[Enclosure]
Washington,
December 20,
1941.
Memorandum for the
President:
a suggested analysis of the basic
topics and their attendant problems
I
The North Atlantic
Our joint war plans have recognized the North Atlantic as our
principal theatre of operations should America become involved in
the war. Therefore it should now be given primary consideration and
carefully reviewed in order to see whether our position there is
safe. Its safety must underlie all our other efforts in the war.
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I suggest the following topics:
A. The safety of the British
Isles
- 1.
- Have the beach defenses been improved?
- 2.
- What is the condition of the mobile forces defending the
Isles?
- 3.
- Should America land any major forces other than air forces in
the British Isles?
Should not American forces take over the defense of Ireland,
releasing the present British forces in North Ireland?
It is assumed that air forces are to go into the Isles.
B. The situation of Iceland and
Greenland2
1. The possibility of the reenforcement of the American garrison in
the light of further calls upon American shipping by any of the
possible expeditions mentioned below.
C. American Navy in the North
Atlantic
- 1.
- Is it sufficient in size in view of the following
possibilities:
- a.
- A violent renewal of submarine activity which is quite
possible during the long winter nights.
- b.
- The demand for naval support for an American
expeditionary force either to the Cape Verdes and Dakar,
the Azores and Natal.3
- c.
- Possible losses to the British naval forces in the
Mediterranean or the Atlantic.
- 2.
- Should the Atlantic fleet be depleted under any circumstances
in order to strengthen the Pacific fleet?
II
American Efforts in Other Theatres
of the War—Their Importance and Their Order of Priority
This seems to me the most difficult and important problem of the
conference. American efforts are now being either made or suggested
in at least four different possible theatres of operation. They may
be called for in others. They are being made or suggested in the
following areas:
- a.
- In the southwestern Pacific theatre.
- b.
- In the western African theatre including the Cape Verdes
and Azores.3
- c.
- In the Syria and Iran theatre.
- d.
- In the Egypt and Libya theatre.
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They might be forced on us in Natal where the
situation at the present moment is perilous, threatening our air
communication with the Far East.4
I have arranged them in what I consider their present apparent order
of priority although I am supporting it suggestively rather than
dogmatically:
1. The Southwestern Pacific
- a.
- This is of first importance because it has been forced
upon us by a new combatant power which is challenging our
entire position in the Pacific and our troops are already
fighting desperately to carry out our legal and moral
obligation to protect the Philippines.
- b.
- It is also of vital importance:
- (1)
- To assist the British in defending Singapore, the
fall of which would be an almost vital blow to the
British Empire as well as to our own future
commercial interests in the Pacific.
- (2)
- To protect the Netherland East Indies and their
sources of oil from falling into the hands of the
Japanese and thus aiding Japan in her contest for
the control of the Pacific against us.
- (3)
- For protecting the great dominions of Australia
and New Zealand from domination by Japan.
- (4)
- To encourage and keep China fighting—who has and
is still carrying the main effort of holding Japan
in check.
- (5)
- To encourage Russia in staying in the war against
the Axis powers.
2. The West African theatre
This theatre is vital to us in two respects:
- a.
- To protect our line of communications and supplies, both
air and sea, with the British activities in Egypt; with the
supply of Russia through the Persian Gulf; with the
activities in the Far Eastern theatre through Australia and
Singapore on the south and through China on the
north.
- b.
- It is vital as a means of preventing Germany from reaching
Dakar from which she would both block the trade route around
Cape Horn and also threaten the South American
continent.
These two reasons seem to me more vital to the
interests of this country than anything we can do in the areas of
the Mediterranean and the Middle East.
The method of our operations in this West African area, in which I
include operations against the Cape Verdes and the Azores, are
directly a question for our military advisers. Personally I regard
any expedition to the Azores as strategically less important than a
strong effort against the Cape Verdes and Dakar.
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3. The area of Syria and Iran
I think this area is strategically, and in view of the ultimate
winning of the war, more important than the Egyptian area because it
furnishes our safest route for help to Russia. Thus far our
activities consist solely in the improvement of the base and the
furnishing of supplies. There is no prospect apparent to me of
combat efforts.
4. The Egyptian area
While this area is of immense importance psychologically to the
British Empire and perhaps strategically as a possible though
unfavorable front for an attack on Hitler in Europe, it seems to me
of the least important to us as a combat area. We should of course
continue our supplies to the British. In my opinion we should not
divert armed forces to that area which could by any possibility be
necessary for use in the Far Eastern area, in Ireland, or in the
West African area.
III
The essential problems of America in the areas which I have described
in the foregoing portions of this memorandum can be in summary
described as follows:
- First: The preservation of our
communications across the North Atlantic with our fortress
in the British Isles5 covering the British fleet.
- Second: The protection of our
communications with the Near and Far East by air via Brazil
and Africa and by water around the Cape of Good Hope.
- Third: The building up as rapidly
as possible of air and sea communications in the Pacific
with Australia.
Underlying all of these objectives is the immediate necessity of
protecting the vital naval and air industrial establishments on the
west and east coasts of the United States.
