Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

159. Letter From the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the President¹

Washington, December 4, 1956.

Dear Mr. President: The difficult position of the West in the Middle East, with the attendant unfavorable effects in Western Europe and in the Free World alliances as a whole, has apparently reached a stage where some additional decisive actions are needed.

The Defense Department has felt for some time that the situation would be improved and we would have a better basis for supporting actions we might need to take in the Near East if our country formally joined the Baghdad Pact. There may be reasons which we do not fully appreciate for not doing this at this time. However, we feel so strongly in regard to the matter that I am sending you some supporting data dealing with it. I hope to find time Friday² afternoon to discuss the matter briefly with you.

I am taking the liberty of sending a copy of this letter and attachments to the Secretary of State.³

With great respect, I am

Faithfully yours,

C.E. Wilson

[Attachment 1]

STATEMENT BY DEFENSE OF THE REASONS FOR U.S. ADHERENCE TO THE BAGHDAD PACT AT THIS TIME

1. Would permit the U.S. to fill the political and military vacuum which has been created by the decline in the U.K.’s position and prestige in the area. The U.S. and the USSR are the only major powers capable of filling this vacuum. The Soviets are already making a strong bid in this direction, and failure of the U.S. to adhere to the Baghdad Pact will be looked upon as a sign of weakness and enable the Soviets to move in uncontested.

2. Would reinforce the firm support by the U.S. of the concept of collective security, which the U.S. has promoted and encouraged throughout the world to counter the Soviet-Communism threat.

3. Would demonstrate to the Soviets and to the world the U.S. determination to support the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the free nations of the Middle East and would counter the growing impression that U.S. policy in the Middle East is one of peace at any price in contrast to Soviet willingness to take strong action when their interests are involved.

4. Would contribute constructively to the attainment of other key U.S. objectives in the Middle East, i.e.,

a. Help to preserve the flow of Middle East oil to markets in W. Europe;

b. Would ensure the availability of bases, strategic positions and Middle East resources to the U.S. and its allies.

5. Would increase the prestige of the Baghdad Pact and its member nations and enable these nations to develop an effective regional defensive organization.

6. Would help to wean several Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Lebanon away from Nasser’s domination and reorient them towards an association of Middle East states more friendly to the West.

7. Would facilitate military planning in consonance with U.S. interests as well as the establishment of a U.S. command in the area.

8. Would strengthen NATO’s southeastern flank and facilitate coordination of planning among NATO, the Baghdad Pact, and SEATO.

9. Would not necessarily increase the magnitude of the military assistance programs in the area because of U.S. leadership and influence in the Pact’s strategic planning. Such planning would give appropriate weight to the wartime potential of U.S. military collaboration.

10. Failure to adhere will result in:

a. A general lack of confidence in the U.S. resolve to support its friends and allies in the face of Soviet pressure.

b. The probable deterioration of other collective security arrangements in which the U.S. participates.

c. Greater success on the part of the USSR in consolidating, strengthening and expanding its position of influence throughout the Middle East, Africa and Asia.

d. The collapse of protection for the southeastern flank of NATO.

e. The collapse of the Baghdad Pact thus confronting the U.S., in the event of involvement in hostilities in the Middle East, with the necessity of undertaking military operations in a hostile environment.

[Attachment 2]

STATEMENT BY STATE OF THE REASONS AGAINST U.S. ADHERENCE TO THE BAGHDAD PACT AT THIS TIME

1. The U.S. has given its full support to the United Nations effort to stabilize the delicate and critical situation in Egypt resulting from the British, French, and Israeli military actions. Any change in the current U.S. relationship with the powers in the area might seriously jeopardize those efforts.

2. The Soviet Union has stated firmly its strong opposition to the Baghdad Pact. U.S. adherence might be taken as a pretext for further and stronger Soviet moves against the West in the Near East. US–USSR relations would be further exacerbated.

3. There is serious doubt concerning the effectiveness of the Baghdad Pact in preventing Soviet penetration of the area. The Soviets appear to be capitalizing on existing tensions in the area and using psychological, economic, and covert military measures rather than direct threats of armed force. By so doing they are, in effect, hopping over the “Northern Tier” line.

4. The U.S. must, in framing its policy, consider its position in the entire Near East where the uncommitted Arab nations are hostile to the Pact and are being seriously threatened from within by the Soviet exploitation of the British and French actions in Egypt. Adherence would involve the U.S. more directly in Hashemite-Saudi-Iraqi-Egyptian disputes.

5. While public support remains strong for the Baghdad Pact in Turkey and Iran, the British and French action in Egypt has seriously weakened public support for the Pact in Iraq and Pakistan. Serious doubt remains as to the advisability of the U.S. adhering to a Pact which has lost a strong measure of support in two of its important members.

6. Adherence would provide Israel with a pretext for renewed demands for a U.S. security guarantee.

7. While the U.S. might gain some psychological benefit from adherence, this step might well be followed by strong demands for further U.S. aid to member countries on grounds that, as a member, we should demonstrate even more dramatically our support for these nations.

8. The original U.S. concept of the “Northern tier” was one of an indigenous organization. The Baghdad Pact, unfortunately, has been regarded by the non-member states of the area as Western-inspired and in large part UK-dominated. There is serious doubt, therefore, whether U.S. adherence would alter the prevailing view and muster for the Pact the necessary additional membership and the widespread public support necessary to make it a really effective instrument for the furtherance of U.S. objectives in the area.

9. Adherence would be strongly opposed by Saudi Arabia, where the U.S. has important interests.

10. We can strengthen the security of these countries through our present relationship in the Economic Committee of the Pact and through our bilateral military and economic programs without risking the serious disadvantages which would be created by adherence to the Pact itself.

11. The immediate pressure upon the U.S. to adhere to the Baghdad Pact arises from the difficulties and apprehensions of the four area members resulting from the Israel-UK-French military action against Egypt. We should not undertake the long term commitment inherent in adherence to the Pact to meet this current and short term crisis which can be and is being dealt with by other means.

12. The problem of obtaining Senate ratification of U.S. adherence to the Baghdad Pact, particularly without concurrently extending a security guarantee to Israel, is still with us. Recent developments in the Near East may have eased this problem, but we have no evidence that the Congress would be amenable to our adherence to the Pact.

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records. Top Secret. Attached to the source text is Document 153; a memorandum from Assistant Secretary of Defense Gordon Gray to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated October 22; four pages of excerpts from Department of State telegrams, quoting statements of foreign leaders and U.S. diplomats to the effect that the United States should join the Baghdad Pact; a paper entitled “Statement by Defense of the Reasons for U.S. Adherence to the Baghdad Pact at This Time”, printed below; and a paper entitled “Statement by State of the Reasons Against U.S. Adherence to the Baghdad Pact at This Time”, also printed below.
2. December 7. No memorandum of the conversation has been found.

3. Transmitted to Secretary Dulles under cover of a letter from Secretary Wilson, December 4. (Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/12–456)

   On December 6, Secretary Dulles telephoned Secretary Wilson concerning his letter. The memorandum of the telephone conversation reads as follows:

   “W, returned the call and the Sec. said he got his letter re the Baghdad Pact. The Sec. wonders whether it is wise to press it on the Pres. at a time when the Sec. can’t be there. W. had no intention of pressing for a decision. Radford and the Chiefs feel so strongly—W. wants him to see the position. The Sec. said he will only see part if he hears them. W. won’t let him make a decision. The Sec. said it should not be presented piecemeal until the other Depts sit in. W. said he does not see the Pres. as much as before. He is going primarily for budget business but promised Radford he would spend time reviewing the thing.” (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)