Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

153. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)¹

Washington, November 30, 1956.

SUBJECT

• U.S. Adherence to the Baghdad Pact

1. In response to a memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), dated 22 October 1956,² subject as above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit the following views on the desirability of U.S. adherence to the Pact in the light of present and foreseeable developments within, and in the general area of, the Baghdad Pact.

2. The United States has gone publicly on record in strong support of the Baghdad Pact Organization. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have consistently, from a military viewpoint, urged that the United States adhere to the Baghdad Pact. In the past, the State Department has objected to U.S. adherence to the Pact on the grounds that Congressional approval could not be obtained because of the objections by Israel; that Israel would demand a security guarantee which in turn would be unacceptable to certain Arab countries. Recent events might lead the Israelis to the conclusion that U.S. adherence to the Pact at this time would offer the greatest opportunity to exert U.S. influence on the political and military situations in the Middle East with resultant advantage to Israel.

3. As of now, the continued effective existence of the Baghdad Pact is at stake. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that continuation of the Baghdad Pact as a regional defense organization against Soviet aggression in the Middle East is vital to the security of this area and to the attainment of U.S. military objectives in this area. The collapse of the Baghdad Pact Organization will be an irretrievable loss to the best interests of the United States in the Middle East.

4. From a military viewpoint, the U.S. position in the Middle East is in a dangerous condition. Egypt, Syria and Jordan have made the beginnings of an alliance against Israel. There is growing evidence that the USSR is working towards the establishment of such an alliance with the expectation of controlling it. The United States and the Western World have no effective defense arrangement which would counteract such an alliance. U.S. adherence to the Pact, at this time, would provide us with an opportunity to establish a military position in the area, if it should later prove desirable.

5. Formal adherence to the Baghdad Pact will not increase the responsibilities that the United States has already assumed in the Middle East or materially increase the cost thereof. In fact, lack of adherence to the Pact might prove to be more costly in that Turkey, Iran and Pakistan might demand, justifiably, more aid. We have, in the past, been active in the development of the Pact and have taken part, in an advisory capacity, in the planning accomplished in the Pact. We have made friends with many of the military leaders of the present Moslem countries of the Pact. It may be expected that these military leaders could exert influence on their national policies. If we join the Pact, the United States would become the military leader in the area and would have the opportunity not only to establish a secure military position in the area but also to influence political and military developments to our advantage.

6. There is evidence that Saudi Arabia and Lebanon are well aware of the enormous danger of Communist expansion in the area and are secretly disposed against Nasser and his friendship with the Soviets. If the U.S. adheres to the Baghdad Pact now, the fear of Soviet penetration which exists in Saudi Arabia and Lebanon could probably be exploited to urge them to join the Pact.

7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the military and political advantages which would accrue to the United States by adhering to the Pact far outweigh any disadvantages which might result. An important result of prompt U.S. adherence to the Pact would be the checking and eventual downgrading of Nasser’s gains. In the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, if the U.S. fails to adhere to the Baghdad Pact now, the opportunity to do so may be lost. Without tangible evidence of U.S. strength in the Middle East, it is a certainty that Nasser will end up with greater prestige than before and that Soviet penetration in the area will become an accomplished fact.

8. The U.S. statement, issued on 29 November 1956 to the effect that the U.S. would “view with the utmost gravity” any threat, political or territorial, to Turkey, Iran, Iraq or Pakistan might be considered to be a definite step in the direction of bolstering the morale of the area of [against?] the principal threat; but it does not go far enough to assure the end result which is required. Indeed, it prompts the logical question: “If this is true, why is the U.S. unwilling to join the Baghdad Pact?” A statement such as that which was made may well be interpreted by the Baghdad Pact powers as evidence that while the U.S. is willing to “talk support,” we are still unwilling to take the forthright and logical action the U.S. position suggests.

9. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff are, from the military point of view, in full accord with current U.S. policies which make maximum use of the U.N., they believe that a U.S. policy which is predicated upon settlement of the major issues in the Middle East solely through the U.N. would prove to be inadequate to the attainment of essential U.S. objectives in the area. The slowness with which effective action can be taken by the U.N., the increasing influence of the Arab-Asian Bloc in the General Assembly, the ever-present Soviet veto in the Security Council and the unlikelihood of achieving U.S. objectives in the Middle East entirely through a large international body, render such a U.S. policy hazardous. Soviet penetration would be complete before U.N. solutions could be expected to materialize—even if U.N.-sponsored courses of action could be controlled so that they would be largely consistent with U.S. interests.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Arthur Radford³
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records. Top Secret. Secretary of Defense Wilson forwarded this memorandum to President Eisenhower on December 4. See Document 159.
2. Attached to the source text but not printed.
3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.