The Iranian Ambassador expressed the hope that the Secretary would consider a possible connection between NATO, SEATO, and the Baghdad Pact, in order to provide a greater strength to all three which would derive from such a relationship.
The Pakistani Ambassador agreed and then said he thought such a connection would be of added strength to all of the security groupings.
The Secretary concluded the discussion by saying he was glad to have had this talk with the Ambassadors. He wanted them to leave with the conviction that we were fully alive to the problems which they raised. It was our firm intention to do something about them. We intend to act in an appropriate manner in association with the four countries, and perhaps with one or two others.
After the meeting in the Secretary’s office the group adjourned to Mr. Hoover’s office where they went over again much of the ground which had already been covered, and discussed what the Ambassadors would say to the press upon their departure. The Pakistani Ambassador proposed that they tell the press that they had again urged the U.S. to adhere to the Baghdad Pact. Mr. Rountree counseled [Page 372] against this, pointing out that the more the Baghdad Pact members publicly urged American adherence without such adherence materializing, the greater the implication of the weakness of the Pact. The U.S. had recently made a strong statement in support of the Pact, and it was understood that the several members welcomed the statement as a contribution to the strength and stability of the organization. The effect of that statement might be completely eradicated if the impression should be given that the Pact members already were urgently pressing for American adherence. The Ambassadors, including the Pakistani Ambassador, seemed to accept this point and to agree that the Pact countries should not give the impression publicly of continuing to insist that the U.S. join.