Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conferences at Washington, 1941–1942, and Casablanca, 1943

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff¹

secret
C.C.S. 155/1

[Casablanca,] January 19, 1943.

Conduct of the War in 1943

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed to submit the following recommendations for the conduct of the war in 1943.

1. Security:

The defeat of the U-boat must remain a first charge on the resources of the United Nations.

2. Assistance to Russia:

The Soviet forces must be sustained by the greatest volume of supplies that can be transported to Russia without prohibitive cost in shipping.

3. Operations in the European Theater:

Operations in the European Theater will be conducted with the object of defeating Germany in 1943 with the maximum forces that can be brought to bear upon her by the United Nations.

4. The main lines of offensive action will be:

In the Mediterranean:

(a) The occupation of Sicily with the object of:

(1) Making the Mediterranean line of communications more secure.

(2) Diverting German pressure from the Russian front.

(3) Intensifying the pressure on Italy.

(b) To create a situation in which Turkey can be enlisted as an active ally.

In the U.K.:

(c) The heaviest possible bomber offensive against the German war effort.

(d) Such limited offensive operations as may be practicable with the amphibious forces available.

(e) The assembly of the strongest possible force (subject to (a) and (b) above and paragraph 6 below) in constant readiness to reenter the Continent as soon as German resistance is weakened to the required extent.

5. In order to insure that these operations and preparations are not prejudiced by the necessity to divert forces to retrieve an adverse situation elsewhere, adequate forces shall be allocated to the Pacific and Far Eastern Theaters.

6. Operations in the Pacific and Far East:

(a) Operations in these theaters shall continue with the forces allocated, with the object of maintaining pressure on Japan, retaining the initiative and attaining a position of readiness for the full scale offensive against Japan by the United Nations as soon as Germany is defeated.

(b) These operations must be kept within such limits as will not, in the opinion of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, jeopardize the capacity of the United Nations to take advantage of any favorable opportunity that may present itself for the decisive defeat of Germany in 1943.

(c) Subject to the above reservation, plans and preparations shall be made for:

(1) The recapture of Burma ( Anakim) beginning in 1943.

(2) Operations, after the capture of Rabaul, against the Marshalls and Carolines if time and resources allow without prejudice to Anakim.

1. Approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their morning meeting on January 19, 1943, ante, p. 637. For draft text of this memorandum prior to revision by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, see C.C.S. 155, January 18, 1943, ante, p. 760.