Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

149. Memorandum of Discussion at the 444th Meeting of the National Security Council⁰

Washington, May 9, 1960.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1.]

2. Preparation for the Summit Meeting

Mr. Gray said that Mr. Merchant would make an oral report on preparations for the Summit Meeting.

Mr. Merchant said the Secretary of State and his party attended a meeting of CENTO in Teheran before going to the NATO meetings in Istanbul. The CENTO representatives were quite interested in the Summit Meeting, particularly in the briefings on that meeting given by Mr. Herter and Mr. Lloyd. The CENTO representatives gave their full support to the position of the Western participants in the Summit Meeting and expressed satisfaction at the extent to which they had been taken into the confidence of the West. Both in the CENTO meetings and in the NATO meetings, Mr. Herter gave rather full exposition of U.S. space activities and developments. As a result of this exposition, Mr. Herter’s listeners sat open-mouthed; apparently they had little realization of the fact that the USSR is not far ahead of the U.S. in space activities.

Mr. Merchant reported that the Secretary of State and his party reached Istanbul for the NATO meeting in a tense atmosphere. Istanbul was a dead city since a total curfew was in effect. The situation, however, appeared to be under control. The Sunday before the opening of the NATO meeting had been devoted to meetings concerned with preparations for the Summit. In the morning U.S. officials met with U.K., French, and German officials.¹ In the afternoon the five Western foreign ministers of the countries represented on the Western side of the Disarmament Conference met to review the state of disarmament and the possible course of disarmament discussions at the Summit.² It was agreed at this meeting that the efforts of the USSR to pin the West down to general principles on disarmament—which Mr. Merchant preferred to call meaningless generalities—should be resisted. An effort will be made by the West to have the Summit Meeting direct the Disarmament Conference to address itself to practical disarmament measures. Further work among the Western representatives will be required just before the Summit Meeting, since some difference of opinion exists on the extent to which control of delivery vehicles for nuclear warheads should be emphasized in a disarmament settlement. The French have raised the idea of controlling such delivery vehicles but Mr. Herter, despite his best efforts, was unable to extract from the French exactly what they have in mind. If control over such delivery vehicles is to be discussed at the Summit, some refinement of the problem will have to be developed this week. Mr. Merchant then reported that representatives of the U.S., the U.K. and France met the Sunday evening before the NATO meetings began, on tactics and procedures related to the Summit Meeting.³

Turning to the NATO Meeting itself, Mr. Merchant said that most of the sessions were devoted to reports by the Western foreign ministers on preparations for the Summit. Mr. Selwyn Lloyd led the discussion on disarmament along the lines which Mr. Merchant had just described. The NATO Council completely endorsed the general approach to disarmament favored by the West; that is, the inauguration of specific disarmament measures on which progress might be made and the avoidance of the semantics of general principles. Some of the NATO foreign ministers questioned the wisdom of the French proposal regarding the control of delivery vehicles as a substitute for a cut-off of the production of fissionable material. An unexpected dividend of the disarmament discussion in the NATO Council was a statement by Mr. Flange of Norway strongly endorsing the view that the peace of the world depends on the effectiveness of U.S. deterrent power.

Mr. Merchant said he would, at this point, like to interrupt his narrative for a moment to speak of the nuclear testing problem. There had been no discussion either in the CENTO or NATO meetings of nuclear testing except for a brief report by Secretary Herter and side conversations between Mr. Lloyd and Mr. Herter in which it was agreed that it would be wise to defer substantive discussion with Khrushchev on nuclear testing until late in the course of the Summit Meeting. Khrushchev’s interest in nuclear testing appears to be genuine; therefore, it seems desirable that the West not discuss this matter too early. The French, who are not taking part in the nuclear testing conference, say that any Paris discussions on this subject should be held outside French premises.

Returning to the NATO Council meeting in Istanbul, Mr. Merchant said that Secretary Herter had briefed the Council on the problem of Germany and Berlin. We expected that the USSR would open its campaign regarding Germany by proposing that separate peace treaties be concluded with East Germany and with West Germany. The West would counter this move by re-introducing the Western peace plan for the unification of Germany which had been advanced during the Geneva Conference last summer. The USSR was almost certain to reject the Western peace plan, whereupon we would table a plebiscite proposal under which the UN would conduct a plebiscite in East Germany, West Germany, and Berlin, asking whether the people of these areas preferred a peace treaty with the unified Germany or with separate Germanies. Mr. Merchant anticipated that the Summit Meeting would engage in considerable skirmishing regarding Germany and would eventually discuss Berlin as a somewhat separate problem. The three Western foreign ministers and the West German Government are agreed on tactics regarding Berlin. It is felt that the short duration of the Summit Conference will make impossible detailed negotiations regarding that city, so that the likely outcome is a directive by the Summit Meeting to a lower level working group to continue the Berlin discussions. In general, the Western Powers appear willing to accept the 1959 Geneva proposal for an interim agreement on Berlin, with its essential point that the Western rights of access to Berlin shall remain unimpaired. No Western government wishes to tamper with Western rights of access.

Mr. Merchant said that a third Summit subject reported upon to the NATO Council concerned East-West relations. Several tripartite working groups had prepared reports for the Western foreign ministers but these reports did not contain very many proposals holding out promise for successful negotiation at the Summit. Some of the French proposals on East-West relations turned out to be troublesome for the U.S. and the U.K.; a final decision on these proposals will await the President’s meeting with De Gaulle and Macmillan next Sunday. The French are proposing some form of East-West economic cooperation in under-developed areas, a proposal which has obvious unacceptable aspects. If De Gaulle continues to push forward this proposal, we may suggest that a logical way for the Soviets to contribute to under-developed areas would be for them to increase their contribution to UN organizations dealing with such areas. The French have also suggested an agreement on limiting the shipment of armaments to sensitive areas. This suggestion also has obvious dangers from the standpoint of U.S. policy. The U.S. and U.K. might have no objection to a general discussion at the Summit of the limitation of arms shipments to sensitive areas, but would not wish to conclude an agreement with the Soviets which would prevent the shipment of arms to such countries in the Middle East as Turkey and Iran. The French have also suggested that the Summit meeting might issue a declaration of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. The U.S. has no particular liking for a declaration of this kind because the Sino-Soviet Bloc gives such an entirely different interpretation to the term “non-interference”. Mr. Merchant said that other aspects of the East-West relations problem such as cultural exchanges, radio jamming, exchange of publications and East-West trade were, in the opinion of the U.S., subjects for bilateral negotiation rather than for Summit discussion. It was generally expected that the Soviets at the Summit would insist upon measures to lessen discrimination against Soviet trade and would seek long-term trade credits. Concluding his remarks on the East-West relations problems, Mr. Merchant said the general temper of the NATO Council had been in the direction of strongly supporting U.S.–U.K. views rather than the French proposals.

Mr. Merchant reported that the NATO Council had evinced definite satisfaction at the extent to which consultation between the U.S., the U.K., and France on the one hand and the other NATO governments on the other hand took place during the period preparatory to the Summit Meeting. The NATO Council, in general, supported our positions and requested that consultation be continued. Mr. Spaak had performed very ably in the NATO meeting. No discordant notes had been produced by the meeting. Mr. Merchant felt the final communiqué of the NATO Council meeting⁴ had created a phrase which was capable of considerable exploitation, i.e., “detente, like peace, is indivisible.” The communiqué also pointed out the anomaly of Soviet action in professing peace and simultaneously attacking the German Government and putting pressure on Greece and Iran.

Mr. Merchant said the NATO Council showed considerable enthusiasm for the ten year plan project proposed by Secretary Herter last December. In the future the NATO Council would be devoting a great deal of time to this project, which has given NATO a sense of continuity.

Mr. Merchant noted that Paris will shortly be the scene of meetings of a Four-Power Working Group on Berlin and Germany, a Five-Power Working Party on Disarmament, a Three-Power Working Party on recommendations as to tactics, and a meeting of the three Western heads of government on Sunday—all prior to the Summit Meeting. In conclusion Mr. Merchant said the alliance was solidly behind U.S. objectives and was not apprehensive as to the results of the Summit Conference.

The President said he wished to bring up a specific question which had been disturbing him; that is, the readiness of the West Germans to extend a credit of $1 billion to the Russians. If it were true that the Germans intended to extend such a credit, he was quite shocked. Mr. Merchant said he was not in possession of any information which would verify this rumor. The President wondered why the West Germans would think of offering such a line of credit to the Russians in the light of Soviet attacks on West Germany. Mr. Merchant said the source from which the information about this credit came was inclined to exaggerate. In any event, whatever credit the West Germans offered to the USSR would be commercial, not government, credit and would probably be only a fraction of $1 billion.

The President concluded discussion of this item by remarking that the Summit Meeting would not be a Sunday School picnic.

The National Security Council:⁵

Noted and discussed an oral report on the subject by the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.

[Here follow agenda items 3 and 4.]

Marion W. Boggs

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Boggs on May 13.
1. See Documents 140 and 141.
2. See Document 142.
3. A memorandum of the conversation among Kohler, Lucet, and Rumbold on May 1, (US/MC/1) is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1650.
4. For text of the final communiqué, May 4, see Department of State Bulletin, May 23, 1960, p. 840.
5. The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 2232, approved by the President on May 13. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)