J. C. S. Files
Memorandum by the British Chiefs of
Staff1
secret
C.C.S. 135/2
January 3, 1943.
American-British Strategy in
1943
1. Our combined resources have increased to the point where we have
been able to wrest the initiative from Germany and Italy, and to pin
down the Japanese in the Southwest Pacific. The days of plugging
holes are over. We must now agree on a plan that will lead to
victory, quickly and decisively.
2. The main factors bearing on the conduct on the war are:
- (a)
- The fighting power of Germany is on the wane and her oil
situation is at the moment critical. What she needs above
all, is a period for recuperation.
- (b)
- All that stands between Germany and the opportunity for
recuperation with an abundant oil supply, is Russia. The
Russian war effort is also the greatest single drain on the
power and hope of Germany and must be sustained and assisted
at all costs.
- (c)
- The Japanese war effort is incapable of much expansion
provided communications with Germany are kept
severed.
- (d)
- The offensive power of the United States is growing. The
main problem is to decide how her armed forces can best be
deployed against the enemy.
- (e)
- The war potential of the British Empire is not capable of
much more overall expansion. The bulk of the British armed
forces are already directed against Germany. As long as
Germany is in the field, a considerable proportion of these
forces must continue to be located in the United Kingdom and
Home Waters.
- (f)
- Shipping is vital—not only to maintain the British war
effort but to deploy the forces of the United Nations
against the enemy.
- (g)
- Submarine warfare is now the only means whereby Germany
could cripple our offensive action.
3. The resources of the United Nations are insufficient to defeat
Germany and Japan simultaneously. We must therefore either
concentrate on defeating Germany while holding Japan, or vice versa.
The arguments may be summarized as follows:
- (a)
- If Germany were allowed breathing space to recuperate, she
might well become unbeatable. Provided we maintain limited
pressure on Japan, she can never become unbeatable.
- (b)
- By concentrating on Germany we uphold Russia. By
concentrating on Japan we should cause little, if any,
relief to the Russians. Moreover, for a given amount of
shipping more United States forces can be deployed against
Germany than against Japan.
- (c)
- In order to defeat Japan, we should need to concentrate
against her so large a naval force that the security of the
United Kingdom and of Atlantic Sea communications would be
seriously jeopardized.
- (d)
- If we do not bring sufficient pressure to bear on Japan
there is a risk of China dropping out of the fight. We must
therefore continue to give China such support as will ensure
that she will not give up the struggle.
- (e)
- Important though China is as an ally against Japan, Russia
is far more important as an ally against Germany. Moreover,
after the defeat of Germany, Russia might be a decisive
factor in the war against Japan, whereas China could never
help us in the war against Germany.
4. It is clear from the above that we should persist in the strategic
policy adopted at the first Washington Conference,2 namely, that we should
bend all our efforts to the early and decisive defeat of Germany,
diverting only the minimum force necessary to hold Japan.
Holding Japan
5. The operations in the Southwest Pacific during the last few months
have forced the Japanese to make this area their principal theater
of operations. These have directly relieved the threat to
Australasia, India and the Indian Ocean, and have indirectly
assisted Russia by staving off a Japanese attack on the Maritime
provinces. The best way of holding Japan is to continue limited
offensive operations on a scale sufficient to contain the bulk of
the Japanese forces in
[Page 743]
the
Pacific. It is necessary to define the broad action required to
implement this strategy.
6. The only way of bringing material help to China is to open the
Burma Road. The reconquest of Burma should therefore be undertaken
as soon as resources permit.
Defeat of Germany
7. The occupation of Germany will ultimately be necessary. For the
present, however, Northwest Europe may be likened to a powerful
fortress which can be assaulted only after adequate preparation. To
make a fruitless assault before the time is ripe would be disastrous
for ourselves, of no assistance to Russia and devastating to the
morale of occupied Europe. We cannot yet bring to bear sufficient
forces to overcome the German garrison of France and the low
countries, which can rapidly concentrate against us in superior
strength and behind powerful coast defenses.
8. The alternatives which lie before us are:—
- (a)
- To devote our main effort towards building up in the
United Kingdom a force of sufficient size to invade the
Continent, or
- (b)
- To devote our main effort towards undermining the
foundations of German military power, simultaneously
building up in the United Kingdom the maximum United States
and British forces which our remaining resources allow in
order to return to the Continent as soon as German powers of
resistance have been sufficiently weakened. The effect of
each of these courses of action is discussed in the
following paragraphs.
Invasion of the Continent
9. If we go for the maximum “
Bolero” with the intention of
assaulting the Continent in 1943 we must be ready to strike by
September. Thereafter weather conditions will progressively
deteriorate. The strongest Anglo-American force which we could
assemble in the United Kingdom by that date for an attack upon
Northern France would be some 13 British and 9 United States
divisions with perhaps a further 3 United States divisions
collecting in the United Kingdom. 6 divisions are probably the
maximum which could be organized as assault forces.
10. The assembly of the above forces would have the following
effects:
On the Axis
(a) We should have to accept only a
small increase in the scale of bomber offensive against
Germany and Italy from now onwards. This would be due to
giving a higher priority to the passage of United States
soldiers across the Atlantic and to the need for bringing
over larger proportion of army support types of United
States aircraft.
(b) We should have to abandon all
amphibious operations in the Mediterranean, thereby giving
Germany the opportunity she so desperately
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needs for rest and
recuperation, and Italy a chance to steady her morale.
On Russia
(c) We could rim a limited number of
convoys to North Russia.
(d) The Axis might well make advantage
of the relaxation of pressure to transfer forces from the
Mediterranean to Russia.
On Turkey
(e) There would be sufficient Allied
Forces left over in the Mediterranean to support Turkey but
these could not be used for offensive operations owing to
lack of shipping and assault craft. The reduction of our
offensive in the Mediterranean would make Turkey all the
more reluctant to join in the war on our side.
On Spam
(f) Relaxation of Allied pressure in
the Mediterranean would make Spain more inclined to yield to
German pressure.
11. Even if we accepted the above curtailment of our activities in
other theaters, we should probably find that the expedition which we
had prepared was inadequate to overcome the scale of German
resistance existing when the time came for the assault. The scale of
“
Roundup” as originally planned
was a total of 48 British and United States divisions; since then
the defenses of the French Coast and the German garrison in France
have been increased to some 40 divisions. In short the adoption of
this strategy would mean a relaxation of pressure on the Axis for 8
or 9 months with incalculable consequences to the Russian Front and
at the end of the period no certainty that the assault on France
could, in fact, be carried out. Or even if it were carried out, that
it would draw out land forces from the Russian Front.
Attrition of Germany
12. Apart from operations to clear the enemy out of North Africa, our
attrition of Germany has hitherto comprised bombing, blockade, raids
and subversive action. All these methods strike at the enemy’s
industrial and economic system, submarine construction, sources of
air power and, last but not least, at the morale of the German
people—and all can be intensified.
13. The bomber offensive is susceptible of great development and
holds out most promising prospects. For this purpose we should aim
at an Anglo-American bomber force of 3,000 heavy and medium bombers
in the United Kingdom by the end of 1943 (See Annex I).
14. Our success in North Africa opens up wide possibilities of
offensive operations against the Southern flank of the Axis. In
particular we may be able to detach Italy from the Axis and induce
Turkey to join the Allies. If we force Italy out of the war and the
Germans try to maintain their line in Russia at its present length,
we estimate that they will be some 54 divisions and 2,200 aircraft
short of what they need on all fronts. If the defection of Italy
were followed
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by that of
other satellite powers, these deficiencies would be still larger.
(See Annex 2)
15. While we follow this policy of bombing and amphibious operations
in the Mediterranean our surplus resources can be devoted to the
build-up of Anglo-American forces in the United Kingdom to take
advantage of any deterioration in German military power. Any
decision to re-enter the Continent would have to allow 3 months for
the collection of landing craft and other preparations. We estimate
that under favorable conditions a force of 12 British and 6 United
States divisions could be made available in the United Kingdom by
September with a further 3 United States divisions collecting in the
United Kingdom. (See Annex 3)
16. The effects of devoting our main effort initially to this
undermining of German military power will be:—
On the Axis
(a) We can substantially increase the
weight of the bomber offensive.
(b) By amphibious operations in the
Mediterranean aimed at bringing about the collapse of Italy
we can give the maximum relief to Russia, wear out the
German Air Force and ultimately threaten Axis economic
resources in the Balkans.
(c) The build-up of forces in the
United Kingdom, though below the maximum rate, would still
be sufficient to pin down substantial German Forces in
Northwest Europe, and would permit us to take advantage in
the autumn of a pronounced decline in German fighting
power.
On Russia
(d) During the period of amphibious
operations in the Mediterranean convoys to North Russia will
be limited to the extent that the United States can provide
escort vessels.
On Turkey
(e) We should have forces available in
the Mediterranean which we could use to support Turkey.
Turkey is more likely to come into the war on our side if we
succeed in eliminating Italy—as we hope to do during 1943.
With Turkey on our side we should be well placed for
offensive action against the Balkans.
On Spain
(f) Germany will have no forces to
spare to invade Spain. Spain is less likely to yield to
German pressure if we keep the German Forces fully extended
by a vigorous offensive in the Mediterranean.
Conclusion
17. Our proposals for the conduct of the war throughout 1943 are
these:
- (a)
- The defeat of the U–boat menace to remain a first charge
on our resources.
- (b)
- The expansion of the Anglo-American bomber offensive
against Germany and Italy.
- (c)
- The exploitation of our position in the Mediterranean with
a view to—
- (1)
- knocking Italy out of the war,
- (2)
- bringing Turkey into the war, and
- (3)
- giving the Axis no respite for
recuperation.
- (d)
- The maintance of supplies to Russia.
- (e)
- Limited offensive operations in the Pacific on a scale
sufficient only to contain the bulk of Japanese Forces in
that area.
- (f)
- Operations to reopen the Burma Road to be undertaken as
soon as resources permit.
- (g)
- Subject to the claims of the above, the greatest possible
concentration of forces in the United Kingdom with a view to
re-entry on to the Continent in August or September 1943
should conditions hold out a good prospect of success, or
anyhow a “Sledgehammer” to wear down the enemy Air
Forces.
Annex I
The Bomber Offensive
- 1.
- The aim of the bomber offensive is the progressive
destruction and dislocation of the enemy’s war industrial
and economic system, and the undermining of his morale to a
point where his capacity for armed resistance is fatally
weakened.
- 2.
- In estimating the prospective results of the air offensive
it is important not to be misled by the limited results
attained in the past 2½ years. Bombing methods and technique
have been passing through a phase of rapid development, new
navigational aids and other ancillary equipment which should
bring about a great advance in bombing accuracy are being
introduced, the training of air crews has been improved, and
better tactical methods, showing great promise, have been
devised.3
- 3.
- As a result, the British Bomber Force will attain far
higher standards of efficiency and accuracy in night bombing
in the future than have been possible in the past. We have
gained a lead over the German defenses, and we do not
believe that they will be able to develop countermeasures
sufficient to offset our advantage.
- 4.
- In spite of the progress made during recent months by the
United States Bomber Command in the bombing of targets in
occupied territory, it is still an open question whether
regular penetration of the defenses of Germany by daylight
will be practicable without prohibitive losses. While every
effort should continue to be made to achieve success by day,
it is important to arrange that, if the daylight bombing
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of Germany proves
impracticable, it will be possible to convert the United
States Bomber Command from a primarily day to a primarily
night force with the least possible delay and loss of
efficiency.
- 5.
- The result attained with a given bombing effort does not
vary directly with the scale of that effort, but tends to
become progressively more fruitful as the effort increases.
Moreover experience shows that, as the bombing effort mounts
above a certain level the defenses become saturated and the
aircraft casualty rate is reduced.
- 6.
- While the enemy’s attention is focussed on Russia, the
Allies have the initiative in strategic bombing which is the
chief method by which they can at present inflict direct
damage on Germany and Germans. We must therefore exploit it
to the full.
- 7.
- British heavy bombers are in steadily increasing
production. In parallel, the build-up of United States heavy
bombers in the United Kingdom will increase our combined
strengths at little cost to shipping space, once the
transfer of American ground personnel has been
completed.
- 8.
- It is not claimed that the bomber offensive will at once
shatter the enemy’s morale. It is claimed that it already
has an appreciable and will have an increasing effect on the
enemy’s distributive system and industrial potential—an
effect which the German high command and German people will
fear more and more.
- 9.
- We recommend that we should aim at operating a force of
3,000 British and United States heavy and medium bombers
from the United Kingdom by the end of 1943. Without drawing
on reserve stocks, this increase in the Allied bomber force
in the United Kingdom will only involve an increase in
petrol import requirements of about 350,000 tons in 1943—a
very small proportion of total requirements.
Annex II
Plan of Action in the
Mediterranean
1. Communications prevent our maintaining large forces in
Southern Russia. It would be unwise to operate against Southern
France except in conjunction with an offensive across the
Channel, and difficult to operate in the Balkans unless either
Italy goes out of the war or Turkey comes into it. To exploit
our African successes, therefore, our plan of action will be:
- (a)
- To bring about the collapse of Italy.
- (b)
- To bring Turkey into the war.
- (c)
- To seize any chance offered by (a) or (b) to operate in
the Balkans.
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elimination of italy
Amphibious
Operations.
2. Once North Africa is cleared, it will be necessary to seize
one or other of the island bases—Sicily, Sardinia or Corsica—in
order to increase the pressure on Italy. Since we cannot capture
Corsica until we have Sardinia, the initial choice will lie
between Sicily and Sardinia.
3. Plans for both these operations are already being prepared and
should be pressed forward as a matter of urgency. We do not,
however, feel able at this stage to express a definite opinion
as to which of the two alternatives should be chosen.
The Bombing of Italy.
4. The bomber offensive which is at present being conducted by
Bomber Command against Northern Italy is already creating panic
and dislocation. As the situation in North Africa clears,
complementary bombing offensives should be developed from the
south, mainly against targets in Central and Southern Italy. The
proposed plan is:
- (a)
- The heavy bombers of Bomber Command based in the
United Kingdom will usually operate against targets in
Northern Italy when weather permits.
- (b)
- The heavy and medium bomber squadrons at present in
the Middle East will concentrate against targets in
Southern Italy from bases in the Benghazi Area, using
Malta as an advance base.
- (c)
- The United States Bomber Groups in North Africa which
will be available for the attack on targets in Italy may
be supplemented by Wellington squadrons of Bomber Command
detached periodically to North Africa to the extent
which airfield capacity and maintenance facilities will
allow. All important Italian towns will then have been
brought within the range of effective attack.
Political Warfare
Campaign.
5. We should as yet make no promises to the Italian people, but
we should warn them of what is in store, concentrate blame for
Italian sufferings upon Mussolini and the Fascist regime and
continuously remind them that their salvation lies entirely in
their own hands.
6. We should exploit to the full the existing internal and
international dissensions in Bulgaria, Roumania and Hungary,
with a view to inducing these countries to recall their forces
from Russia and occupied territories.
Raids on the Italian Coast and
Coastal Shipping.
7. “Commando” raids and harassing attacks by sea and air against
the Italian coast and shipping would produce military results
out of proportion to the effort involved. Later, from bases in
Sardinia, Corsica or Sicily, we should be able to carry out
large and sustained raids against Italian ports and cities.
[Page 749]
Diversions in the Eastern
Mediterranean.
8. When we are in occupation of the whole North African Coast, we
shall be well placed for developing threats and deception plans
in any quarter—for example, simultaneously with operations in
the Central Mediterranean, we could build up a large deception
plan against Crete and the Dodecanese.
Increased Subversive
Activities in the Balkans, Corsica and Italy.
9. We must give increased assistance to the insurgents in
Yugoslavia and stimulate sabotage in Greece, since in both
countries the garrisons are largely Italian. By sabotage in
Italy and subversive activities in Corsica we shall add to the
burden of the Italians.
The Collapse and
After.
10. It is not beyond hope that the cumulative effect of the above
measures, if pressed forward with vigor and determination, and
especially if accompanied by assaults on the mainland, will
result in the collapse of Italy, possibly at an early stage in
our operations. The garrison of the Balkans is mainly Italian.
Germany will be unable to undertake the two new commitments of
garrisoning both the Balkans and an Italy in a state of
collapse, without devastating results on the Russian Front. She
must choose one or the other.
11. If the Italian collapse results in a request for an
armistice, which will mean that Germany has decided to withdraw
from Italy, we should welcome the proposal, provided that:
- (a)
- Italy lays down her arms everywhere.
- (b)
- She grants the limited facilities which we shall
require in Sardinia, Sicily, the Dodecanese and in
certain areas of Italy, for the further prosecution of
the offensive against Germany, particularly in the
Balkans.
12. We should not assume any obligation for the defense and full
occupation of Italy since:
- (a)
- It would entail a considerable liability for internal
security.
- (b)
- We should encounter insuperable difficulties in
conducting operations against the Germans established in
a strong, natural defensive position in the Alps, to
which their communications would be short, easy and by
land—in contrast to ours.
turkey
13. Our motives in inducing Turkey to join us in the war would
be:
- (a)
- To use Turkey as a base for air attacks on important
objectives, such as the Roumanian oilfields and Black
Sea communications.
- (b)
- To close the Dardanelles to the Axis and open them to
the United Nations.
- (c)
- To force an increased dispersal of German Forces by
using Turkey as a base for potential threats in the
Balkans and South Russia.
- (d)
- To deny Turkish chrome to Germany. We should not want
Turkey to embark on major land operations in the
Balkans, with or without Allied help.
14. A prime factor influencing Turkey’s entry into the war will
be her fear that by staying out she will be penalized at the
Peace Conference in favor of the Russians. British and United
States diplomatic action should be concerted to exploit this
anxiety to the full in the hope of accelerating a Turkish
decision to join the Allies. Turkey will not come into the war
until she feels reasonably sure of her own security. She will
become increasingly reassured as we develop our operations
against Italy, as the Germans become more stretched on all
fronts and as the Balkans become more restive. From the Turkish
point of view a sufficient degree of security may be achieved
considerably before the end of the war.
Staff Talks.
15. In the meantime the opening of semi-official staff talks is a
practical step which we can take. Such talks are being initiated
by His Majesty’s Ambassador and will be kept informal for the
present. Although these will deal initially with Turkish
dispositions and British air assistance under existing defensive plans, they should be extended
as soon as possible to cover offensive
operations based on Turkey, and the use of Turkey as a base for
staging threats to the Axis. The transportation and port
facilities which we should require, the provision of coal for
the Turkish railways, and the provision of wheat for Turkey
herself should also be considered.
Supply of Material and
Financial Assistance.
16. We should adhere to our program of financial assistance and
credits and continue to supply Turkey with materials and
equipment, though these will not in
themselves cause Turkey to abandon her neutrality. The
extent of this supply must suffice at least to ensure the
benevolent neutrality of Turkey so that she limits and obstructs
her export of chrome to Germany. Beyond this, further supply
should depend on the progress of the staff talks. Serious
shortcomings in the Turkish clearance capacity will, in any
case, limit the volume of materials and equipment which can be
sent into the country.
Military Cooperation.
17. The details of Allied-Turkish military cooperation must be
settled at the Staff Talks. The general form of this cooperation
might be British naval control of Eastern Mediterranean and
Aegean Sea communications, while the Black Sea might be a
Russian responsibility. We might provide air forces for defense
of Istanbul and Ankara. On the army side we should be prepared
to make full use of the potentially first-class infantry of
which the Turkish Army is
[Page 751]
mainly composed, and limit the provision
of military forces to armored and specialist troops. We could
thus form a balanced army for defense or offensive purposes.
action in the balkans after
the collapse of italy
18. In the event of an Italian collapse, our further action in
the Mediterranean will be influenced by Germany’s concentration
and distribution of her forces and by the attitude of Turkey.
Action in the Balkans might result in the following benefits:
- (a)
- We should obtain bases for air attack on Roumanian
oilfields and refineries, and for fanning the already
glowing embers of revolt in the Balkans.
- (b)
- We should (i) be able to
interrupt the Danube supply route to Germany, (ii) create a threat to the German
southern lines of communication to South Russia, (iii) cut Axis sea communications
between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea.
- (c)
- The raw materials of the Balkans (particularly oil,
chrome and copper) are vitally important to the Axis.
The loss of chrome and copper, together with the cutting
of Axis sea communications in the Aegean, on which the
Axis supply of chrome from Turkey largely depends, would
deprive Germany of almost all her sources of these
indispensable products.
Plan of Action.
19. Our plan of action for developing our effort against the
Balkans might be
- (a)
- Intensification of subversive activity in the Balkans,
and supply of arms and equipment to the Patriot forces
in Greece, Yugoslavia and Albania, and
- (b)
- When the time is ripe, the despatch of Allied land and
air forces to act as a rallying point for offensive
action of insurgent forces in this area.
Annex III
Cross-Channel
Operations
- 1.
- We intend to return to the Continent the moment the time
is ripe.
- 2.
- Subject to the prior claims of the Mediterranean, and of
the bomber offensive, therefore, our policy should be to
assemble the maximum British and United States forces in the
United Kingdom for invasion of the Continent in the event of
a sudden crack in German military power.
- 3.
- For example, it is possible that continued pressure on the
Russian Front, the bombing offensive from the United Kingdom
and offensives in the Mediterranean might combine seriously
to weaken Germany and to bring Italy to surrender during the
summer. It might then be justifiable to forego further
offensives in the Mediterranean and to concentrate rapidly
for a Cross-Channel operation. If the
[Page 752]
decision were taken at the end
of May, we calculate that Allied shipping resources might
allow us to have in the United Kingdom ready for an invasion
of the Continent on the 15th of September some 12 British
and Canadian divisions, 6 United States divisions, with a
further 3 collecting in the United Kingdom. There would be
enough air forces to support the operation. Out of these 18
divisions we estimate that we shall be able to launch an
assault of about 5 divisions, 3 British and 2 United
States.
- 4.
- In addition to providing the maximum possible force for
our ultimate return to the Continent when Germany has been
effectively weakened, the gradual build-up of forces in the
United Kingdom will meanwhile play an important part in
containing German forces in France and the Low Countries.
The assault forces available should, moreover, allow this
containing effect to be intensified by raids.
- 5.
- Our re-entry to the Continent during 1943 will be
impracticable at less than three months’ notice, owing to
the necessity of bringing home landing craft from the
Mediterranean. Owing to the difficulty of carrying out
Cross-Channel operations during the six months October to
April this delay may be increased by anything up to nine
months.
- 6.
- The deterioration of German power, when it does come, is
likely to be rapid. If, therefore, in the summer of 1943
German strength is considered likely to fail during the
forthcoming winter, it may be advantageous to secure a
foothold on the Continent in the late Autumn—for example, in
the Cherbourg Peninsula—in order that we may be ready to
exploit any German weakening during the winter.
- 7.
- Our preparations for a re-entry onto the Continent to stay
should, therefore, include plans for:
- (a)
- Establishing a permanent foothold in Autumn 1943,
and
- (b)
- A re-entry of the Continent at any time with the
maximum forces available, in the event of a
pronounced deterioration in the fighting power of
the German armed forces generally—this operation to
be at three months’ notice.
